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ABSTRACT

ESSAYS IN MARKETING, LAW, AND ETHICS
Suneal Bedi
David Reibstein

This dissertation focuses on employing both empirical and normative
methodologies to answer questions at the intersection of marketing, law, and
ethics. The first chapter focuses on how federal and state statutes deal with
trademark dilution. Using traditional branding theory and consumer psychology
methods, I argue that federal law is misguided and must be re-formulated. The
second chapter seeks to better understand the implications of brands publicly
taking political and social stands. In particular, it argues that consumer boycotts
in response to these brands serve an important role in the marketplace of ideas
and it provides a research agenda for marketers to better understand these socalled consumer boycotts. The third and final chapter seeks to criticize the
common marketing practice of catering to consumer preferences. Marketers are
often pre-occupied with these preferences and therefore prioritize them even if
they create cultural harms. This harm often accrues to those who are not the
target demographic of the marketing strategy. As such, paradoxically, marketers
should seek to be critical of consumer preferences in some contexts.
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PREFACE

This dissertation represents my work in both the Legal Studies & Business Ethics
department and Marketing department at The Wharton School at the University
of Pennsylvania. Over the past five years I have worked to develop both
normative analytical and empirical methodological skills to analyze issues at the
intersection of marketing, law, and ethics. The three articles in this dissertation
use a multi-method approach to contribute to business scholarship. My goal is
that this work pushes forward interdisciplinary thinking in business schools and
cross collaboration on important issues concerning society and the marketplace.
These three essays seek to contribute to two prevalent areas of marketing
research. First, marketing scholarship has long understood the importance of
brands. Scholarship in branding has answered questions like “How do
consumers utilize brands in decision making processes?” (Keller 1993; Escalas &
Bettman 2003; Erdem et al 2006), “How should we manage a company’s brand?”
(Reibstein et al 1995/1998; Aaker 1996), “How should we value a company’s
brand?” (Srinivasan & Park 1994; Simon & Sullivan 2003), “How does a strong
brand insulate a company from economic shocks?” (Johansson 2012; Keller
2003), “How does a brand contribute to a consumer’s social identity? (Reed et al
2012; Reed 2002; Elliott & Wattanasuwan 1998). I seek to expand on this work
by analyzing how the law protects brands. In the first chapter of my dissertation
titled “Measuring Trademark Dilution by Tarnishment” I criticize how federal and
vii

state laws have crafted legislation that protects a company’s trademark
(synonymous with brand in the legal context). In particular, I argue that trademark
dilution (i.e. harm to an existing brand) laws do not adequately represent the
empirical realties of the marketplace. While current law creates a presumption
that dilution occurs when a trademark is co-opted, I show that this presumption is
misguided. Instead, using branding theory and marketing methodology, I show
that dilution only occurs under a narrow set of conditions. Courts would do better
at policing trademark dilution lawsuits if they both required evidence of harm and
paid head to the conditions under which it is likely.
In addition to legal aspects of branding, only recently has marketing scholarship
begun to explore how brands contribute to political and social issues. Brands
taking public stands on controversial political issues is a recent phenomenon that
deserves more attention. In the second chapter of my dissertation titled “To
Boycott or Not to Boycott” I analyze this recent trend of brands taking political
stands and the natural consumer response: a boycott. I argue that legal, ethical,
and marketing theories have encouraged brands to take on political viewpoints.
As such, consumer boycotts serve an important role in the marketplace of ideas.
Rather than worry about boycotts, brands should recognize that they are part a
parcel of the decision to take part in the political process. The chapter ends with
a research agenda laying out empirical avenues for marketers to better
understand how and why brands participate in political speech and why in
response consumers boycott.
viii

Second, marketing scholarship has always emphasized the importance of
consumer preferences (Allenby & Rossi 1998; Yang & Allenby 2003). To be sure,
being a good marketer often means creating products and services that are
tailored to consumer preferences (Lehmann et al 1998). Methods and theories of
how these products should be designed (Green and Srinivasan 1990; Green et al
2001), what distribution channels they should occupy (Stone et al 2002; Chu,
Chintaguna, & Vilcassim 2007), how they should be priced (Dobson & Kalish
1993: Iyengar, Jedidi, and Kohli 2008), and how they should target certain
demographics (Smith 1956; Dallmann 2001) are part and parcel of marketing
scholarship. However, little work has questioned this longstanding mantra of
catering to consumer preferences. In the final chapter of my dissertation titled,
“Marketing’s Ethical Blindspot: Catering to Consumer Preferences,” I argue that
too much emphasis has been placed on consumer preferences. Blindly catering
to preferences can cause various forms of harm—in particular, cultural
imperialism, a form of group harm that originally arises out of the critical political
theory literature. This final chapter seeks to bring a unique ethical prospective on
otherwise seemingly noncontroversial marketing practices. I argue that much of
this harm accrues to those consumers who are not necessarily even targeted by
marketing strategies. Instead, a kind of negative externality arises when
marketers preoccupy themselves with consumers’ preferences. The chapter
ends with prescriptive guidance on how marketing can still be effective but
accountable to the potential of group harms.

ix

Ultimately, I hope that these essays speak to legal scholars, ethicists, and
marketers and help bridge the methodological and theoretical divides among
these disciplines.
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CHAPTER 1: Measuring Trademark Dilution by Tarnishment
Introduction
Does having your trademark associated with sex harm your brand? What about
disgust? Or low quality products? The answer to these questions is at the core of
trademark tarnishment. Trademark tarnishment, a form of trademark dilution, is a
hotly debated federal and state cause of action in intellectual property law.1 The
basic definition is deceptively simple. Trademark tarnishment occurs when a
junior mark harms the reputation of a substantially similar existing senior
trademark by associating itself with something perverse or deviant, even if
consumers know that the two marks come from different sources.2

1 See e.g., Jacoby, Jacob, Considering the Who, What, When, Where and How of Measuring
Dilution, 24 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 601 (2007) (arguing that dilution can be measured with
survey methodology); Tushnet, Rebecca, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and
Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507–568 (2008) (arguing that current marketing scholarship
on dilution is misguided because it does not take into consideration contextual decision making);
Beebe et al., Is Trademark Dilution a Unicorn? An Experimental Investigation (forthcoming)
(arguing that previous measurements of dilution were misguided because they did not take into
consideration contextual decision making and effects on consumers of unexpected trademark
names); Lee, Thomas R., Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2004) (laying out various
theories of when and what extent of dilution should count as legally actionable); Diamond, Shari
and Franklyn, David, Trademark Surveys: An Undulated Path, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 2029, (2014)
(providing a deep background on how surveys are used in trademark cases by plaintiffs).
2

15 U.S.C. § 1125 (c)(1) and (c)(2)(c) provide that “regardless of the presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury . . . ‘dilution by tarnishment’
is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
harms the reputation of the famous mark.” Note that the statute has several exceptions that
implicate First Amendment concerns such as parody, news reporting and competitive advertising.
We make sure to steer clear of any tarnishing marks that would potentially raise First Amendment
concerns.

1

For example, assume an adult store is going to name itself “Chicks Fill A.” This
store is associated with sex, adult products, pornographic materials, perversion,
anti-conservative values, and even disgust. Chick-fil-A, the restaurant, then sues
Chicks Fill A for trademark tarnishment, asking for an injunction on the use of the
name. Its theory being that Chick-fil-A prides itself on its conservative and
Christian values and tasty food. And even though consumers know that Chicks
Fill A and Chick-fil-A are not owned by the same company, the perversion and
sex associated with Chicks Fill A will harm the reputation of Chick-fil-A. Currently,
federal law and related legal principles are simply ill-equipped to adequately
analyze such trademark tarnishment cases.
Legal and empirical scholars disagree as to when and whether trademark
tarnishment even exists.3 Moreover, Congress and courts disagree as to the
prima facie evidence necessary to prove its existence.4 This is all compounded

3

Some argue that dilution by tarnishment can be measured and does likely exist. See Jacoby,
supra note 3. These scholars advocate for empirical studies to help tease out when and why
trademark tarnishment exists, while others have been adamant in arguing that both empirical
studies measuring tarnishment are flawed and that tarnishment does not actually exist. See
Tushnet, supra note 3, Christine Haight Farley, Trademark Dilution Law: A Remedy in Search of
a Harm, 16 FORDHAM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL,101 (2006)
(arguing that tarnishment does not exist in the marketplace and there is no evidence to show that
tarnishment would exist). These scholars mainly criticize the methodology of empirical scholars
but also argue that the realities of trademark tarnishment cannot be studied as they are too
complex. See Christopher Buccafusco, Paul Head, and Ben Wu, Testing Tarnishment in
Trademark and Copyright Law: The Effect of Pornographic Versions of Protected Marks and
Works, 94 W ASH. U. LAW REV. 341 (2017) (finding no statistically significant empirical proof of
trademark tarnishment); see also Beebe et al., supra note 3 (arguing that dilution by blurring
studies are flawed and hence do not adequately show dilution).
4

The Supreme Court advocates for a showing of actual harm which would entail Chick-Fil-A
having to wait until Chicks Fill A launched their store; federal law advocates for a likelihood of
harm but provides no guidance on how Chick-Fil-A would utilize such a standard, and subsequent
interpretation of federal law advocates for a presumptive harm which would mean Chick-Fil-A
need not produce any evidence of purported or potential harm to succeed in getting an injunction.

2

by the fact that there has been no real attempt to define what “harm to
reputation” means in the trademark dilution context.
Drawing on marketing scholarship and social science methods, we provide the
first workable framework that courts can use to hear and accurately analyze
cases like the Chick-fil-A example above. We rely on experimental survey
methodology to empirically show that tarnishment can exist under certain
conditions; the main key here is quantifying the number of exposures to the
harmful mark. Our interdisciplinary approach ultimately leads to the conclusion
that courts should require litigants to introduce evidence that shows a junior mark
is likely to harm the reputation of a senior mark.
We are the first to define exactly what a trademark’s reputation is and how to
measure harm. Drawing upon extant brand equity theory, we argue that the
reputation of a trademark should be best understood and measured as the
reputation of the brand the trademark represents. This includes brand
associations and brand attitudes. Brand associations and brand attitudes are
measurable concepts that focus on consumer perceptions of the relevant
trademarks and brands. Marketing scholars have long understood and worked
with these measures of reputation and we transplant them from the marketing
discipline to assist in the analysis of trademark dilution claims.

3

Using this exact definition of reputation and drawing upon empirical social
science methodology,5 we are the first to show that tarnishing does exist in the
marketplace. To do this we use an experimental survey framework.6 We measure
a trademark’s reputation before and the after consumers have viewed
advertisements with tarnishing trademarks. We use both real tarnishing cases as
well as fictional ones. Our studies using fictional tarnishing marks show that
companies can prove that certain junior marks have a likelihood of harming their
reputation without having to wait for signs of actual harm. This is exactly the
standard that federal law purports to adopt but does not fully explicate. We
innovate on previous empirical work by using multiple exposures of tarnishing

5

For why dilution is a distinctively empirical issue, see Peterson, Robert A., Karen H. Smith, and
Philip C. Zerrillo, “Trademark Dilution and the Practice of Marketing,” JOURNAL OF THE ACADEMY
OF MARKETING SCIENCE 27, no. 2 (1999): 255. For a general discussion of why trademark law writ
large requires empirical work, see 6 J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:158 (4th ed. 2014) (“To an extent not true in other fields of law, in
trademark and false advertising disputes the perceptions of large groups of ordinary people are
key factual issues.”); Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer Surveys in
Trademark Infringement: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1013,
1017 (2012); Jacoby, Jacob, The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary
Meaning, Acquired Distinctiveness, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution. NYU, Ctr for Law
and Business Research Paper No. 00-03; The Trademark Reporter, Vol. 91, 2001.
6

Using surveys is quite commonplace in trademark lawsuits. See e.g. Diamond supra note 3;
Jacob Jacoby; Amy H. Handlin, Non-Probability Sampling Designs for Litigation Surveys, 81
TRADEMARK REP. 169, 179 (1991).; Bird & Steckel, supra note 7, Reginald E. Caughey, The Use
of Public Polls, Surveys and Sampling as Evidence in Litigation, and Particularly Trademark and
Unfair Competition Cases, 44 CAL. L. REV. 539, 547 (1956). Surveys are routinely used in
trademark infringement cases to determine whether confusion existed and in determining how
famous a mark is. However, to our knowledge little use of surveys appear in trademark
tarnishment cases, specifically surveys drawing upon marketing branding theory as we do here.
Diamond shows that only a small percentage of surveys tackle questions of dilution and an even
smaller portion tackle tarnishment.

4

marks, increasing the external applications of our methods, and introducing
tarnishing in different forms.7
This paper is in five parts. Part one provides a brief background on the current
state of trademark dilution—specifically, trademark tarnishment. We focus on the
passing of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (“TDRA”) and its
subsequent interpretation in the Sixth Circuit. Part two defines what exactly a
trademark’s reputation is and how it can and should be measured, something
both Congress and courts have neglected to detail. Here we draw from the
marketing literature around brand reputation. Part three details our experimental
studies in which we show tarnishment does exist but is more likely to occur under
certain conditions including multiple exposures. We use various measures of
brand reputation as dependent variables including brand associations, brand
attitudes, and ranking of a brand against its competitors. We also introduce
tarnishment in various forms, including sex tarnishment, disgust tarnishment, and
low quality tarnishment. In part four we respond to criticisms that empirical proof
in trademark tarnishment cases is both expensive and unreliable. Our studies in
the paper would only account for a small percentage of litigation costs and,
moreover, companies routinely collect the information necessary for experimental
survey dilution studies. In part five we provide guidance to courts and litigants on
how to effectively execute our survey methodology.

7 We focus on sex tarnishment and the Chick-Fil-A example above because that is the
subject of most recent trademark tarnishment cases.
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Part One: A Brief History of Trademark Dilution Laws
Trademark dilution has been a long standing common law cause of action.8 Up
until 1995, most trademark dilution claims were brought under state statutes.9 In
1995, Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act which defined more
clearly trademark dilution. This Act defined trademark dilution as the “lessening
of the capacity of a famous mark to identify or distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of competition between the owner of the
famous mark and other parties, or likelihood of confusion, mistake, or
deception.”10 Although this federal law did not distinguish between types of
trademark dilution, subsequent case law articulated two ways that dilution could
occur.
The first is dilution by blurring, which focuses solely on the lessening of a
distinctiveness of a mark even when consumers are not confused as to the

8

An exhaustive list of trademark dilution by tarnishment cases is beyond the scope of this paper.
The following is a short representative list: Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema, 467
F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (applying New York General Business Law § 368-d); Jordache
Enterprises v. Hogg Wyld, 625 F. Supp. 48 (D. N.M. 1985) (applying N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3-10);
The Pillsbury Company v. Milky Way Productions, Inc. U.S. Dist. Lexis 17722 (N.D. Ga. 1981)
(applying Ga. Code Ann. § 106-115).
9

See supra note 10. Trademark dilution’s originations started with Frank Schecter’s 1927
law review article, where he argued that “the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark
should constitute the only rational basis for its protection” 40 HARV. L. REV. at 813, 831. Twenty
year later, Massachusetts was the first state that passed a trademark dilution statute: “Likelihood
of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark
shall be a ground for injunctive relief.” 1947 Mass. Acts p. 300 ch. 307. Several states then
followed and passed their own trademark dilution laws before the FDTA was enacted in 1995.
See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition Section 25.
10 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2002).
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source of the mark.11 The classic example courts have employed is Kodak
pianos. If a piano company created a brand called “Kodak Pianos,” the new
brand would likely dilute the brand of Kodak film. The theory being that over time
the mark Kodak has created an image of photography. However, that image is
lessened by the existence of Kodak pianos.12 Dilution by blurring does not
require a harming of the reputation of a mark due to some unseemly association.
That is reserved for dilution by tarnishment. This paper is not focused on dilution
by blurring, as such, the remainder of this section will only focus on dilution by
tarnishment.
Dilution by tarnishment occurs when a junior mark, that is similar13 to a senior
mark, is introduced into the marketplace and this junior mark harms the
reputation of the senior mark, even if consumers are not confused as to the
source of the goods. This occurs when the junior mark is associated with
something perverse. Courts before and after the 1995 Federal Trademark
Dilution Act routinely heard dilution by tarnishment cases. These cases have
generally have fallen into four categories: unwholesome tarnishing, low quality
tarnishing, disgust tarnishing and sex tarnishing.

11

Confusion as to the source of mark is trademark infringement, and a separate cause of
action with separate prima facie case and standards of proof. We are only focused here on
trademark dilution as distinct from trademark infringement.
12 See infra section 3 for empirical studies on trademark blurring.
13 Note that the marks need not identical but simply similar enough. Here courts often employ
different multifactor tests to determine whether two marks are sufficiently similar. In our empirical
strategy below, we use the exact same mark so as to not confound our results with
determinations of similarity.
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Unwholesome tarnishing occurs when a junior mark launches a product
associated with unwholesome ideas or thoughts which then harm the reputation
of an existing senior mark.14 Take for example Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v.
Hogg Wyld, Ltd.15 In that case Jordache jeans sued a company who made jeans
using the mark “Lardache.” Jordache argued that the term “Lardache” was not
only very similar to Jordache but also created associations of obesity (coming
from the word “Lard”). They argued that Lardache diluted their brand by creating
unwholesome associations of their jeans with obesity, something they deemed
harmful to their brand.16 Ultimately, Jordache lost this case as the court found
that Lardache was not sufficiently similar to the Jordache and hence not likely to
harm the reputation of Jordache.17 No empirical evidence was introduced by
either party to support their claims. Several other cases have contemplated
unwholesome tarnishment.18
Low quality tarnishing occurs when a junior mark launches a product associated
with low quality and this harms the reputation of an existing senior mark. The
most famous case on this point concerns the luxury retailer Louis Vuitton. Louis

14

See infra note 24 for a discussion of disgust.
F. Supp. 48 (D.N.M. 1985).
16 Id. at 55.
17 Id. at 56.
18 See Girls Scouts of the United States of America, v. Personality Posters MFG. Co., Inc. 304 F.
Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y 1969) (in which the Girl Scouts argued that a poster made by Personality
Posters that contained an image of a Girls Scout who was pregnant and the caption “be
prepared” painted their brand in an unwholesome light); Steinway & Sons v. Robert Demars &
Friends, 210 U.S.P.Q. 954 (C.D. Cal 1981) (in which Steinway claimed that a logo very similar to
theirs being used on a beer holder tarnished their mark as it created an association with alcohol).
15
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Vuitton sued a dog toy company that made a dog toy called “Chewy Vuitton.”19
They argued that since the dog toy was low quality (it was meant for a dog to
chew on and rip) that these associations would pass onto their own brand and
harm the reputation of Louis Vuitton as a luxury bag retailer.20 There, the court,
without requesting or conferring with empirical evidence, held that “Chewy
Vuitton” has no tarnishing or harmful effect on Louis Vuitton’s brand.21
Disgust tarnishing occurs when a junior mark launches a product that is
associated with bodily disgust and this harms the reputation of an existing senior
mark.22 Take for example, Chemical Corporation of America v. Anheuserbusch.23 The beer company’s slogan was “Where there is life, there is Bud,”
alluding to the Budweiser brand that the company makes. Chemical Corporation,
a company in the extermination business came up with a slogan for a special
type of floor cleaner: “Where there is life, there is bugs.” Anheuser-busch argued
that the association of the slogan with bugs would harm their brand as people
would begin to associate their beer with insects, something that would clearly be
19

Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252 (4th Cir. 2007).
Id at 264, 269.
21 Id at 269.
22 We use the following definition of disgust from psychology literature as this maps well onto
the use disgust in tarnishing cases: “A ‘revulsion at the prospect of (oral) incorporation of an
offensive sub- stance’. This is not to say that people experience disgust only toward ingestible
objects, but rather it emphasizes the strong link between objects having some form of physical
contact with their bodies and feelings of disgust. Thinking about touching or even being near
certain objects is often enough to evoke disgust.” Andrea C. Morales and Gavan J. Fitzsimons
(2007) Product Contagion: Changing Consumer Evaluations Through Physical Contact with
“Disgusting” Products. Journal of Marketing Research: May 2007, Vol. 44 (quoting Rozin, Paul
and April E. Fallon (1987), “A Perspective on Disgust,” Psycho- logical Review, 94 at p. 23);see
also Angyal, Andras (1941), “Disgust and Related Aversions,” JOURNAL OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, 36 (3), 393–412.
23 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
20
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disgusting.24 Anheuser-busch won that case on a finding that the two slogans
would confuse consumers. In holding this, the court did acknowledge, without
conferring or using empirical evidence, that the Chemical Corporation’s slogan
would harm Budweisier’s reputation.25 Several other cases have contemplated
disgust tarnishing.26
Finally, the most prevalent and often argued form of tarnishment is sex
tarnishment. This occurs when a junior mark launches a product that has
associations with sex or obscenity and these associations harm an existing
senior mark. Although, several cases exist on sex tarnishing,27 we focus here on
the most infamous, recent 2003 installment and its aftermath, Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc.28

24

Id.
Id.
26 See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 2009) (in which
Starbucks argued that a coffee name “Charbucks” would harm their reputation as a high quality
coffee because the word “char” connoted burnt coffee and the court, without consulting empirical
evidence, ruled that “charbucks” did not have the associations of low quality or disgusting coffee);
Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (in which Velveeda
argued that a website with sexual comics using the word “Velveeta” tarnished its mark as sex
associations with food were disgusting.); Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650 F. Supp. 1166 (C.D.
Cal. 1986) (in which Godiva argued that Dogiva creates associations of disgusting dog food
harming the Godiva brand); Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir.
1996) (in which Hormel argued that Jim Henson’s use of “Spa’am” in a muppet movie for an
obese disgust character would harm the reputation of the food product Spam)
25

27

See Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp. at 371-372 (in which the Dallas Cowboys
argued that a pornographic film that used a similar logo to the football team’s star logo harmed
the reputation of the cheerleaders); The Pillsbury Company v. Milky Way Productions, Inc. 1981
U.S. Dist. Lexis 17722 (Northern District of Atlanta 1981) (in which the cereal brand Rice Crispy
Treats sued Milky Way Productions because they used various characters of the cereal brand in
pornographic situations); Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9747 (S.D.N.Y
2000) (in which Mattel argued that the website “barbiesplaypen.com” that portrayed Barbie dolls
in lewd sex acts tarnished the Barbie brand).
28

537 U.S. 418 (2003)
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The Victoria Secret Case and Subsequent Developments

In 2003 Victoria Secret sued an adult sex shop called “Victor’s Little Secret” for
trademark dilution arguing that since the sex shop was selling unseemly
products, consumers would begin to associate the famous Victoria Secret
fashion mark with taboo sex toys. These transferred associations were purported
to happen even though it was agreed by both parties that consumers would not
confuse products of Victor’s Little Secret and Victoria Secret as coming from the
same company.29 Moreover, the “disposition…also [made] it apparent…that there
was no significant competition between the adversaries.”30 Stevens, writing for
the majority held that Victoria Secret could not win the lawsuit in its current form,
because there was no confusion between the marks and the company had not
introduced any empirical evidence that Victor’s Little Secret had any effect on the
reputation of Victoria Secret.31 Simple mental associations between the marks
was not proof enough to make out a successful tarnishment case.32 The Court
held that to show trademark dilution (in this case trademark tarnishment) under
the FTDA, a plaintiff must introduce empirical evidence demonstrating that the

29

Id. at 429 (“We decide the case on the assumption that the Moseleys’ use of the name
‘Victor’s Little Secret’ neither confused any consumers or potential consumers, nor was likely to
do so.”).
30 Id. at 429.
31 Id. at 433. (“[W]here the marks at issues are not identical, the mere fact that consumers
mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish
actionable dilution.”)
32 Id.
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junior mark had the purported effect on the reputation of the famous mark. The
Court held that “‘actual harm’ rather than merely a ‘likelihood’ of harm must be
shown by Victoria’s Secret in order to prevail.”33
This was the start of some clarity in the trademark tarnishment saga. The Court
had spoken, and mere rhetoric and intuition were not enough to prove or win a
trademark tarnishment lawsuit.34 But although the Court took a clear stance on
requiring empirical proof, it did not go so far as to decide what kind of empirical
proof is necessary.35 This, of course, left practitioners and scholars alike unsure
about what form of evidence should be introduced.36
The Court’s ruling in Moseley was, however, short lived. Congress, in passing
the TDRA, overturned Moseley and provided for a new set of rules for proving
dilution. The TDRA broke up dilution into two forms: blurring and tarnishment.
Blurring is defined as the “lessening of the distinctiveness of a famous mark
33 Moseley 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003). For a more extensive discussion of Victoria Secret and its
interpretation of the FDTA, see Mota, Sue, Victor's Little Secret Prevails (for Now) over Victoria's
Secret: The Supreme Court Requires Proof of Actual Dilution under the FTDA, 19 SANTA CLARA
HIGH TECH. L.J. 541 (2003).
34 “The evidence in the present record is not sufficient to support the summary judgment on
the dilution count.” Victoria Secret, 537 U.S. at 434. The Court continued in arguing that even the
one witness who tipped off Victoria Secret showed no evidence of changing his viewpoint of
Victoria Secret, only that he was reminded of Victoria Secret when seeing Victor’s Secret. Id.
35 Nowhere in the Court’s opinion did it lay out what exactly would be sufficient to show
dilution had taken place. The Court even acknowledged that “consumer surveys and other means
of demonstrating actual dilution are expensive and often unreliable.” Id. at 434. Yet, the Court still
held that “whatever difficulties of proof may be entailed, they are not an acceptable reason for
dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory violation.” Id.
36 See Bunker, Matthew et al Proving Dilution: Survey Evidence in Trademark Dilution Actions, 3
U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 37 (2004) (providing suggestions on how consumers surveys could be
used to measure dilution); Julie, M. M., Cox, A. D., & Cox, D. S. Quantifying brand image:
Empirical evidence of trademark dilution, AMERICAN BUSINESS L. J., 43(1), 1-42 (2006). (laying out
potential experimental designs for proving trademark dilution). We draw upon the advertising
exposure aspect of Magrid et al. in our studies below.
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using a similar competing mark,” while tarnishing is defined as the “reputation
harm suffered by a famous mark with the use a similar competing mark.”37 The
statute provides details on how both types of dilution are to be proven in a court.
First, a plaintiff must show that their mark is famous and has been used in the
marketplace.38 Second, a plaintiff must show that the rival mark is similar enough
to the famous mark, though it need not be confusing to consumers as to the
source of a good.39 Finally, and most importantly for this paper, a plaintiff need
only show that the rival mark has a “likelihood” of harming the famous mark. The
House Judiciary Committee Report rejected the Moseley standard arguing that it
“creat[ed] an undue burden for trademark holders who contest diluting uses and
should be reversed.” Thus “the new language [provides]…specifically that the
standard for proving a dilution claim is ‘likelihood of dilution,’” not actual dilution.40
But the question of what constitutes “likelihood of dilution”41 was still unclear.
Moseley required empirical evidence with its “actual harm” standard, and though

37

15 U.S.C. § 1127.
Id.
39 Moseley, 605 F.3d at 419 (“The FTDA’s legislative history mentions that the statute’s purpose
is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the mark’s distinctiveness or
tarnish or disparage it, even absent a likelihood of confusion.”)
38

40

Moseley, 605 F.3d at 419 (quoting U.S. Cod Cong & Amd. New, 109th Cong. 2d Sess. 2006,
Vol. 4, pp.1091, 1092, 1097).
41

We view this standard like the statutory standard in trademark infringement of “likelihood of
confusion.” Courts have developed a multi-factor test that can be used to prove likelihood of
confusion. Included in this multi-factor test is empirical evidence on whether consumers are likely
to be confused. This empirical evidence can take the form of survey evidence. See infra section 4
for further discussion. See also Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961) (employing an eight-factor test that considers the following factors: “[T]he strength of his
mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the proximity of the products, the likelihood
that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion, and the reciprocal of defendant’s good
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Congress rejected that standard, its laxer standard of “likelihood” could have
been interpreted to still require empirical evidence. Congress might have meant
that a senior mark need not wait until a junior mark has actually caused harm
before it brings a lawsuit. Instead, a “likelihood” determination could mean that
the senior mark needs to introduce empirical evidence that shows if the junior
mark’s existence were to continue, it would tarnish the senior mark.
However, the first case to interpret this new likelihood standard held that no
empirical proof whatsoever was necessary to prove “likelihood of dilution.” In
2010, Victoria Secret once again brought its suit against Victor’s Secret. In this
subsequent proceeding, the Sixth Circuit held that the “likelihood of dilution”
standard should be “interpreted…to create a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at
least a very strong inference, that a new mark used to sell sex-related products is
likely to tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association between
the two.”42
In a more recent case which seemed to implicate disgust tarnishing, the court
granted a permanent injunction against a junior tarnishing mark without any
introduction of empirical evidence.43

faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of the
buyers”); see also Diamond supra note 3.
42

Id. The court further acknowledged that “the phrase ‘likely to cause dilution’ used in the
new statute significantly changes the meaning of law from ‘causes actual harm’ under the
preexisting law. The word ‘likely’ or ‘likelihood’ means ‘probably.’ 605 F.3d at 419.
43 VIP Products, LLC, Plaintiff, v. Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 3d 891 (D. Ariz.
2018).

14

In effect, what started as a requirement to show empirical proof of actual harm
has become no requirement to show any empirical proof of harm. What we are
left with is a shifting of burden on the defendant to prove a lack of dilution.44 VIP
Products had produced a dog toy that looked similar to a Jack Daniel’s whiskey
bottle. Instead of nutrition facts of whiskey however, the dog toy contained
language such as “Bad Spaniels”, “40% Poo by Vol.”, and “100% Smelly”.45 Jack
Daniel’s brought a Stanford marketing professor to opine on the potential
tarnishing effect of Bad Spaniels. While that expert used cited the theories we
draw upon here,46 there was still no empirical evidence introduced and instead
the court relied upon simply theory to conclude that Bad Spaniels would harm the
reputation of Jack Daniel’s.
Given the findings of our empirical strategy below we argue that the Supreme
Court’s standard of actual harm is too narrow and too strict. Requiring companies
to wait until there has been a harm is problematic as we describe further in
section three below.47 However, we also note that the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation of the federal law is too lenient. Tarnishment only occurs in a
narrow set of circumstances and is idiosyncratic.48 The federal standard of a

44

Note that this presumption seems to only hold for sex tarnishing marks as the court only
discussed sex in its opinion. It is still unclear what the new “likelihood” standard would mean for
other forms of dilution.
45 Id. at 898.
46 The expert in that case used associative network theory to explain why it is the case that a
tarnishing mark can harm an existing mark. We discuss it briefly further see infra note 63.
47 See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d Cir. 1989)
(in which Lexis Nexis sued Toyota before it introduced the “Lexus” car model, arguing that waiting
until the car launched would cause irreparable damage to the Lexis brand).
48

We discuss the condition and idiosyncrasies further below.
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“likelihood of harm” is the appropriate standard, but Congress’s lack of detail in
how companies are to show this likelihood of harm is problematic. We argue that
courts should require plaintiffs to introduce empirical evidence as we detail below
to assist in litigation of trademark tarnishment. At its core, trademark dilution is an
empirical cause of action.49 It is unclear simply based upon a semantic
relationship between two marks if one will tarnish another. Clear empirical proof
of harm using experimental methodology is the only way to prove if there is a
likelihood of trademark dilution.50 We argue that our experimental survey method
below should be utilized and required by courts in trademark tarnishment
litigation. Evidentiary standards should be clear and empirical evidence should
be required to prove a “likelihood” of trademark tarnishment.

Part Two: Measuring a Mark’s Reputation

Federal law defines tarnishment as a harming of the reputation of a famous
mark.51 But scholars, courts and Congress alike have provided no guidance to
litigants on what exactly “reputation of a mark” is and what it means to “harm”
that reputation. In this section, we draw upon marketing literature to help bring
clarity and concreteness to the concept of a mark’s reputation.

49

For detailed discussions of why trademark tarnishment is an empirical cause of action see
Jacoby, supra note 3, and Buccafusco, supra note 5.
50 Note that one could use more quantitative models to show actual harm of a diluting
trademark. We speak of this strategy in detail in other papers.
51 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
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For all intents and purposes, the reputation of a famous mark is synonymous with
the reputation of the brand. This flows nicely from the purpose of having a
trademark in the first instance. A trademark tells the consumer what the source of
a product is. But over time, consumers viewing a mark, use that mark not only as
shortcuts for source identification, but also for association identification. The
mark comes to represents what attributes of the product the customer expects to
get.52 Many marketers refer to a trademark or a brand as a “promise,” that is, a
promise of what the consumer can expect to get. The trademark “Nike” signals
that the company Nike makes a given product. But it also signals that the product
is likely high quality, well designed, stylish for an athlete, popular in certain
circles, etc. These associations are the reputation that the trademark commands
in the marketplace. This reputation is exactly the reputation of the brand. Nike’s
reputation as a brand is one of high quality and well-designed athletic wear.
Therefore, to better understand how to measure a mark’s reputation, we focus on
how to measure brand reputation. Going forward, we use brand reputation and
trademark reputation synonymously.

52 David Aaker, Managing Brand Equity: Capitalizing on the Value of Brand Name, The Free
Press, 1991 at 16 (“Brand [reputation] is a set of brand assets and liabilities linked to a brand it is
name and symbol, that add to or subtract from the value provided by a product or service to a firm
and /or that firms’ customers.”).
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Brand reputation has been a long-standing interest of marketing scholars. These
scholars have cultivated strategies for not only measuring the value and
associations people place on marks and brands, but also for managing brands to
leverage these exact associations.53
Brand and trademark reputation serves many purposes including to help
consumers make purchasing decisions quickly and accurately,54 to create
positive attitude and perceptions of the brand as a whole,55 and even to help a
company extend their products to neighboring categories (so called brand
extensions).56 Ultimately, however, reputation matters because it influences
whether consumers will purchase one’s products or consume the services of
one’s brand and even what they will be willing to pay. Owning a trademark with a
good reputation in the market will likely make consumers more willing and likely
to purchase from that company over others.57

53

Id. Aaker argues that brand associations in addition to perceived quality are one of five
aspects of brand reputation.
54 Id. at 111 (“Associations can serve to summarize a set of facts and specifications that
otherwise would be difficult for the customer to process and access, and expensive for the firm to
communicate.”)
55 Id. at 113 (“Some associations are liked and stimulate positive feelings that get transferred
to the brand . . . . Some associations create positive feelings during the use experience, serving
to transform it into something different than it would otherwise be.”).
56 Id. (“An association can provide the basis for an extension by creating a sense of fit
between the brand name and the new product, or by providing a reason to buy the extension.”).
57 Shuba Srinivasan, Marc Vanhuele, Koen Pauwels Mind-Set Metrics in Market Response
Models: An Integrative Approach. 27 JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH 4, 672 (2010) (empirically
showing that changes in brand associations have independent effects on sales); Keller, Kevin
Lane (2003), Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based Brand Equity,
JOURNAL OF MARKETING, 57 (arguing for the importance of measuring and quantifying consumer
brand associations); also, LaPointe, Patrick and David Reibstein (2006), Marketing Metrics and
Financial Performance. Cambridge, MA: Marketing Science Institute; Ambler, Tim, (2003),
Marketing and the Bottom Line, 2d ed. London: Financial Times/Prentice Hall; LaPointe, Patrick
(2005), Marketing by the Dashboard Light. New York: Association of National Advisers Press.
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Brands and brand reputation are incredibly important to protect. Strong brands
have been linked to strong sales58 and strong customer loyalty.59 Finance
scholars even treat a brand as financial asset. Sullivan and Simon and show that
industries and companies that rely upon strong brands (consumer products and
generally business to consumer companies) show high brand values on standard
balance sheets.60
Several different metrics have been used in marketing literature to measure
brand reputation. We describe these metrics, how to measure these metrics, and
how to evaluate harm to these metrics below. We then use these measures of
brand reputation as a definition of trademark reputation in our empirical studies

58

See e.g. Kusum L. Ailawadi, Donald R. Lehmann, Scott A. Neslin Revenue Premium as an
Outcome Measure of Brand Equity, JOURNAL OF MARKETING, Vol. 67, No. 4, 2003 (concluding that
companies with strong brands show higher revenues—brand revenue premiums—in comparison
to companies that are not branded). Ailawdi et al. compared revenues of famous consumer
packaged goods brands with those that are were “generic” (i.e., not famously branded), and
found a significant difference between the two types of goods.
59

Arjun Chaudhuri, Morris B. Holbrook The Chain of Effects from Brand Trust and Brand Affect to
Brand Performance: The Role of Brand Loyalty, JOURNAL OF MARKETING, Vol. 65, No. 2, 2001
(showing that the strong brands create strong brand trust and brand attitude which in turn
influence purchase loyalty and attitudinal loyalty).
60

Simon, Carol J., and Mary W. Sullivan. The Measurement and Determinants of Brand Equity: A
Financial Approach, MARKETING SCIENCE, vol. 12, no. 1, 1993 (using publicly available balance
sheets for several companies in various industries and deconstruct a company’s assets to arrive
at a value of the company’s brand, and confirming the intuition that industries and companies that
rely upon their brand to make a profit shower higher values of brand equity than those that focus
more on business to business or non-consumer facing endeavors). Even trademarks which are
closely tied to brand reputation have been shown to have high balance sheet values for
companies that rely heavily on the associations those trademarks have in the marketplace. See
Alexander Krasnikov, Saurabh Mishra, David Orozco, Evaluating the Financial Impact of
Branding Using Trademarks: A Framework and Empirical Evidence, JOURNAL OF MARKETING, Vol.
73, No. 6, 2009.
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below.61

Brand Associations:
Brand associations most generally are anything “linked in memory to a brand.”62
These associations derive from how products are marketed and over the course
of time as consumers interact with the products themselves.63 For Nike this could
be “athletes,” “high quality,” “sweat wicking,” etc. These associations are
idiosyncratic in many ways. First, brands not only have associations but also
levels of strength. The links in memory to a brand will be stronger when that
brand is more pervasive for an individual consumer (e.g., well-known) and when
the consumer has had several interactions with the brand.64 This means that
brand associations are likely strongest for those consumers who have brand

61

We do not spend time here discussing the process by which brands become associated in
long term memory with certain perceptions. Psychology research has described this process as
the associative network theory. According to associative network theory, brand knowledge is
“encoded in memory as a pattern of linkages between concept nodes.” A trademark or a brand
has several nodes attached to it which represent the three forms of brand knowledge (a product
category, brand attributes, and brand attitudes.) These nodes are encoded over time as
consumers interact with a mark and its products. Companies benefit by having a trademark with
strong connecting nodes. When a consumer sees a mark, they retrieve from memory the various
nodes associated with the mark. Tarnishing marks that are similar to an existing mark are likely
encoded close to the senior existing mark in the shared associative network. Therefore, when a
consumer interacts with an existing brand, it is possible that the perception nodes linked to the
tarnishing brand will also be triggered. This is the theorized process by which a tarnishing mark
can harm the reputation of an existing mark. For detailed analysis of associative network theory
see John Anderson, A Spreading Activation Theory of Memory, JOURNAL OF VERBAL LEARNING
AND VERBAL BEHAVIOR 22, no. 3: 261–95 (1983) and Pullig et al infra note 94. We do not detail
this theory in this paper but have another paper focused on the psychology theories that predict
tarnishing. Please email one of the authors for a draft of that paper.
62 Aaker supra note 54 at 111.
63 Id. (“A link to a brand will be stronger when it is based on many experiences or exposures
to communications, rather than few.”).
64 Id.
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loyalty and consistently choose the brand over other competing brands.65
Second, different brands have different target customers. Understanding which
customers hold which associations is an important task for the marketing
manager.66 Moreover, it could be the case that certain brands, although having
small market share, have very strong loyalty and create strong associations with
the target consumers.67 We leverage this idiosyncrasy in brand loyalty and
associations in our experimental section below.68
Trademark tarnishing is purported to change these brand/trademark
associations. Specifically, the cause of action is thought to ruin or pervert
prevailing positive mark associations with sex, disgust, or low quality, thus
harming a company’s brand reputation.69

65 These consumers would likely be the ones who have the most exposure to the product given
that they utilize it. See also Kevin L. Keller, and Sanjay Sood, “The Effects of Product Experience
and Branding Strategies on Brand Evaluations,” Dartmouth Tuck Working Paper (2003).
66 We show below that certain consumers (conservatives) have more positive associations
with a publicly conservative brand.
67 Take for example Rolls Royce or Prada. They have very strong brand associations with
those consumers who are their target market. It’s worth noting however, there is a tension here
because dilution protection is only available for those marks that are famous among the general
consuming public, i.e. the entire US population—niche fame is not enough under TDRA. See
Alexandra J. Roberts, New-School Trademark Dilution: Famous among the Juvenile Consuming
Public, 49 IDEA 579 (2009).
68 We use brands that are in the same space but have differing brand loyalty and market
shares to show that tarnishing might affect different brands differently even though they produce
the same goods.
69 Note that under a more robust definition of tarnishing, any change in association that a brand
does not want would cause harm to the trademark. A brand builds a particular reputation to a
specific customer segment, not just a positive one. A brand must protect its exact brand
reputation to leverage all that comes with having a clear and well understood brand, most
importantly brand extensions. Take Under Armor, for example. Under Armor’s original brand was
focused on the aggressive athlete. See http://www.uabiz.com/company/kevinplank.cfm. Imagine
a company that creates an athletic brand called “Under the Armor” and is geared towards polo
players. Furthermore, assume that “Under the Armor” sponsors the best polo players in the world.
We might be hard pressed to think that “Under the Armor” has tarnished Under Armor, because
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Marketers extensively research how associations of brands come about.
Sometimes, they come about via conscious promotion70 and advertising,71 and
other times they are almost accidental in nature. When determining the brand
associations for trademark tarnishment we take as given the strength and
content of the brand associations. As such, in our empirical strategy below we
draw upon companies that have clear associations that have been cultivated
over a course of time.
Measuring associations is generally a straightforward task. Most previous work
that attempts to measure brand reputation via associations has used customer
surveys to better understand what mental image consumers have of the

both brands are associated with the pinnacle of their sports. However, “Under the Armor” might
have changed the particular association of Under Armor from aggressive athletes to more “chic”
athletes. Although seemingly a positive association, being associated with “chic” athletes would
be harmful to Under Armor. They would have a hard time marketing towards aggressive sports
like football, basketball, rugby, wrestling, or boxing. Brand extensions of the original company
would be closed off after the introduction of “Under the Armor.” In many ways, this broad
conception of tarnishing as not just negative brand associations but any change in brand
associations is in line with viewing trademarks as property rights. If one owns a trademark they
should have sole power to shape it into whatever they like. Any use of the trademark or a similar
variant would be considered a trespass on the trademark property right. As such, a trespass even
if it does not have a negative that changes reputation in any way (even positive) should be
considered dilution. For a more detailed discussion on how trademark dilution moves toward a
property-like right see Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whitling Away of the Rational
Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 866 (1997), and Bevery W.
Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark - Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and
Prospects, 67 TRADEMARK REP. 607, 624 (1977).
70 Aaker supra note 54 at 167 (arguing that promotions increase the awareness of your
product but can also cheapen it and hence can tarnish brand equity).
71 Id. at 163 (“Advertising which creates brand associations that change the use experience is
termed ‘transformational advertising’”).
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products.72 This takes the form of asking consumers open ended questions on
what they think about when they see or hear a particular trademark. In our
experiments below, we simply ask respondents to rate how much they agree with
prevailing associations of a famous trademark in the marketplace. By doing this,
we are not only exploring or discovering the types of associations consumers
have, but also to what extent various consumers hold each of the prevailing
associations.
Hence, our first dependent variable in measuring mark/brand reputation is to
what extent consumers agree with or hold prevailing associations of a famous
brand. For example, we measure to what extent a consumer agrees that Nike
products are “high quality,” “made for athletes,” and are “very stylish.”

Brand Attitudes:
A brand/mark’s reputation also incorporates how consumers feel about the given
brand/mark. This feeling towards the brand is called brand attitude.73 Common
brand attitudes questions are “Do I like the brand?”; “Do I feel like the brand

72

Customer surveys are the mainstay in consumer behavioral research. See Ilieva, J., Baron, S.,
& Healey, N. M. (2002), Online surveys in marketing research: Pros and cons, INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL OF MARKET RESEARCH, 44(3), 361. Surveys are also the mainstay in expert testimony for
trademark disputes. See Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark
Litigation, 19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 490 (1989); Robert Bonynge, Trademark Surveys and
Techniques and Their Use in Litigation, 48 A.B.A. J. 329, 334 (1962).
73

Ajzen, Icek; Fishbein, Martin (1977), Attitude-behavior relations: A theoretical analysis and
review of empirical research, Psychological Bulletin, American Psychological Association 84 (“[A]
person’s attitude represents his evaluation of the entity in question. Moreover, an attitude is
specific to a person, context, time and the target the attitude is directed against.”).
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reflects my identity”; “Do I want to approach the brand’s products?”. Brand
attitudes are an important part of what predicts if consumers will purchase from a
given brand74, whether brand extensions will be successful,75 and whether a
given advertisement will be persuasive.76 We measure brand/mark attitudes
using a Likert scale focused on how much a consumer “likes” the target brand.77
Given that we use tarnishing advertisements, we expect that brand/mark
attitudes after viewing these advertisements might change for the worse. If this
happens to be the case, this is evidence that consumers are less likely to
purchase from the brand going forward. How and when brand attitudes change in
response to advertisements has been intensely written about in the marketing
and psychology literature. Attitude change is explained by the Elaboration
Likelihood Model (“ELM”).78 The ELM predicts that attitudes change via one of
two paths, a central route and a peripheral route. In the central route, attitude

74

Spears, Nancy & Singh, Surendra (2004), Measuring Attitude Toward the Brand and
Purchase Intentions, JOURNAL OF CURRENT ISSUES AND RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING 26, 53–66
(showing how the two constructs of brand attitude and purchase intentions are related).
75 See Aaker, David A., and Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer evaluations of brand extensions, THE
JOURNAL OF MARKETING (1990): 27–41. For a similar analysis but focused on brand alliances
rather than extensions, see Simonin, B., & Ruth, J. (1998), Is a Company Known by the Company
It Keeps? Assessing the Spillover Effects of Brand Alliances on Consumer Brand
Attitudes, JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, 35(1).
76

See generally Petty (1986),Communication and persuasion: central and peripheral routes
to attitude change, Springer-Verlag, New York.
77 Likert, R. (1932), A technique for the measurement of attitudes, ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY, 22
140, 55 (Likert scales are very common scale measurements used in consumer behavior
research). For details on which brand attitudes scales predict purchase intention most readily,
see Spears, Nancy, and Surendra N. Singh, Measuring attitude toward the brand and purchase
intentions, JOURNAL OF CURRENT ISSUES & RESEARCH IN ADVERTISING 26.2 (2004): 53-66.
78

Petty, Richard E; Cacioppo, John T., The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion, Advances
in Experimental Social Psychology: 126.
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change occurs because an individual will pay close attention to advertising and
will thoughtfully, cognitively, and rationally evaluate the message of the
advertisement.79 In the peripheral route, attitude change occurs because an
individual uses negative or positive cues in the advertisement to make simple
and often crude inferences about the brand being advertised.80
The ELM predicts that a consumer’s available cognitive resources at the time of
the advertisement is one factor in predicting which route the consumer will take.81
When a consumer is under stress and has little cognitive availability to process
an advertisement, they will follow the peripheral route, and the central route when
resources are readily available.82 Previously, however, attitude persuasion has
been focused on the target brand’s own advertisements. We however, expand
this model to include how tarnishing ads might change brand attitudes of the
target brand.
The ELM has implications for our studies below. We argue, if tarnishing
advertisements are presented in contexts in which consumers have ample
cognitive processing capability available, they are less likely to change
brand/mark attitudes. This is because, consumers will clearly internalize that the
79

Petty, Richard E; Cacioppo, John T; Schumann, David (1983), Central and peripheral
routes to advertising effectiveness: The moderating role of involvement, JOURNAL OF CONSUMER
RESEARCH 10 at 138.
80 Id. at 138.
81 Petty, Richard E; Cacioppo, John T (1984), Source factors and the elaboration likelihood
model of persuasion, Advances in Consumer Research: 668–672. Note that the model also
predicts that involvement will influence the route used. While a consumer is more involved
(generally defined as a motivation) in the process of viewing and evaluating the advertisements,
they are more likely to follow the central route of processing.
82

Id.
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tarnishing mark and the target mark come from different entities and tarnishing
ads should not affect perceptions of a different entity. However, when tarnishing
ads are presented in contexts in which consumers have little cognitive
processing capability available, we expect tarnishing ads to have a larger effect
on trademark attitudes. This is the because, consumers will not clearly internalize
that the two marks are different entities. We expand on this below in the
discussion sessions of our various studies.

Competitive Rank:
Legal scholars have criticized previous trademark dilution studies because they
do not take into consideration contextual decision making. When respondents
are asked about brands in isolation, dilution may exist, but this dilution could go
away if the decisions are put in a realistic shopping context.83
Context is important for another reason. Just because brand reputation
decreases for some consumers, this alone is not sufficient evidence to conclude
that purchase likelihood will decrease. It could be the case that even though
associations have changed for a given mark, that mark is so preferred to other
competitor brands that market share of the target does not change. If this is the
case, it makes trademark tarnishing and dilution in general less problematic.

83 See In Re Pom Wonderful LLC, District Court of California, Expert Testimony by David J.
Reibstein, Exhibit 3, at 51 arguing that certain methodologies used in surveys are not reliable
because they attempt to measure an effect in isolation and are not connected to what consumers
“would do in the real world.” See also Tushnet, supra note 3; Beebe et al., supra note 3.

26

Therefore, it is important to measure market share of the tarnished brand against
the market share of its competitors.84
To do this, we measure the preferred rank of the target brand in comparison to
other similar competitive brands. By looking at how the rank of competitive
brands changes with tarnishing marks we might find that even though
associations show little change, a tarnished brand loses significant market share.
And vice versa: brand associations might change a lot but the tarnished brand
loses little to no market share.

Other Measures of Brand Reputation:
While brand/mark associations are a satisfactory way to measure how good a
mark’s reputation is, the ultimate reason to cultivate a strong trademark
reputation is to make sales. A brand that has a good reputation has strong
positive associations, and these associations then lead consumers to
consistently choose the brand’s products in the marketplace.85

84 Beebe et al supra note 3 (that study used car brands that had high and low awareness).
Aaker supra note 54 at 112 (“Many brand associations . . . represent a basis for purchase
decisions and brand loyalty.”). Note that this is connection between positive brand associations
and purchase intention is codified in the purchase funnel framework. For a detailed explanation of
the purchase funnel, see E. K. Strong, Jr. The Psychology of Selling and Advertising. New York
1925, p. 349 and p. 9
85
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The link between associations and purchase likelihood is often hard to measure,
however.86 This is because several other characteristics about a brand influence
purchase likelihood including marketing expenditures and competitor
expenditures. Recent scholarship has attempted to connect more clearly brand
associations with purchase likelihood. In doing this, marketers have realized that
brand associations do have an independent effect on purchase likelihood.87
Although purchase likelihood is an important part of what makes a brand and
hence a trademark valuable, we do not define tarnishing as necessarily
influencing purchase likelihood. It could be case that purchase likelihood goes up
after seeing tarnishing marks. This could happen in at least two ways. First,
brand awareness (how consumers readily recall a brand) may go up after seeing
tarnishing ads.88 After seeing a copycat mark or a mark that mimics an existing
mark, the famous existing mark is more readily retrieved in memory which
increases its brand awareness. This has been demonstrated in marketing
literature focusing on luxury goods. Previous empirical work has found that
copycat luxury brands make it more likely that the original luxury brand is
included in a purchase set. This happens both because the awareness of the
brand is increased, and because people may like the brand more after knowing
that others are attempting to copy it.89

86

See Srinivasan supra note 59 at 674.
Id.
88 Aaker supra note 54.
89 See Arghavan Nia, Judith Lynne Zaichkowsky, Do counterfeits devalue the ownership
of luxury brands?, J OURNAL OF PRODUCT & B RAND MANAGEMENT, Vol. 9 Issue: 7, pp.485-497
87
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In addition, certain brand perceptions may change and cause new consumers to
like the brand more and hence increase purchase likelihood and sales. For
example, one could argue Victor’s Secret would make perceptions of Victoria
Secret more sexual than they currently are. This could make the brand more
appealing to some consumers and cause sales to go up.
We specifically do not define tarnishing as changes in purchase likelihood, brand
awareness or changes in sales. Instead, we focus solely on changes in brand
perceptions, attitudes, and rank.90 We do this because this most clearly connects
to the statutory language of “harm to reputation.” We also think that brand
perceptions and brand attitudes are important to brand independent of sales.
Marketing literature has historically been sensitive to a company’s brand
perceptions independent of the effect on sales. But the law clearly is and is
moving towards protecting a brand as speech, something that a company cares
about independent of sales.91 In that regard, we think our measures of tarnishing
are the correct ones that courts should be focusing on.

(2000) (showing that counterfeit luxury goods do not decrease the liking of authentic luxury
goods and increase the brand awareness of authentic luxury brands); Sophie Hieke, Effects
of counterfeits on the image of luxury brands: An empirical study from the customer
perspective, J OURNAL OF BRAND MANAGEMENT, Vol. 18 Issue: 2, pp.159-173 (2010)
(empirically showing that counterfeits brands do not change prevailing brand perceptions of
authentic luxury goods).
90 Note we do attempt to show that tarnishing does have effects on sales, but the point here
is that tarnishing should still be recognized even if there is no effect on sales.
91 Much discussion in the literature on corporations as people has focused on the speech
implications of giving brands first amendment rights. See e.g. Alan J. Meese and Nathan B.
Oman, Hobby Lobby, Corporate Law, and the Theory of the Firm: Why For-Profit Corporations
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Part Three: Measuring Trademark Tarnishment

Above we identified how to use brand reputation to measure a trademark’s
reputation and how to measure harm to that reputation. In the following section,
we use those measure to presents three sets of studies that show conditions
under which tarnishment (harm to a trademark’s reputation) is likely to exist. We
conclude that when consumers see several exposures of tarnishing marks, are
more passively engaged in viewing those exposures, and when they are the ideal
customer segment, tarnishing is likely to occur. We show how our studies differ
from previous dilution studies and provide a brief overview of our studies here
before proceeding further detail below. Ultimately, we show a viable empirical
strategy to measure a “likelihood of harm” per the federal statute that courts
should begin to adopt. Our strategy applies to the “likelihood of harm” standard
because we mostly use fictitious marks in the studies below.

are RFRA Persons, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 273 (2014) (arguing that the holding in Hobby Lobby is
consistent with the corporate theory of the firm), Frederick M. Gedicks and Andrew Koppelman,
Invisible Women: Why and Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause,
67 VT. L. REV. EN BANC 51 (2014) (arguing that ruling in favor of Hobby Lobby would create a
regime where significant costs of health care are going to borne by female employees), Mark
Tushnet, Do For-Profit Corporations Have Rights of Religious Conscience?, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
ONLINE 70 (2013) (arguing that there are several relevant and important factors in determining
whether or not for-profit corporations have religious conscience).
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Previous Dilution Studies vs This Article
Although not terribly prevalent in dilution scholarship, some previous empirical
work on dilution (both blurring and tarnishing) has been performed. We detail that
work briefly here and show how our work builds on previous studies.
Previous studies can be categorized into which type of dilution they studied.
Dilution by blurring (a lessening of distinctiveness) has received the most
empirical attention. Both peer reviewed marketing scholarship92 and law review
scholarship93 have attempted to find ways to measure dilution by blurring. Given
that this paper is focused on dilution by tarnishment, we will not spend much time
going through those studies. We only say here that those studies focused on
measuring how quickly consumers could match a trademark with its products.
Those studies neither attempted to measure reputational harms nor did they
attempt to measure how reputational harms effected purchasing behavior.
Only one study has looked at dilution by tarnishment. Buccafusco, Head and Wu
use sexualized versions of movie posters to measure tarnishing. They find no
statistically significant effect of the sexualized movie posters on desire to watch
the original movie.94 In that study, Buccafusco et al showed movie posters to

92

Beebe et al., supra note 3; Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution: Empirical
Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 265, 268 (2000); Chris Pullig,
Carolyn J. Simmons, and Richard G. Netemyer, Brand Dilution: When Do New Brands Hurt
Existing Brands? 70 J. MARKETING 52, 54 (Apr. 2006).
93

94

Tushnet, supra note 3.
Buccafusco, supra note 5.
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respondents and then asked them their desire to watch the original movie. This
dependent variable measurement is akin to measuring purchase likelihood.
Our studies below differ from previous dilution studies in several ways. First,
while other studies only looked at response times95 and choice likelihood96 we
focus here on measuring reputational harm. We measure the construct of
trademark reputation through brand association and brand attitudes. As we
discuss above, focusing on these aspects of brand reputation most clearly tracks
tarnishing as harm to reputation of a brand. We specifically do not use purchase
likelihood and sales as measures because these measures of financial health of
a brand may go up in the face of tarnishing marks, yet, tarnishing may still
negatively affect the message a company wants to communicate.
Second, previous studies have focused on using only catalogue ads (a one page
ad that explains the diluting brand to the respondent). We vary the medium in
which we present diluting ads using catalogue ads, website, and banner ads.
This not only maps onto real tarnishing cases nicely but also gives our studies
external validity.97 Moreover, these studies have used only single ad exposures.

95

Beebe et al., supra note 3; Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby supra note 94; Pullig supra
note 94.
96 Buccafusco supra note 5.
97 External validity is a common concern in social science literature, in particular work done
through experimental studies in a lab. The concern with many empirical studies is the lack of
applicability to the real world. Real world dynamics do not necessarily mimic the lab. As such,
many studies run in the lab do not translate to results in the real world. We focus on using
advertisements that tend to exist in the real world (websites and banner ads) in that way our
results have more external validity than other previous dilution studies.
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Lastly, and most importantly, previous dilution studies showed only one
exposure to respondents and measured subsequent outcomes. Dilution,
however, is most likely to occur when respondents are confronted with the
diluting trademark over several exposures. This is because the perceptions of the
senior mark have been engrained in consumer memory for quite some time. One
exposure will not be enough to change these perceptions. In our studies, we use
multiple exposures and show that under multiple exposures, tarnishing is more
likely. As such, we vary the number of exposures in our studies.
The importance of our use of brand associations and attitudes to operationalize
trademark reputation deserves further explanation. If we are to find significant
effects of tarnishing on senior marks for purposes of proving that tarnishing
exists, we must study marks that are most susceptible to tarnishing. Note that is
not the legal requirement. Any trademark can bring a lawsuit of tarnishment. We
only argue that certain marks (those that have associations that are at odds with
sex, disgust, or low quality), are more likely to be actually tarnished.
The notion of inconsistent perceptions arises nicely from the work in brand
extension dilution. Previous work has looked at what happens when a brand
extends its own brand into a new category. The lack of fit and typicality of a
brand extension with a senior brand is a key indicator of the likelihood of dilution.
When a brand extension has attributes that are inconsistent with the current
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residing brand associations those existing associations become diluted.98 For
example, Neutrogena soap has “gentle” brand attribute associations. If the brand
were to introduce a new extension that has a “harsh” brand attribute association,
consumers might view Neutrogena soap as less “gentle.” In this same way, when
a tarnishing mark has associations that are inconsistent or at odds with the
associations of the senior famous mark, there is a higher likelihood of dilution by
tarnishment.
Trivially, if a pornographic movie’s name is used in another sex oriented way, we
would find little empirical evidence pornographic movie has been tarnished, after
all, the associations would not have undergone any substantive change.
Likewise, if a mark has associations that are consistent with or orthogonal to sex,
we would also find it weird to presume sex tarnishing. In this way, Buccafusco et
al do not use the most appropriate marks/movies in their sex tarnishing studies if
the purpose to demonstrate the existence of tarnishing. They use movie
names/posters that have associations that are orthogonal to sex associations.
For example, in attempting to see if “Jack Reach Around” tarnishes “Jack
Reacher” they find no tarnishing, but that shouldn’t be surprising to us. Jack

98 See Kevin Keller and David A. Aaker, The Effects of Sequential Introduction of Brand
Extensions, JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH 29, no. 1: 35–50 (1992) (showing that brand
extensions that have inconsistent or incompatible new perceptions fail to be successful); Barbara
Loken and Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand Extensions Have a
Negative Impact?, JOURNAL OF MARKETING 57, no. 3: 71–84 (1993) (showing that when a new
mark is introduced with perceptions that are inconsistent with the existing mark, the existing mark
can be diluted); Maureen Morrin, The Impact of Brand Extensions on Parent Brand Memory
Structures and Retrieval Processes, JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH 36, no. 4: 517–25 (1999)
(showing that Neutrogena soap is harmed by introducing an extension that is perceived as
harsh).
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Reacher likely has no underlying mark association that would be harmed by also
being associated with sex. Instead, a better test of tarnishing would be to tarnish
a mark that has some known associations that are counter to sex in some way.
The only movies that intuitively satisfy this in the Buccafusco et al study are
“Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone” and “Wreck-It-Ralph.” One could
reasonably assume that those movies are associated with children and
families—associations that are susceptible to sex tarnishing. In our studies,
whether we study sex, low quality, or disgust tarnishing we use target marks that
have known associations that are directly in contrast to sex.99 (Sex contrasting
“Chick-fil-A=wholesome”; Disgust contrasting “Dove=clean”; Low Quality
contrasting “Louis Vuitton=high quality”).
Buccafusco et al do however, appropriately use the trademarks that legally fall
under the tarnishing doctrine. Our point here is as an empirical strategy, it is
more apt to use marks that are highly likely to be tarnished. In this way, we do
stack the deck to some degree. By choosing brands that we hypothesize should
suffer reputational harm in the face of tarnishing advertisements, we focus on
isolating the marketplace effect of tarnishment. If our marks and our studies do
not show tarnishing, then that is very good evidence that tarnishing likely does
not exist.

99

We establish these associations through several pre-tests.
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Overview of Our Studies
In each of the studies we focus on looking for harm to the reputation of a
mark/brand. From the marketing literature described above, we operationalize
trademark reputation as: brand associations (including how much a consumer
likes a given brand)—taken from the prevailing associations of the brands we
use, brand attitudes, competitive rank or market share, and purchase likelihood.
In each study, we measure on a seven-point Likert100 scale how much
consumers agree that prevailing associations accurately describe the brand. We
also have them rank the target mark against its competitors. Although we think
that purchase likelihood is not a good measure of tarnishment, we include it here
because previous work as attempted to measure it. As we show, it can actually
be counterproductive to understanding tarnishing.
Each study followed a similar pattern. We first showed consumers what we
considered trademark tarnishing advertisements. Some of the tarnishing marks
were taken from court cases and others were fictional.101 After showing
consumers these ads, we gave them filler questions and tasks before asking
them about the associations they have of the target brand. We were interested to
see if there was a decrease in positive associations, a decrease in likelihood of
purchase, and a decrease in rank after consumers had seen the tarnishing ads.

100

A Likert scale is scale named after Dr. Rensis Likert and it is a psychometric scale that is
used to generally elicit response of whether or not respondents agree with an underlying
statement.
101 In creating these marks/brands we attempted to have the mark as similar as possible to
the target brand without creating any consumer confusion.
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In our first two sets of experiments we found limited evidence of trademark
tarnishment. Showing consumers one advertisement or one website of a
tarnishing brand representation had marginal effects on mark associations,
likelihood of purchase and rank. In many cases, however, there was no effect on
any of our dependent variables. In our last experiment, we varied the number of
advertisements and found that as the number of tarnishing advertisements
(exposures) increases, the likelihood of tarnishment increases. This lends us to
conclude that tarnishment is not a one-time phenomenon. Rather, it takes
several exposures to have a significant effect on the target trademark/brand.
We also note that certain consumers are effected more than others. How fluent a
consumer is with a given brand, how strong they feel about the brand, and even
their personal demographics play significant roles in whether tarnishing marks
have their anticipated effects. We describe these takeaways in more detail in
Part Four below.

Study 1: Single Advertisements
Our first set of studies used single advertisements. We did this with the intention
of mimicking previous studies on trademark dilution. In those studies, only one
advertisement was used and dilution was measured.
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Study 1A: Disgust and Low Quality Tarnishing
Stimuli: Although Moseley only concerned tarnishment via associations of sex,
several cases have drawn out other categories of tarnishment. Tarnishment via
associations of disgust and low quality have been extensively litigated.102
Therefore, in this first study we attempted to include one tarnishing stimuli for
both disgust and low quality.
We also decided to use a mix of real tarnishing marks/brands taken from famous
cases and fabricated marks. We used two real trademarks: First, “Chewy
Vuitton”, a company that makes dog toys in the shapes of Louis Vuitton bags and
“Dogiva” a company that made dog treats. Chewy Vuitton was sued by Louis
Vuitton (“LV”), where LV claimed that the low-quality dog toys made by Chewy
Vuitton would tarnish the LV mark and consumers would begin to associate low
quality goods with LV.103 Second, Godiva, a company that makes luxurious
chocolates, sued Dogiva claiming that consumers would start to associate
Godiva with disgust, as dog treats were not appetizing to human consumers. We
then also used a fabricated brand: Dove Manure. We did this with the intention to
create a brand that was clearly in a different category as the target brand (Dove

102

Jordache Enterprises, Inc, 625 F. Supp. 48; Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A., 507 F.3d 252;
Starbucks Corp. 588 F.3d 97; Campbell Soup Co, 650 F. Supp. 1166; Anheiser Bush, 306 F.2d
433.
103

See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A, 507 F.3d 252.
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Soap)104 and had associations that were the opposite of the target brand—
manure is dirty and does not smell pleasant.
The form of our stimuli was modeled after previous scholarship studying
trademark blurring.105 Each advertisement clearly indicated the name of the
tarnishing mark, had a picture of the product being sold and contained reviews
from consumers that articulated the potential tarnishing associations. For
example, for Dogiva, one of the reviews read: “My dog loves these treats, but I
tried them once and they were pretty gross.” A sample advertisement is copied
below in Appendix 1.
Procedure: We used a 4X1 between subject’s design where each subject saw
one of four advertisements (Chewy Vuitton, Dogiva, Dove Manure, and a
control).106 We used Amazon Mechanical Turk to recruit subjects to take our
survey (N=190).107

104 We also specified in our ad that “DOVE MANURE was NOT associated with DOVE
SOAP.” We followed here the lead of Pullig et al supra note 94. There each advertisement came
with disclosures that the diluting brand was not associated with target brand.
105 See Pullig supra note 94, for similar advertisement forms.
106 We also included two other control advertisements that stayed the same for all
respondents.
107 Amazon Mechanical Turk is an internet marketplace that allows businesses (and individuals)
to coordinate with humans to perform tasks that computers are currently unable to do. It is a
simple and cost effective way for social scientists to get consumer data on various topics.
Marketing, psychology, management, and legal scholars have routinely used Amazon Mechanical
Turk to recruit respondents for surveys and other empirical studies. For more background on the
marketplace, including its reliability and demographics, see Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., &
Gosling, S. D., Amazon's mechanical Turk: A new source of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data?,
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6(1), 3-5 (2011) (arguing that Amazon Mechanical Turk
respondents are more diverse and the data obtained is just as reliable as more traditional
methods).; Bentley, Frank et al. Comparing the Reliability of Amazon Mechanical Turk and
Survey Monkey to Traditional Market Research Surveys, CHI Extended Abstracts (2017)
(discussing the reliability of traditional marketplace consumer research versus Amazon
Mechanical Turk).
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Respondents first read each of the ads. They then answered some filler
questions before answering questions about the ads. We asked each respondent
to replicate the name of the brand (tarnishing mark) advertised and to describe
the product being sold. We used these questions as manipulation checks. Those
respondents that did not correctly replicate the names of the tarnishing marks
were not included in the analysis of the data. The control group saw no tarnishing
advertisements but instead saw an unrelated one page advertisement.
Afterwards, respondents answered our dependent variable questions on a Likert
7-point scale. We asked each respondent how much they agreed with the
statement that each mark’s products were associated with various attributes. For
example, we asked respondents how much they agreed with the statement that
“Louis Vuitton bags are high quality.”108 Table 1 shows each brand and the
respective attribute we measured.

108 To get these associations we pretested what associations consumers had with each brand
with a different set of respondents. We then took the most common attributes and used them in
our study.
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Table 1: Measured Associations for each brand
Brand
Louis Vuitton

Godiva

Dove

Measured Association
“How high quality are the products from
Louis Vuitton?”
“How likely are you to purchase
products from Louis Vuitton?”
“How tasty are the products from
Godiva?”
“How likely are you to purchase
products from Godiva?”
“How clean are the products from
Dove?”
“How likely are you to purchase
products from Dove?”

We then measured the same dependent variables for the control group. We used
the control group responses as baseline measurements that represent beliefs
about our various brands/marks before seeing a tarnishing ad. We then
compared these “pre-tarnishing/control” measurements to the post-tarnishing
measurements to see if the tarnishing advertisements had any effect on brand
reputation.109
Results: We analyzed the results using separate Analysis of Variance (ANOVAs)
and did not find any significant differences on any of the dependent variables
measured.110 However, there was a marginally significantly difference in the
Louis Vuitton purchase condition. Table 2 details the omnibus ANOVA results.

109

Note that ideally, we would run a within subjects design experiment where we would have
measured perceptions of the brands before showing tarnishing advertisements, and then
measured them again with the same respondents after showing tarnishing advertisements.
However, given that respondents are quick to understand within subjects studies like ours, we
decided to include a randomly assigned control condition that would act as a pre-tarnishing
measure in order to avoid any possible demand effects.
110 An analysis of variance test is used to compare the average response rate of two groups.
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Table 2: Omnibus ANOVA Results
Dependent Variable

F (3,186) =

Louis Vuitton—High Quality
Louis Vuitton—Purchase Likelihood
Godiva—Tasty
Godiva—Purchase Likelihood
Dove—Clean
Dove—Purchase Likelihood

.244
2.050
.535
2.041
.373
.806

Significance
(p value) =
.866
.108
.665
.110
.773
.492

We were interested in whether the specific tarnishing ads had a negative effect
on the associations of the target brand. (e.g. Did seeing Chewy Vuitton make
consumers less likely to purchase Louis Vuitton in comparison to those who only
saw a control advertisement). If tarnishing did exist, the associations consumers
have for a given brand would be lower in the tarnishing ad condition than in the
control condition. Therefore, we ran Tukey contrasts between the specific
tarnishing brand (Chewy Vuitton, Dogiva, Dove Manure) and the control
advertisement to determine if a single advertisement did harm the reputation of a
brand.

The means of each responses are compared using the variance of each sample to determine
whether the two samples have means that are statistically different from each other. A statistically
significant result indicates that the means of the two groups are highly likely to be different from
each other. In social science methodology, the level of significance that is deemed to be
statistically significant is 5% or 1% (which means that there is a 5%/1% likelihood of seeing a
difference in means between two groups, when in reality the means of the two groups are the
same). A 10% significance is deemed “marginally significant.” We indicate the level of
significance of each of our tests with the designation “p”.
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We found that none of the tarnishing advertisements had significant negative
effects on the target brands. One tarnishing ad however (Chewy Vuitton) had a
marginal positive effect on how much consumers liked the target brand (Louis
Vuitton). The mean difference in purchase likelihood between the Chewy Vuitton
tarnishing condition and the control condition was .951 (p=.074) meaning that
those in the tarnishing condition rated their likelihood to purchase one point
higher on average on a seven-point scale in comparison to those in the control
condition. We found this to be an interesting finding. It seems that Chewy Vuitton
increased how much respondents wanted to buy Louis Vuitton.111 If we only
defined tarnishing as changes in purchase likelihood, we would not find any
tarnishing effects for cases like Chewy Vuitton. Although, perceptions of Louis
Vuitton did not change and so tarnishing is not likely happening, it is not enough
to simply show that purchase likelihood does not change. Instead, purchase
likelihood should be distinct from harm to the reputation as contemplated by
trademark tarnishment.
Discussion: Study 1A showed no evidence of tarnishment. While respondents did
view single tarnishing ads, the ads did not seem to influence the associations
that respondents had towards the target marks. Two obvious reasons come to
mind about why the tarnishing ads had little to no significant effect.112 First, one

111

Note that this is consistent with empirical work on how copycat luxury goods increase
purchase likelihood of authentic luxury goods. We term this effect “garnishing.” We hope to
further think about this effect going forward in empirical work. Note that Buccafusco, supra note 5,
found a similar effect although with sex tarnishing.
112 A potential third reason is due to our small sample size. It’s generally more difficult to find
significant effects of mean responses when sample size is small. In this case, even though our
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exposure is just not enough to move consumers. We address this concern in
Study 2 and Study 3. Second, consumers might have strongly held beliefs about
the target marks, thereby making it very difficult to influence consumers with one
ad. In Study 1B we address this concern by using two brands/marks in the same
category, one with a widely-held reputation and one with a lesser known
reputation.

Study 1B: Disgust and Strong versus Weak Brands
Stimuli: The stimuli for Study 1B were similar to Study 1A. We focused on two
toothpaste brands: Crest and Tom’s113. Crest has a large market share and is
widely known as a nationwide brand. Toms however, has a drastically lower
market share and is not as widely known.
Our tarnishing marks were Crest Hot Sauce and Tom’s Hot Sauce. This is a type
of disgust tarnishing. We expected that when associated with something like hot
sauce, the toothpaste marks would be perceived as less fresh and less tasty. A
sample of the advertisements is copied below in Appendix 2.

sample size was about 50 for each condition (which is somewhat standard for the psychology
literature), we found no directional effects even marginal in favor of tarnishing. In that way, we
think that sample size did not account for the lack of effects we found.
113 The actual toothpaste trademark is Tom’s of Maine. We shorten it to “Tom’s” because that
is colloquially how consumer’s use it in the marketplace.
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Procedure: The procedure for Study 1B was the same as Study 1A. We used a
3x1 between subject design where each respondent saw one of three ads
(Crest’s Hot Sauce, Tom’s Hot Sauce, Control Ad). They were then asked how
much they agreed with the statement that Crest Toothpaste (Tom’s Toothpaste)
was fresh and tasty on a 7 point Likert scale. They also ranked their preference
for Crest, Colgate, Toms and Sensodyne toothpastes. Again, we used the control
group as a pre-tarnishing measurement of brand associations.114
We again recruited respondents via Amazon Mechanical Turk (N=178).
Results: We analyzed the results using an ANOVA and did not find any
significant differences on any of the dependent variables measured. The
tarnishing marks had no effect on the target marks Crest and Tom’s toothpaste.
The omnibus ANOVA showed no difference among the Crest, Tom and the
control groups.115
Discussion: Study 1B showed no evidence of tarnishing of either the Crest or
Tom’s marks. Even though Crest and Tom have difference reputations in the
toothpaste space, we did not find that these differing reputations had any effect
on the likelihood of tarnishing occurring. We now turn to the other reason that
Study 1A might have not had an effect. One exposure is likely not enough to
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See supra note 111 for why a between subjects design with a control group was used
rather than a within subjects design.
115 Toms cleanliness—F(2,175)=.264, p=.769; Crest cleanliness—F(2,175)=.306, p=.737;
Toms tastiness—F(2,175)=.165, p=.848; Crest tastiness—F(2,175)=.251, p=.595; Toms rank—
F(2,175)=1.111, p=.331; Crest rank—F(2,175)=.452, p=.605.
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produce tarnishment. Therefore, in Studies 2 and 3 we increased tarnishing
exposure.

Study 2: Websites and Sex Tarnishing
Study 1 results used one tarnishing exposure and found no tarnishing. However,
multiple exposures could have a greater chance of showing tarnishing.
In Study 2 we utilized a common real life tarnishing situation: a website. Several
cases have arisen when a website was created that used a similar domain name
to a famous existing mark.116 These cases have mainly arisen in the context of
sex tarnishing. The most visible case concerned Barbie. “Barbiesplaypen.com”
posted videos and photos of Barbie dolls taking part in lewd sexual acts. As
such, in this study we focus on sex tarnishing that occurs when a website URL
and webpage harm the reputation of a protected mark/brand.
Stimuli: We created screenshots of a fabricated website titled “ChicksFillA.com.”
In our study, Chicks Fill A was an adult store that had a website containing
several photos of scantily clothed women/men and adult products, including
pornographic magazines. We created Chicks Fill A with the intent that it would
tarnish the brand Chick-fil-A. Chick-fil-A is a popular fast food chain that serves
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See Mattel, Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9747; (in which Mattel argued that the website
“barbiesplaypen.com” that portrayed Barbie dolls in lewd sex acts tarnished the Barbie brand);
Williams Sonoma v. Friendfinder Inc., U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31299 (2007) (in which Williams Sonoma
argued that Friendfinder was using the mark “Pottery Barn” to direct Internet users to sex oriented
websites).
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only chicken products. We predicted that being associated with sex would make
people less likely to want to consume food from Chick-fil-A. But sex should have
a unique tarnishing effect on Chick-fil-A. Over the course of several years, Chickfil-A has branded itself as a company that is focused on wholesome, religious
and family values. We thought that being associated with sex and adult products
would certainly harm the Chick-fil-A mark.
We used a home page, an about page, and a reviews page to provide ample
exposure to the tarnishing mark. A website constitutes several exposures
because we allow respondents to look through the different pages of the website
which display the tarnishing mark several times.
Procedure: We used a 2X1 between subjects design where consumers either
saw the Chicks Fill A website or a control website. 117 They were asked to click
through the websites and explore the pages. They then answered some filler
questions.118 Finally, respondents then answered how wholesome and tasty they
found Chick-fil-A.119 They also rated how much the liked products from Chick-fil-A
and ranked their preferences among Chick-fil-A, Chipotle, Qdoba, and
McDonalds. We then asked some demographic questions about gender, political
leaning, and previous adult store experience.120 We treated the control condition
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We also included a second control website that stayed the same across all respondents.
These filler questions were included to make sure that the consumers had some time
before being asked to rate their brand associations and attitudes towards Chick-fil-A. Filler tasks
were unrelated to the study.
119 How wholesome the company is, how tasty the food is, and how much you like the
company Chick-fil-A.
120 Our intention behind these questions was the controversy behind Chick-fil-A. Chick-fil-A
118
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as pre-tarnishing just as we did in our previous studies. We again recruited
respondents via Amazon Mechanical Turk (N=154).
Results: We ran separate ANOVAs on the various dependent variables and
found a negative effect of the tarnishing ad on wholesome associations and liking
of Chick-fil-A. Figure 1 below shows the ratings of Chick-fil-A in the Tarnishing
condition versus the Control condition.

Figure 1: Results of Chick-fil-A Sex Tarnishing Website on Brand Associations

Ratings of Chick-fil-A
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Wholesome Ratings*

Tasty Ratings

Control Condition

Like Ratings**

Tarnishing Condition

* F(1,152)= 6.107, p=.015
** F(1,152)= 2.813, p=.09

Wholesome ratings went down significantly after respondents saw the
tarnishing website. In addition, those in the tarnishing condition liked Chick-fil-A
has branded itself as a religious company. Given its public political leaning, we anticipated that
conservatives would be more likely to have positive associations of the brand. We also thought
that women may be more offended by the Chicks Fill A manipulation than men and wanted to be
able to account for it.
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less (marginally significant). Tasting ratings did go down (directionally) but we did
not see statistically significant effects of tarnishing. Importantly, these decreases
of Chick-fil-A perceptions after viewing the tarnishing website did not hold for the
other fast food chains. The tarnishing website had no effect on how respondents
viewed the other fast food chains. This lends us to conclude that the effect of
tarnishing is unique to the similar senior trademark (i.e., seeing sex doesn’t put
respondents in negative moods or harm the reputation of any trademark, just the
reputation of the trademark at issue).
We also found a marginally significant negative effect of the tarnishing mark’s
website on the rank of Chick-fil-A against its competitors. Figure 2 shows this
result. Both Chipotle and Qdoba saw marginally significant results as well but in
the opposite direction (those in the tarnishing condition like those brands more).
This makes sense, because given that we restricted respondent choice to the
four brands, the consumers who moved from Chik-fil-A seemed to have moved to
Chipotle and Qdoba.
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Figure 2: Results of Chick-fil-A Sex Tarnishing Website on Rank

Rank of Fast Food Chains
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3
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Chick-Fil-A Ranking*

McDonalds
Ranking**

Control Condition

Chipotle Ranking**

Qdoba Ranking**

Tarnishing Condition

*Chick-fil-A F(1,152)=3.286, p=.09
**McDonalds F(1,152)=1.852, p=.176; Chipotle F(1,152)=3.422, p=.07.;
Qdoba F(1,152)=2.484, p=.09

We then ran a two-way ANOVA treating the ad condition and political leaning as
fixed factors.121 We expected that those who were more conservative would like
Chick-fil-A more at the start, and hence, would show more evidence of tarnishing.
The two-way ANOVA showed no significant interaction term for any of the
dependent variables but did show a main effect of political leaning on wholesome
ratings,122 leading us to believe that political leaning did not influence how the
tarnishing ad effected mark associations.

121 Political leaning was measured on a 7-point scale with 7 being extremely conservative and
1 being extremely liberal. We then created dummy variable where conservative was defined as a
rating 5 or above and liberal was defined as 4 or below.
122 The main effect of political leaning for wholesome was significant: F(1,152)=2.740, p=.011.
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Discussion: In study 2 we explored whether increases in ad exposure had
corresponding increases in tarnishing. We found mixed evidence of sex
tarnishing. While being in a tarnished condition did have some negative effect on
the brand reputation of Chick-fil-A, it did not have a large significant effect across
all dependent variables. We also note that gender and political leaning did not
significantly affect our results.

Study 3: Sex Tarnishing and Banner Ads
Previous studies looked at various forms of tarnishing and slightly increased
exposures of tarnishing brands. This study attempts to dive more deeply into the
exposure hypothesis and to test a more realistic form of advertisements.
Study 3 utilized banner ads (ads that appear on a webpage that are sponsored
by the advertising party) on online news articles. This is an increasingly common
occurrence in everyday online browsing and represents the most realistic form of
advertising exposure that we studied.

The interaction term of political leaning and tarnishing ad for wholesome was not significant:
F(1,152)=0.393, p=.905.
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Stimuli: We continued to use ChicksFillA.com in this study. We chose four
different online news articles and placed a various number of advertisements on
these articles. A sample article with sponsored ChiksFillA.com ads is shown
below in Appendix 3.
Procedure: We used a 4X1 between subject’s design where each subject saw
one of four levels of ad exposure (0 tarnishing ads, 1 tarnishing ad, 4 tarnishing
ads, and 8 tarnishing ads). We spaced out the tarnishing ads across the four
online news articles. Respondents first read the articles. They then answered
some filler questions before answering questions about the articles.123 We then
asked respondents to rate how wholesome and tasty they found Chick-fil-A. They
also rated how much they liked Chick-fil-A products and ranked their preferences
between Chick-fil-A, Chipotle, Qdoba, and McDonalds. Finally, respondents
answered some demographic questions about gender and political leaning.
We again recruited respondents via Amazon Mechanical Turk (N=171).
Analysis: We ran separate ANOVAs on the various dependent variables and
found significant negative effects of ad exposure on wholesome ratings and liking
ratings of Chick-fil-A. And found marginally negative effects on tastiness

123 We used these questions as manipulation checks. Those that did not correctly answer
simple questions about the news articles were not included in the analysis, as it is unlikely they
were paying attention to the survey.
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ratings.124 Figures 3-5 below show how increasing ad exposure decreases the
tastiness, liking, and wholesome ratings of Chick-fil-A.
Running Tukey contrasts showed that the zero-ad and four-ad conditions for
tastiness ratings were marginally significant. Mean difference=.777, p=.106. Our
results show a direct relationship between tarnishing and ad exposure.
Increasing ad exposure increases the amount of tarnishing.

Figure 3: Tastiness Ratings for Chick Fil A by Condition

124 Wholesome Ratings F(3,167)=2.537, p=.058; Liking Ratings F(3,167)=3.738, p=.012;
Tasty Ratings F(3,167)=1.988, p=.118. Ranking was not significant F(3,167)=1.308, p=.217.
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Figure 4: Liking Ratings for Chick Fil A by Condition

Figure 5: Wholesome Ratings for Chick Fil A by Condition

The eight-ad condition showed a large spike in ratings. Those in the eight-ad
condition were not only immune to the tarnishing advertisements but consistently
rated Chick-fil-A higher on all accounts in comparison to the other conditions. We
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think this was due to a potential demand effect. Respondents in the eight-ad
condition likely discovered what we were looking for and thought we wanted a
more positive evaluation of Chick-fil-A. Eight ads within four newspaper articles
provided an obvious manipulation and this could have affected the results. We
expect that if we had distributed the eight ads over more than four articles, we
would find results consistent with those in the one ad and four ad conditions, as
well as results consistent with those brand attitude changes in Study 2 above.125
We also ran a 2-way ANOVA treating ad exposure and political leaning as fixed
factors.126 For wholesome ratings, the interaction term was significant.127
Conservatives were more negatively affected by tarnishing ads than liberals.
Even though interaction terms were not significant in our other 2-way
ANOVAs128, we did find that conservatives showed the hypothesized effect more
than liberals. Looking at Figures 6-9 below we see that the trend for
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Another explanation could be due to identity threat. As we look below on the 2 factor ANOVA,
we find that the uptick in the eight condition is driven by the responses of conservative
consumers. Conservative consumers like Chick-fil-A more than liberals in our study. This is likely
because Chick-fil-A espouses conservative principles and hence lines up with the social identity
matrix of conservatives. When seeing an ad for a Chicks Fill A adult store, there is a type of
cognitive dissonance or social identity threat for the conservative consumer—more likely in the
eight-ad condition, because the Chicks Fill A brand was incredibly obvious and apparent
Psychology literature suggests that when faced with such social identity threat, consumers
respond by elevating their perceptions of brands that are closely tied to their social identity in
order to combat the threat. The increase in brand associations in the eight condition could be a
social identity threat response by conservative consumers. For a detailed discussion of
responses to social identity threat, see Dalton, A., & Huang, L. (2014), Motivated Forgetting in
Response to Social Identity Threat, JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH 40(6).
126

We dummy coded the political leaning scale just as in previous studies.
F(3,163)=3.343, p=.021
128
Tasty Ratings F(3,163)=1.431, p=.236; Rank F(3,163)=1.910,
F(3,163)=1.652, p=.180.
127
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p=.130;

Liking

conservatives on all measured metrics of brand reputation show the existence of
sex tarnishing when ad exposure is increased.129
Figure 6: Wholesome Ratings of Chick-fil-A Condition x Political Leaning

Contrasts indicate that the zero-ad and four-ad conditions for conservatives were
significantly different (mean difference=2.931, p=.003)

129 Note that the eight-ad condition is still an outlier and an anomaly even when controlling for
political leaning.
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Figure 7: Tasty Ratings of Chick-fil-A Condition x Political Leaning

Contrasts indicate that the zero-ad and four-ad conditions for conservatives were
marginally significantly different (mean difference=1.903, p=.079)

Figure 8: Liking Ratings of Chick-fil-A Condition x Political Leaning

Contrasts indicate that the zero-ad and four-ad conditions for conservatives were
significantly different (mean difference=2.194, p=.031)
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Figure 9: Ranking of Chick-fil-A against competitors Condition x Political Leaning
(Note that a higher ranking means a lower rating in terms of liking)

Contrasts indicate that the zero-ad and four-ad conditions for conservatives were
marginally significantly different (mean difference=1.250, p=.095).

Discussion: In this study, we directly manipulated the exposure of sex tarnishing
ads. We used banner ads on online news articles. We found that as we
increased the level of ads from zero to eight, we found larger effects of
tarnishing. The tipping point seemed to be four ads. Four tarnishing ads seemed
to have consistently caused significant tarnishing effects for those respondents
who were conservative leaning. When seen in context with Studies 1A and 1B
this finding makes sense. One off advertisements and a small number of
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tarnishing exposures has little to no effect on mark reputation. But when
exposure is increased, we enter the realm where sex tarnishing becomes a
reality.
We also note that all our studies are consistent with the classic Elaboration
Likelihood Model as described above in section two. The model predicts that
when cognitive capacity is available, the central route to attitude persuasion will
be used. This could explain why catalogue and website tarnishing
advertisements did not have large effects on brand associations and brand
attitudes. For those ads, we directed consumers to focus on the advertisements
themselves, read and evaluate the marks. This likely triggered the use of the
central route. The central route is characterized by reasoned, rational, cognition.
In this type of processing, it is likely that consumers were extremely readily
cognizant that the two brands (tarnishing brand and the target brand) were from
two different sources. As such, they were less likely to allow the tarnishing brand
to dilute the target brand. However, in our last study, we did not direct any
attention towards the advertisements themselves. Instead, we told consumers to
focus on the newspaper articles. The tarnishing advertisements were only
background noise. Therefore, when seeing the advertisements, consumers were
under cognitive load and stress, because they were focused on the articles. In
this case, we would predict the peripheral route of processing to manifest. Given
that the peripheral route is more emotional driven and focused on using crude
cues rather than reasoned evaluation, it is likely that consumers were less readily
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cognizant that the two brands were distinct (although, it was clear nobody was
confused as to the source). Therefore, they were more likely to allow the
tarnishing brand to dilute the target brand.
The interaction of political leaning and tarnishing is also an interesting take-away.
We found that conservatives were more likely to have positive association and
attitudes towards Chick-fil-A as a baseline (a main effect of conservative
leaning). This is likely because Chick-fil-A espouses conservative ideals and so
is more appealing to conservative consumers. It also is the case that tarnishing
ads had a larger effect on conservatives than they did on left leaning consumers.
This makes sense as an adult store is likely to be extremely unappealing to a
conservative (at least more so than a left leaning consumer). Given both the
unappealing nature of the tarnishing ad and the higher baseline liking of Chick-filA by conservatives, we think it is consistent with theory that conservatives would
show larger effects of tarnishing than liberals.

Replication of Study 3
Our study above implies that as the number of ads goes up, the potential for a
tarnishing effect also goes up. It is important in any experimental survey
methodology to replicate effects to make sure that the initial results manifest for
different groups of consumers. To replicate our banner ad study above, we used
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a new sample of 191 consumers.130 Since it seemed that four tarnishing ads
were the sweet spot of reputational harm, we only compared mark associations
and attitudes for two conditions (zero tarnishing ads vs. four tarnishing ads). The
study proceeded in the exact same way as above except we asked two new
questions to get at consumption habits of respondents. We asked respondents
how often in the past two months they have consumed Chick-fil-A products and
on average how much they spend per visit to Chick-fil-A. We did this to help us
estimate the revenue effect of the four tarnishing ads.
We successfully replicated our previous results and found statistically significant
effects of four tarnishing ads on brand associations and attitudes. Those that saw
the four tarnishing ads rated Chick-fil-A as less tasty, preferred it less compared
to competitors, and liked it less. (Tasty Ratings F(1,189)=12.02, p=.048; Rank
F(1,189)=4.355, p=.059; Liking F(1,189)=18.395, p=.015). Again, we see that
brand attitude shows the largest statistical effect (1 percent significance level)
and the largest absolute effect. The ratings of liking went from 5.40 to 4.78, a
decrease of .62 on the Likert Scale. This comports nicely with the Elaboration
Likelihood Model’s predictions as described above.
These results held both for conservative and non-conservative consumers. The
robustness of our results make us confident that increasing sex tarnishing ad

130 In getting new consumers, we made sure that on Amazon Mechanical Turk we had
indicators for those respondents who had taken Study 2 and Study 3 above. We did not want any
consumers to have already seen the Chicks Fill A website or banner advertisements.
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exposure does increase the likelihood of harm to the reputation of the existing
senior brand.
We also note that the decrease in liking ratings (among others) might not seem
at first to have serious revenue effects tied to purchase likelihood, after all it was
only a decrease of .62 on a scale of 1-7. However, we can provide an estimate of
the revenue effect of only a .62 decrease in liking ratings given that we asked
consumers how often they consumed Chick-fil-A and how much they spent when
they visited the store previously. Doing this, we estimate that the revenue effect
of four tarnishing ads is a decrease of $1,804.50 for our sample. The pretarnishing estimated revenue for our sample was $7,650, and the post-tarnishing
estimated revenue for our sample was $5,854.50131. This shows that even small
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To get the estimated revenue for the pre-tarnishing sample we first calculated the number of
people who answered each interval on the scale 1-7 (e.g., 10 people answered a 1, 8 answered a
2, etc.). We then divide these numbers by the total population of the pre-tarnishing sample to get
the percentage of people who gave a rating “n” to their liking of Chick-fil-A. We call this
percentage
where P represents the percentage of people in the non-tarnishing sample, “Z,”
who gave Chick-fil-A a liking rating of “n” where n=1-7. We then define
where P represents
the percentage of people in the non-tarnishing sample, “T,” who gave Chick-fil-A a liking rating of
“n” where n=1-7. We then calculate how often consumers patron from Chick-fil-A given that they
gave a liking rating of 1-7. This was easy to calculate as it was one of the added questions we
asked in our replication study. We asked this question on a two-month specification, so we
multiplied the answers by 12. We then averaged the number of visits across each rating. We
define the number of yearly visits for any given rating as
where “n” represents each rating 17. Note that this number is the same across the pre-tarnishing and post-tarnishing samples,
meaning we only estimate how the movement along the Likert scale affects revenue. We also
asked our respondents their average dollar expenditure for each visit to Chick-fil-A. We averaged
these to get $9, which after looking at the Chick-fil-A menu does seem like the reasonable price
for one meal. With these numbers, we can calculate the pre-tarnishing estimated revenue and the
post tarnishing estimated revenue by taking the number of consumers who gave a specific rating
to Chick-fil-A multiplying it by the number of yearly visits of consumers by specific rating, and
finally multiplying by the average expenditure of $9 per visit. We then simply take the difference
between the two revenues. This difference in revenue can represented by the following
expression:

.

62

changes in mark attitudes and mark associations that harm the reputation of the
brand can have drastic effects on revenue. Our analysis above shows that
showing four tarnishing ads created a 25% decrease in revenue for our sample.
However, we don’t argue that this is necessary or even sufficient measure to
prove tarnishment. Trademark tarnishment should be recognized even in the
absence of a decrease in revenue. We only take on this exercise to show that
tarnishing can have serious negative consequences on financial health of a
company.
Note that this is an effect measured directly after viewing the tarnishing
advertisements. We acknowledge, as is the case with any advertisements, there
is a decay of the total effect on brand attitudes. In the same way that viewing an
advertisement for a product creates a spike in awareness and association that
decreases over time. We expect that the tarnishing effect of an ad is not everlasting. The effect spikes and then likely decreases over time. However, if our
respondents were then shown these ads again as the tarnishing effect began to
decay, we think that this would cause the effect to permeate throughout time.132

132 Much has been written about the decay effect of advertisements and the frequency at
which advertising needs to be shown to be effective. The following is a non-exhaustive
representative list: Vijay Mahajan and Eitan Muller, Advertising Pulsing Policies for Generating
Awareness for New Products, 5 Marketing Science no. 2 (1986) (building an analytical model that
evaluates whether pulsing or an even policy of advertising is more effective); Herman
Ebbinghaus, Memory, New York: Columbia Press (1913) (showing that consumers forget
advertising as distance from exposure increases); J. L. Simon, What Do Zielske’s Real Data
Show About Pulsing?, 19 Journal of Marketing Research, 415-420 (1979) (finding that advertising
is most effect when it is pulsed in non-uniform increments rather than a large one time burst and
more effective that uniform pulsing).
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Part Four: Survey Methodology in Trademark Tarnishment Cases

In this section, we briefly show why using experimental survey methodology is a
workable requirement for plaintiffs in trademark dilution by tarnishment cases.
We ultimately argue that our methods above should be the type of proof that is
required in subsequent court proceedings. In part five below we focus on what
aspects make a good survey for trademark dilution cases and what aspects
courts and litigants should focus on.
Surveys and Trademark Litigation

Surveys are routinely used in intellectual property cases including patents and
trademarks.133 In patent litigation, conjoint analysis (a form of survey
methodology) is routinely used to show which attributes of a product consumers
prefer and how much they value those attributes. This is helpful for damages in
patent infringement cases.
Surveys have a strong historical role in trademark analysis.134 They have been
used traditionally to help courts and litigants understand whether a mark is

133 See e.g., Diamond, supra note 3; Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer
Surveys in Trademark Infringement: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA. J.
BUS. L. 1013, 1017 (2012); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jerre B. Swann, Editors’ Introduction:
Surveys in Modern Litigation Involving Trademarks and Deceptive Advertising, in TRADEMARK
AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN.
134 Although initially, surveys were not widely used, over the course of past 50 years, survey
use as rapidly increased”
According to one account, only 18 surveys were offered in reported cases in the
fifteen years between 1946 and 1960, growing to 86 surveys between 1961 and
1975 (approximately 6 per year). Between 1976 to 1990, 442 surveys were
presented in reported cases (29 per year); between 1991 and 2005, 742 surveys
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famous in this first instance135, whether two marks are similar enough, and
whether a junior mark is likely to confuse consumers as to the source of a
good.136 In a sample of 96 cases, Diamond and Frank found that 81% of surveys
used in trademark litigation cases were used to determine a likelihood of
confusion, 33% were used to establish secondary meaning, and 20% were used
for deceptive meaning.137
The likelihood of confusion standard138 is satisfied using either survey evidence
of proposed confusion (like we do above), actual confusion (bringing in
consumers and experts who testify that consumers were actually confused), and

were offered (approximately 49 per year on average); and in the seven years
between 2006 and 2012, about 315 surveys appeared in reported cases
(approximately 45 per year).”
Diamond, supra note 3 (quoting Shari Diamond, et al., Survey Evidence: Crunching the Numbers
(Feb.
28,
2013),
available
at
http://www.mccarthyinstitute.org/panel_pdfs/empiricalworkmaurerdiamondford.pdf).
135 This is a multifaceted requirement in trademark litigation. One prong of satisfying this is
establishing secondary meaning. Secondary meaning is important because one cannot
trademark a term that does not have a special meaning:
The question of whether a descriptive mark has achieved secondary meaning is
important both in the bulk of litigation that takes place before the Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board (TTAB) in office actions to determine whether a descriptive mark
qualifies for trademark protection through registration on the Principal Register and
in trademark infringement litigation in federal court. Although circumstantial
measures are often used to support a claim of secondary meaning (e.g., “amount
and manner of advertising” and “volume of sales”), surveys provide direct evidence
on the relevant legal question: whether the relevant consuming public has come to
identify the mark as denoting source.”
Diamond, supra note 3 at 2034.
136

Diamond, supra note 3.
Id. at 2057.
138 In a trademark infringement action, a senior mark must simply show that the junior mark “is
likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive.” 15U.S.C. § 1114(2012).
137
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“argument by inference.”139 In a likelihood of confusion survey, consumers are
generally shown both marks at issue and asked where each comes from. If the
majority of consumers think both marks come from the same source, this is good
evidence of a likelihood of confusion.
Surveys have also been recently used to show dilution.140 But most survey
empirical work, whether in law reviews or court proceedings has focused on
dilution by blurring.141 These surveys focus on measuring whether junior harm
the distinctiveness of a relevant senior mark. However, little survey work has
been introduced in dilution by tarnishing cases.142 This is partly because, as
described above, the standard of proof has been puzzling to legal scholars and
courts. But it also due in part to a lack of a good framework for measuring the
likelihood of reputational harm. We have provided such a framework in this paper
and below argue why it is a workable standard.
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Id. at 2036 (citing 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 32:158 (4th ed. 2014)).
140

Id. at 2039.
See Beebe, supra note 3; Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, supra note 94; Pullig, supra note
94; Shari Seidman Diamond, Surveys in Dilution Cases II, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE
ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW, SCIENCE, AND DESIGN at 155, 157–62 (arguing that it is
difficult to produce surveys that show a decrease in distinctiveness); Jerre B. Swann, Swann’s
Rebuttal to Diamond, in TRADEMARK AND DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING SURVEYS: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND DESIGN 163, 163–65 (arguing against Diamond that impaired distinctiveness
can be established empirically). Cases are also seeing more use of dilution surveys, See e.g.,
Nike, Inc. v. Nikepal Int’l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1820 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
141

142 We found one case concerning trademark tarnishing that did use empirical survey evidence.
Charles Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp 3d 1302, (N. D. Ga. 2008) (in which WalMart sued Charles Smith for making t-shirts with the slogan “Wal-Qaeda” with the intent to make
political statement against Wal-Mart. The court there heard testimony from Jacob Jacoby on a
survey he commissioned to find out if the t-shirts harmed the reputation of Wal-Mart’s trademark.
The case was ultimately dismissed because the t-shirts were political speech and protected under
the First Amendment.)
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Surveys in Trademark Tarnishment Cases
Surveys are a fruitful way to measure the reputation of harm to a senior
trademark. The crux of the problem for using surveys for trademark tarnishment
has been a good definition of trademark reputation. It is here where marketing
scholarship is useful because marketing scholars have consistently measured
and studied brand reputation.143 To better understand trademark and brand
reputation, marketing scholarship routinely uses survey methodology.144
Moreover, these surveys routinely use fictional brands and stories to manipulate
brand associations and brand attitudes.145 This is exactly the correct way to
measure a likelihood of reputational harm to a trademark. Long-standing
marketing scholarship methods provide rigor and precedent for courts to require
sophisticated survey evidence.

143

See infra Section 2 for further discussion on marketing scholarship on brand dilution.
An exhaustive list of marketing scholarship that uses surveys to measure brands would be
incredibly long. For an overview of surveys in the field, see George Gallup, Jr., (1988) SURVEY
RESEARCH: CURRENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES, JOURNAL OF CONSUMER MARKETING,
Vol. 5 Issue: 1, pp.27-30.
144

145

The following is a non-exhaustive list of marketing scholarship using fictional brands in
studying brand dilution: Lau, K. C. and Phau, I. (2007), Extending symbolic brands using their
personality: Examining antecedents and implications towards brand image fit and brand dilution,
PSYCHOL. MARK., 24: 421–444 (using fictional brands to study how various factors of a brand
speak to consumers); Sanjay Sood, Kevin Lane Keller (2012), The Effects of Brand Name
Structure on Brand Extension Evaluations and Parent Brand Dilution, JOURNAL OF MARKETING
RESEARCH: June 2012, Vol. 49, No. 3, pp. 373-382 (using fictional brands to study how brand
extensions harm the underlying brands); Vanitha Swaminathan, Richard J. Fox, Srinivas K.
Reddy (2001), The Impact of Brand Extension Introduction on Choice, JOURNAL OF MARKETING:
October 2001, Vol. 65, No. 4, pp. 1-15 (using fictional brands to study brand extension effects).
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It is important to note that there are alternatives to surveys to measure dilution.
Regression analysis using real life data is in many ways an ideal way to measure
harm to the reputation of a mark. With regression analysis, large amounts of data
are used to attempt to show the point at which mark association and mark
attitudes change. Ideally, to do this a litigant would have an abundance of real life
market measures of mark attitudes, mark associations and purchase data for two
periods of time. First, data would need to be collected for a set time period before
a tarnishing mark was introduced and then an equal time period after a tarnishing
mark was introduced. With this robust data, a regression could be run to
determine whether the introduction of a tarnishing mark had a negative effect on
the measured mark associations, mark attitudes and purchasing behavior.
There are several advantages of using regression analysis to measure
reputational harm. Surveys are not quite the “real world”—their external validity
can be questioned. In our surveys above, no consumers made actual decisions
in a store. Using real world data and regression analysis the external validity of
the result is drastically higher than for a survey. This is where the advantages
stop and the severe difficulties begin.
First, to use real world data on mark associations, mark attitudes, and purchase
behavior, a litigant needs this data. Collecting data on brand perceptions by
consumers isn’t that difficult, one simply needs to ask consumers who patron the
store. But, this data needs to be collected at equal time periods. For example,
one cannot collect data every day for a month and then skip a few days and
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continue collecting data. For regression analysis to be specified correctly, data
must be collected in equal installments. This is very difficult to do over a long
period of time.
Second, to isolate the casual effect of a tarnishing mark, we must control for
every other potential variable that can affect mark reputation and sales. This is
practically impossible. Marketing of a competitor brand, marketing of the litigant’s
brand, the interest rate, political elections, monetary policy, the stock market,
weather and several other factors can influence how people make decisions and
what perceptions they have of a brand.146 To truly isolate the effect of a
tarnishing mark, a regression needs to hold constant all other metrics that might
influence a mark’s reputation. As such, drawing casual influences from real world
data is incredibly difficult.147 Survey methodology using the type of randomization
that we used above, allows us to easily draw casual connections. Given that our
study is done on Amazon Mechanical Turk and given that we have only varied

146 At least one article in the marketing arena has attempted to use brand perceptions across
many consumers and create causal inferences. Srinivasan, supra note 59 (using vector
autoregressive models to isolate effects of brand perceptions on sales).
147 See e.g., Hibbs, Douglas A., Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in
Time-Series Regression Models, SOCIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGY, vol. 5, 1973, pp. 252–308
(detailing the difficulties of using regression data over time to make casual inferences); Winship,
Christopher, and Stephen L. Morgan, The Estimation of Causal Effects from Observational Data,
ANNUAL. REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 25: 659-706 (2009) (discussing several designs and data analysis
models available to strengthen causal inference from non‐experimental data). This difficulty of
casual analysis with real world data is tied to the problem of endogeneity as well. For discussions
of endogeneity in regression analysis, see Rubin, Donald B. For objective causal inference,
design trumps analysis. Ann. Appl. Stat. 2 (2008), no. 3 (emphasizing that endogeneity problems
should be analyzed before data is collected).
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the relevant trademark between our conditions, we can safely say that the result
we find is casually connected to the tarnishing mark.148
Lastly, to use real data, litigants must wait for a tarnishing mark to be introduced
into the market and then wait for it to have an effect before they can analyze
whether the mark caused reputational harm. This means, that regression
analysis cannot handle the Chick-fil-A case in the introduction. It can only hand
non-fictional tarnishing marks. Regression analysis can potentially measure
“actual harm.” Given the federal standard—a “likelihood” standard—courts and
litigants must employ a method that can handle fictional brands and pre-emptive
tarnishing lawsuits. Surveys do exactly this. Above we created a fictional brand
(Chicks Fill A) and showed how it affected the brand reputation of Chick-fil-A.
Only with surveys using randomization can this be achieved.149
Reliability and Cost of Surveys in Trademark Tarnishing Cases
Legal scholars have been critical of survey and empirical work in litigation
arguing that it is unreliable and costly.150 We respond to those criticisms here
briefly.
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See e.g. Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005), Establishing a causal chain: Why
experiments are often more effective than mediational analyses in examining psychological
processes, JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 89(6), 845-851 (discussing why
randomization and surveys can isolate causality better than real world regression analysis); Sobel
ME. 1995, Causal inference in the social and behavioral sciences, in Handbook of Statistical
Modeling for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, ed. G Arminger, CC Clogg New York: Plenum.
(detailing the methods in social science that produce the best causal inferences).
149 See infra section 2 on why companies would not want to wait for a tarnishing mark to be
introduced before seeking an injunction.
150 See Tushnet, supra note 3 (criticizing surveys because they do not mimic real world
purchasing decisions and hence are unreliable); see also Beebe et al., supra note 3 (showing that
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Survey methodology has been a staple of consumer behavior research for
decades.151 Consumer behavior research generally is considered the study of
how consumers in the marketplace make decisions and behave.152 Trademark
dilution is exactly focused on how consumers make decisions and which things
effects consumers in the marketplace.153 As such, in order to better understand
consumers, surveys are exactly the right type of evidence needed in trademark
litigation.154 Although, surveys do not exactly represent the real world, as
described above, they do approximate the real world. Over the course of the past
several years, marketing scholars have continued to not only refine their survey
methods to make them more reliable, but have continued to replicate their
results. In our empirical strategy above, we replicated our final results of four ads
having a significant tarnishing effect. Surveys allow mass reproduction of results

when dilution by blurring measurements are put in a realistic context, dilution effects go away);
151 Marketing scholarship routinely uses survey methodology, and companies themselves
also use the strategy to gain insights into consumer behaviors. For discussion of reliability of
consumer behavior research, see Peter, J. Paul, Reliability: A Review of Psychometric Basics
and Recent Marketing Practices, JOURNAL OF MARKETING RESEARCH, vol. 16, no. 1, 1979, pp. 6–
17 (discussing which marketing methods prove to be more reliable and offering guidance to
scholars on increasing reliability).
152 Helgeson, J. G., Kluge, E. A., Mager, J., Taylor, C. (1984), Trends in consumer behavior
literature: A content analysis, JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, 10, 449-454. (consumer
behavior is the “acts of individuals directly involved in obtaining and using economic goods and
services, including the decision processes that precede and determine these acts”).
153 See Jacoby, supra note 3 (arguing that trademarks are distinctly linked to consumer
behavior).
154 Court cases have said as much. See, e.g., Schering Corp. v. Pfizer, Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225
(2d Cir. 1999) (“Surveys are routinely admitted in trademark and false advertising cases to show
actual confusion, genericness of a name or secondary meaning.”); Kate Spade LLC v. Saturdays
Surf LLC, 950 F. Supp. 2d 639, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“It has become routine in Lanham Act
cases to submit [confusion] surveys”).
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which should give courts and litigants confidence in the product of survey
methodology.
This is not to say that every survey is a reliable approximation of what will
happen if a tarnishing mark is introduced. Quite the contrary. It is important to
craft a well-designed and well analyzed survey. We discuss the dynamics and
requirements for a reliable dilution survey study below in section five.
One might also argue that surveys are expensive and cumbersome to use in
tarnishing litigation. Even though they are used in trademark infringement
litigation routinely, collecting data on mark associations, and attitudes and
purchase likelihood, especially with fictional marks, might seem difficult. First, on
a cost account, surveys would be a very small percentage of total litigation costs.
The studies we presented in this article only cost a few thousand dollars, and
similar work would cost even less given that companies have a better sense of
their own mark’s associations and accompanying attitudes.155
But companies have a huge cost advantage in producing the dilution studies we
advocate for here. Large companies are constantly managing their brands and
this includes managing the associations and attitudes consumers have towards
their trademarks.156 At any given point, a good brand manager will be collecting

155

We needed to extensively pre-test brand attitudes, perceptions and purchase likelihood
before measuring potential tarnishing effects.
156 Companies sometimes collect such good granular weekly data that scholars can use this
data in their empirical studies. See Srinivasan, supra note 59 (using data from brands on brand
perceptions, attitudes, associations, and purchase likelihood measured across hundreds of
consumers on a weekly basis).
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data on consumer behavior. She will be making sure she understands how
consumers view the brand, how they relate to the brand, whether they like the
brand, and how likely they are to buy from the brand. These are the same data
points we, as non-company insiders, have to initially collect, adding to the cost of
our study. The brand and trademark manager need not spend money collecting
data in the first instance. Expert witnesses and litigants can use the existing data
that brands collect to substantially lower the cost of dilution surveys and increase
the reliability of those exact surveys. By using data of actual daily consumers, the
results of a dilution study using a brand’s real life data come closer to mimicking
reality, increasing external validity of the study.

Part Five: Guidance for Courts and Congress

We think that courts and legal scholars have yet to fully integrate marketing
scholarship and methodology to measure trademark tarnishment. Above we
showed that using brand theory and surveys, it is possible to empirically show
that a junior mark has a “likelihood of harm”. Ultimately, we hope that our theory
and methods will guide courts and maybe even Congress to clearly lay out what
types of empirical evidence should be necessary to prove trademark tarnishment.
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court’s actual harm standard is too strict, as
companies lose market share if they must wait until tarnishing marks are
introduced into the market before bringing a lawsuit. The presumptive Sixth
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Circuit standard, however, is too liberal because, as our studies show, tarnishing
(even sex tarnishing) doesn’t occur in all circumstances and even when it does,
the effects don’t seem to be drastically large.157
Four distinct conditions likely need to hold before tarnishing is likely to play a
large part in harming a mark’s reputation: 1) the extent to which consumers know
about and like a given brand, 2) the extent to which consumers are exposed to
the tarnishing mark, 3) idiosyncrasies in the demographics of the relevant
consumers and 4) context in which marks are encountered. Courts and litigants
that intend to require, introduce, or argue against surveys to show trademark
tarnishing would be wise to craft surveys that touch on these important
considerations. We discuss each of these below and how they should be used to
craft reliable surveys and provide guidance to courts on how to interpret these
surveys.
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We note that the Cohen’s D for many of our effects were around .3-.4 These are small to
medium effect sizes. Although, no area of the law specifies how large a statistically significant
effect need be, we note that reporting effect size it is an important step in understanding how
harmful tarnishing marks actually are. Effect size calculations are ways to express how large an
effect is. Just saying the effect is statistically significant is often not enough, and so Cohen’s D is
a measure of the size of the effect. For more details on why effect sizes are important in
psychology research see Christopher Ferguson, An effect size primer: A guide for clinicians and
researchers. PROFESSIONAL PSYCHOLOGY: RESEARCH AND PRACTICE, 40(5), 532-538, (2009).
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Consumer Knowledge and Liking
Trademark reputation cannot be harmed if it is not known. Specifically, it must be
the case that the brand associations that a company is claiming could be
tarnished must be widely known to the public.
It is important for plaintiffs to understand which associations consumers hold and
which ones are widely held when constructing surveys to explore trademark
tarnishment. Significant pre-testing on a mark’s associations is an important step
in making sure plaintiffs are isolating those relevant associations. Often, a brand
might think it has a certain reputation in the marketplace, but consumers are not
convinced of it or are not cognizant of it. If this is the case, survey methodology
will not show any negative effects of a tarnishing mark.
On the other hand, plaintiffs should be wary of consumers who hold very strong
positive associations of their mark. It was possible in our last study that those in
the eight-ad condition had very strong feelings on Chick-fil-A. So much so that it
is possible that no level of ad exposure would have swayed them in any way.
Plaintiffs need to be cognizant of the varying brand associations and relative
strength of associations that consumers have. To create a realistic measurement
of tarnishing, courts should require plaintiffs to use the brand’s target segment in
their surveys.158 It is likely not consequential enough that tarnishing occurs with

158 This is often a point of contention in expert testimony. See Hankinson v. Rooms to Go
(citation), Expert Testimony, David J. Reibstein at 46 (arguing that the Gaskin survey did not
attempt to use the correct customer segment of Rooms to Go; by just using customers who
previously purchased a Rooms to Go product, the survey did not adequately “ensures that
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some consumers, it must occur for the plaintiff’s actual consumers for the
revenue effect to be large. Plaintiffs however can and should use future
consumers in their surveys. By arguing that a strong brand reputation allows for
more efficient and profitable brand extensions, plaintiffs can and should
incorporate future target segments into their surveys. When plaintiffs choose their
sample wisely and appropriately, even small tarnishing effects could have a large
impact on a brand’s bottom line.
Defendants, of course should be wary of the samples that plaintiffs choose.
Defining a target segment too narrowly or too broadly could have the potential to
create fabricated tarnishing results.

Advertisement Exposure
Our studies show that exposure has a large effect on the existence of
tarnishment. This makes intuitive sense. Just as normal advertising exposure
increases awareness of brands, tarnishing exposure increases the potential for
reputational harm. In our first set of studies we found very little tarnishing of one
off ads. However, in our last study when we varied significantly the number of
advertisements, we saw that tarnishing began to rear its ugly head.

respondents taking his survey have ever or would be willing to purchase this type of protectant
and stain warranty plan” at issue in the litigation); see also, Reibstein expert testimony supra note
85 at 50 (arguing that the respondents used in the Maronick survey were not representative of the
population write large who were the subjects of the litigation).
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Marketing theory reinforces our finding here. When exploring the relationship
between advertising exposure and effectiveness, marketers have discovered a
type of S-curve. This S-curve shows that at low exposures of advertising,
effectiveness does not increase. However, after a certain point, the effectiveness
of the marginal advertisement is incredibly high. It then flattens out at high levels
of ad exposure. This makes sense if we think about tarnishing as combative
advertising. For the tarnishing mark to have a large effect on the existing senior
mark, its own advertising needs to be effective. If consumers do not perceive
“sex” or “disgust” from the tarnishing mark, their perceptions of the senior will not
be effected. Therefore, we must look to how effective the tarnishing ad is to really
understand how the existing senior mark’s is affected. In this case, high exposure
rates reinforced the sex nature of our tarnishing mark and therefore significantly
affected perceptions of the senior mark.
This has implications for litigation. Take for example Moseley. Victor’s Little
Secret was by no means a national brand. They had only one store in a small
strip mall in a small town. They mainly advertised in local newspapers and local
television. The distribution and exposure levels of Victor’s Little Secret were quite
low. The chances of a consumer of ever seeing Victor’s Little Secret was low and
even if they did see, the chances of seeing it several times was even lower
(although those who lived in the town or commuted by the store sign would have
had multiple exposures). Therefore, for the consumer writ large we would expect
that Victor’s Little Secret probably had little to no tarnishing effect on Victoria
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Secret. This is particularly important, given that that 6th Circuit held that Victor’s
Little Secret presumptively tarnished Victoria Secret.
When using surveys to show potential tarnishing effects, plaintiffs should be
careful to realistically portray the exposure levels of the tarnishing mark.
Moreover, courts and defendants should act as gatekeepers to make sure that
plaintiffs don’t introduce evidence that drastically over estimates the number of
ad exposures that consumers will receive in the marketplace.

Consumer Demographics
Consumers are unique. They have unique identities and unique connections with
a brand. Some consumers think that Chick-fil-A is the best thing ever because it
is super tasty and has the best sweet tea around. Others think that Chick-fil-A is
the best thing ever because of the religious and family oriented wholesome
values it espouses. Still others, are increasingly critical of Chick-fil-A specifically
because it infuses its religious agenda in its marketing and political
contributions.159
We measured political leaning because we thought that certain types of
consumers would have different perceptions of the Chick-fil-A trademark. We did
find that conservatives found the brand more wholesome overall than liberals.
159 For a clear discussion of the connection of Chick-fil-A to religion and the criticisms it has
faced, see Emma Green, “Chick-fil-A: Selling Chicken with a Side of God,” The Atlantic, Sept 8,
2014, available at https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/09/chick-fil-a-sellingchicken-with-a-side-of-god/379776/.

78

This is an important metric in survey methodology. Understanding and measuring
how consumer idiosyncrasies effect tarnishing is important for courts and litigants
to keep in mind. Plaintiffs should be measuring these demographic
characteristics and using them in their analysis.
But it is not just demographics that effect brand liking. Demographics can also
affect how consumers respond to a tarnishing advertisement. For example, we
found that conservatives generally disliked our Chicks Fill A adult store ad more
than liberals. We also found that women disliked the Chicks Fill A ads more than
men. Respondents who had never been to an adult store disliked the ads more
than those that had. This only reinforces the fact that understanding what
consumers constitute your target segment and where they come from in terms of
geography, gender, political leaning, etc. will allow plaintiffs to better craft
surveys that more realistically asses the existence of tarnishment.

Context
Our studies show that the Elaboration Likelihood Model predicts well when
tarnishing will likely affect a senior brand. We showed that under cognitive load,
sex tarnishing is more likely to occur. This is because consumers use
surrounding cues of an advertisement when they are under cognitive load, rather
than rationally analyzing the merits of an advertisement.
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Cognitive load is more effective because it makes the sex aspect of the
tarnishing mark more salient for consumers. Moreover, when seeing a similar
mark associated with sex under cognitive load, consumers spend less time
distinguishing Chicks Fil A from Chik-Fil-A (although consumers were not
confused as to the source of the mark). These two factors (high effectiveness
and less dissociation between the marks) creates a larger tarnishing effect.
When little attention is paid to the tarnishing mark, it likely is encoded in a
consumer’s memory closer to the original mark. This increases the likelihood that
the tarnishing mark’s perceptions will be recalled when a consumer interacts with
the original mark.160
Courts and litigants should recognize the context in which tarnishing ads are
perceived. In some cases, tarnishing ads are in magazines or retail environments
where consumers generally spend time focusing and evaluating the merits of an
ad. However, when tarnishing ads are placed in locations where consumers
might be under cognitive load (banner ads, billboards), tarnishing marks do not
receive high levels of analysis and hence can cause reputational harm more
easily.
Conclusion

In this paper, we have provided a workable framework for analyzing trademark
tarnishment cases. We showed that reputational harm can be defined using
160

This is supported by associate network theory see infra note 63.
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extant marketing scholarship. Our empirical studies show that tarnishing does
exist, but under certain conditions. We showed using three experimental studies
that certain types of junior marks can harm the reputation of senior marks. But
our studies showed mixed results. This only reinforces the realities of trademark
tarnishment (i.e. it should not be a presumptive reality). As such, the current state
of legal doctrine and court precedent is insufficient to adequately hear trademark
tarnishment cases. The federal likelihood of harm standard that some courts
have employed, devoid of any empirical proof, is an unworkable standard. Courts
should require plaintiffs to show empirically that the junior mark in question will
harm or has harmed the plaintiff’s mark in the same way he have done here.

We also note that more research on the dynamics of tarnishing and trademark
dilution are necessary and ripe for studying. We only focused on sex tarnishing in
our latter studies. Tarnishing takes many forms and the psychology literature
shows robust effects of disgust aversion. Disgust is an important form of
tarnishing that deserves further study. Social identity tarnishing is also an
unexplored form of reputational harm. Many consumers make personal
connections with brands, because they view the brand as a part of their social
identity. What happens when a junior mark puts that personal connection in
question? For example, Lululemon appeals to those who embody a certain type
of identity (focused on relaxation, lean body types, women, etc.). What would
happen if a company focused on heavy lifting, aggressive grunting in the gym,
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that was male dominant, introduced a clothing brand called “Liftinglemon”?
Liftinglemon might harm Lululemon’s connection to the lean body female social
identity if Lululemon becomes associated with more masculine heavy lifting.161

Appendix 1: Sample Advertisement for Study 1A

161 We thank a participant at the 2016 Boston University Intellectual Property Working Paper
Conference for suggesting social identity tarnishing.
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Appendix 2: Sample Advertisements for Study 1B

CREST HOT SAUCE
Jason Crest is the most knowledgeable man when it comes to hot sauce. His Crest Hot Sauce is
the single hottest yet tastiest sauce you will ever try. It is made from the hottest peppers in the
world (the Naga Viper Pepper)!

Every naga peper that goes into Crest Hot Sauce is carefully selected to be just ripe enough to
be a fire cracker but not so ripe that it loses the smoky, savory flavor that we all want when it
comes to hot sauce.

Crest Hot Sauce has been gaining lots of popularity and you can find it at various mom and pop
grocery stores around the country. Crest Hot Sauce is made with the care and attention you
want from the people who understand hot sauce the best. You can use Crest Hot Sauce on
basically anything: Pizza, Wings, Eggs and even Salads!

Check out what people are saying about us:
“Crest Hot Sauce is the hottest sauce I’ve ever had. It
burned my mouth and my tongue…which I loved.”
—Suzy V.
“I consider myself a hot sauce connoisseur, and Crest Hot
Sauce is probably one of the top 3 hot sauces I’ve ever
had in my life.”—Neal B.
“You think Tabasco is hot??, try Crest, it’s like lighting a
fire in your mouth!”

83

Appendix 3: Sample News Article with Banner Ads for Study 3
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CHAPTER 2: To Boycott or Not to Boycott

Introduction:

On September 3, 2018 Nike explicitly endorsed the controversial former NFL
Player Colin Kaepernick in an Instagram post and commercial with the tagline:
“Believe in something. Even if it means sacrificing everything.” Kaepernick was
previously criticized heavily for his political and social commentary by kneeling
during the U.S. National Anthem at various football games. Immediate backlash
against Nike ensued. Thousands of former Nike consumers publicly boycotted
the brand and decided to burn shoes, cut logos off socks and shirts, and even
divest from Nike deals. At least one small city and some colleges even pledged
to boycott the Nike brand. (Gay 2018).
Boycotting by consumers is an ever-increasing form of consumer behavior. As
companies begin to take positions on both political and social issues, they
invariably upset segments of the market. Other recent examples include the
boycott of Chick-fil-A after the company publicly contributed to advocates against
same sex marriage (Nicas 2012), the anticipated boycott of the 2018 movie First
Man, where critiques claimed that the movie inappropriately left out the American
Flag on the moon landing (Epstein 2018), and the boycott of In-N-Out Burger due
to their public donation to the California Republican Party (Tsang 2018).
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Researchers have sought to study consumer boycotting. Marketing and
consumer behavior scholars have attempted to better understand the mindset of
boycotters (e.g., what are the incentives to boycott) and the underlying contexts
in which boycotting is likely to occur. (Friedman 1999; Kozinets & Handelman
1998; Klein, Smith, & John 2004). Other studies have attempted to determine
whether boycotting itself has any effect on a company in the long run. (Miller and
Sturdivant 1977). Surprisingly, little work has grappled with whether consumer
boycotting is an ethical practice—that is, should consumers be boycotting from a
moral perspective? Only a few articles seek to explore the ethical boundaries of
consumer boycotts. (Hussain 2012; Radzik 2017; Friedman 2001).
In this paper, I argue that consumer boycotting is an important ethical practice
that is constituent of the prosocial consumer. Boycotting for expressive purposes
acts as counter speech and, as such, the action contributes to the marketplace of
ideas by combatting the ever-increasing prevalence of corporate political speech.
Hence, boycotts should be encouraged and even lauded in the marketplace. I
start with a simple definition of consumer boycotts to narrow the scope of action.
In doing this I contrast the recent forms of political and social consumer
boycotting from consumer boycotts of the past. My account seeks only to analyze
those boycotts that express public dissatisfaction with a company’s political or
social stance. I then provide a brief survey of the motives for boycotters, drawing
on extant empirical and political philosophy research. Here, I define the noninstrumental (i.e., not necessarily seeking corporate behavior change) expressive
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motive of boycotting. Finally, I argue that when boycotts are motivated by
expression, they act as counter-speech to the political and social expression of
corporations. Engaging in counter speech is an important part of ethical
consumerism. I conclude with an agenda for consumer behavior research on
better understanding expressive boycotting and its relationship to the prosocial
consumer.

Part One: What is a Consumer Boycott?
Consumer boycotting is a form of ethical consumerism. “Ethical consumerism is
the practice of choosing to buy certain goods and services at least partly on the
basis of ethical considerations.” (Hussain 2012 p. 2). Boycotting is the decision to
not buy certain goods or services based upon one’s belief that the company that
produces those goods or services has taken an immoral or unethical action.
Although these actions can take several forms, my argument will focus on a
response to corporate actions that have an implicit political or social message.
It is important to note that in addition to the purchasing decision or lack thereof,
boycotting is often accompanied by outward public communication of a
consumer’s position and reason for boycotting. Many consumers take to social
media to proudly announce their boycott decision and rationales and even take
certain further affirmative actions (such as destroying shoes and shirts) that are
deemed to divest the consumers of the boycotted products they currently own.
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This particular form of boycotting is a relatively recent phenomenon. (Friedman
1999). Harkening back to the Stamp Act of 1756, we saw that the colonies
boycotted tea and other goods to express their dissatisfaction with the British. In
civil rights battles, many black Americans boycotted the public bus systems
because they acted as means of segregation. Still yet, the U.S. Olympic team
was pressed to boycott the 1980 Olympics due to Russia’s involvement with
Afghanistan. But the boycotts of recent seem to be different from these iconic
historical ones.
In comparison to mass groups of people actively marching and coming together
to protest a policy or a government, the consumer boycotts I seek to elucidate
are more modest. Often, they are simply individuals making a public commitment
not to patron a corporate entity. More so, and as discussed further below, these
boycotts do not seem to implicate instrumental motives. Whereas boycotts of the
past were clear in that their purpose was to create social and political policy
change, it is often unclear what outcome consumer boycotts of recent seek to
achieve. One is hard pressed to understand what exactly those burning Nike
shoes in response to Colin Kaepernick really want Nike to do.
I ultimately conclude below that the form of boycotting I define here as a
response to corporate entities taking political and social stances is humbler in its
motives than the boycotting of the past. This does not mean that this form of
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boycotting is in any way less valuable, however. As a matter of fact, recent
consumer boycotts are incredibly valuable and necessary in today’s marketplace
as a form of combatting corporate speech.

Part Two: Why do Consumers Boycott?
The motives of previous boycotts like the bus boycotts of the 1950s and current
consumer boycotts differ drastically. While the civil rights boycotts had clear
missions to change government policies towards minorities and more recently
towards women and the LGBT community, the consumer boycotts at issue in this
paper have more nuanced missions and motives. It is here that empirical
research has begun to study what exactly motivates a boycotter and what
contexts make boycotting more likely. Empirical research, however, has lagged
in analyzing what I term the non-instrumental expressive nature of boycotts. This
motivation for boycotting is something that has been recognized in both legal and
philosophical circles and it is this form of boycotting that I argue is desirable in
today’s marketplace. In this section I lay out the various motives of boycotting
and identify the non-instrumental expressive motive.
Two general motives to boycott have been identified in empirical literature:
instrumental and non-instrumental.
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A. Instrumental Goals
Seeking to change company behavior is a key motivator for consumer
boycotting. In many ways, this harkens back to the traditional boycott seeking to
change governmental policy. In the recent consumer boycotting context, the goal
is often to change some aspect of corporate policy. These policies could be
economic in nature (layoffs, pricing), social in nature (sweatshop labor), or even
political in nature (lobbying).
Most empirical work finds evidence that the perceived likelihood of a boycott
changing a company’s behavior or actions is a strong predictor of whether a
consumer will boycott in the first instance. (Friedman 1999; Kozinets &
Handelman 1998; Klein, Smith & John 2004). This is a type of instrumental
boycott. The boycott itself is only valuable because it has the potential for
change. Klein et al. found that when perceived likelihood of success is high,
participation of boycotting goes up. Sen, Giirhan-Canli & Morwitz (2001) find
similar results and argue that “perceived efficacy” of a boycott to create corporate
change influences participation. Moreover, the instrumental motivation explains
why consumers participate in boycotts even though objectively the likelihood of
success is low—many consumers have exaggerated perceptions of the efficacy
of consumer boycotts (John & Klein 2003). Moderators of instrumental success
include how widespread the boycott is and the overall expectation of
participation. (Sen, Giirhan-Canli & Morwitz 2001).

90

Most work in this context has used either fabricated or real examples of boycotts
to better understand motivations and done so in the corporate economic context.
For example, Klein et al. (2004) used an ongoing boycott called the Bremmer
Boycott to study various consumer incentives. The Bremer Boycott concerned
the closing of several factories by a European multinational firm that sold various
consumer food products. The closings were opposed due to the perception that
the company’s actions were harsh and motivated by corporate greed. Klein found
that consumers who thought a boycott would change Bremmer’s behavior and
potentially re-open the factories were more likely to participate. Sen et al. used
lab studies in which they fabricated a company that instituted an unanticipated
sharp increase in price. The instrumentality of boycotting then was manifested in
the desire of consumers to influence the company to lower their prices—a type of
corporate economic change.
Some have argued that instrumental motivations for corporate change can be
problematic on ethical grounds. Hussain argues that social change ethical
consumerism (e.g., boycotting for instrumental reasons) can be an impermissible
form of vigilantism. (Hussain 2012). He argues that once a consumer boycotts
with the intent to create corporate policy change, she is subject to a unique set of
procedural moral requirements. (Hussain 2012). In a liberal democracy, “the
process by which laws, policies, and patterns of behavior develop should be
consistent with procedural values.” (Hussain p. 3). Bribery, for example, may lead
to a socially beneficial outcome, but partaking in bribery would conflict with a
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procedural value of fairness or openness. On Hussain’s account, boycotting in
order to create concrete social change (broadly defined) violates democratic
procedural values, the value being that citizens should not use private actions to
influence policies that are in the purview of the legislature.
For example, consumers may boycott a company for selling contraceptives.
Hussain argues that this could create pressure on companies and potentially
eradicate the private sale of contraceptives, a decision that should be left to the
legislature as this is the appropriate procedural posture of a liberal democracy. In
effect, on his account, consumers may not use private power to influence social
policy.
This account does have some appeal but it is silent on forms of boycotting that
do not take social change as their end goal. As I describe below, research has
shown that there are other incentives that boycotting consumers internalize.
When consumers boycott for these other reasons, Hussain’s account of
impermissible boycotting falls flat and another account is necessary.

B. Non-Instrumental (Intrinsic) Goals
Although instrumental goals have been discovered in boycotting behavior, noninstrument/intrinsic goals also predict likelihood of boycotting. Empirical research
has found that desire to fit into certain social groups and desire for self
enhancement also influence boycotting behavior. (Klein, Smith & John 2004).
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Boycotting can serve as a means of expressing to others and one’s self the type
of consumer one is. Kozinets and Handelman describe this as “akin to a
hygienically cleansing process.” (1998 p. 477; Klein, Smith & John 2004). This
form of moral self-expression is a common occurrence in active purchasing
decisions. Consumers often buy products to express a certain identity, and these
produces become part of their identities. In the same manner, withholding
purchases can also act as a means of expressing one’s identity. Moreover,
expressing a moral identity through boycotting can “boost social and personal
self-esteem either by associating with a cause or a group of people or simply by
viewing [oneself] as a moral person.” (Klein, Smith & John 2004 p. 97).
In addition, social pressures can also act as strong mechanisms for boycotting.
(Witkowski 1989; Garrett 1987; Friedman 1999; Sen et al 2001). If one is seen
consuming a product or service that others deem unethical, the shame or guilt
that is created can be a strong motivator to boycott. Klein et al measured these
instrumental goals by using self-reported agreement scales including “I would
feel guilty if didn’t boycott” and “I would feel uncomfortable if other people who
are boycotting saw me purchasing or consumer the relevant products.” These
questions do capture to some degree these non-instrumental goals.
However, there is a whole set of non-instrumental goals that seem to be uniquely
implicated in the current instantiations of boycotts. I term these non-instrumental
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goals expressive goals. While previous work has shown that individuals use
products to express identities, they can also use products to express outward
speech towards a company’s actions. For example, boycotting a company that
supports a certain political candidate need not seek to change that company’s
position but instead can act as a way of speaking to the company in the form “I
do not like what you have done. I disagree with what you have done. I do not
think the candidate you endorsed is the best candidate.” In this way, expressive
goals serve purely a speech function. The consumer treats the company as they
would another person who endorses a certain social/political agenda and
responds to that endorsement. In the boycotting case, the response is not just
with words, but with actions.
These expressive goals have been recognized by political philosophers more
than empiricists. (Friedman 2001; Radzik 2017; Hussain 2012). Hussain writes,
“expressive ethical consumerism occurs when [a consumer] buy a product to
express her approval or disapproval of certain values, beliefs or practices.” This
is distinct from instrumental goals because “the rationale does not have to do
with changing methods…but rather with expressing certain attitudes and
judgments about [a company’s] practice.” (Hussain p. 4). Radzik similarly
acknowledges that “part of what a boycott does is send a critical message,
wherein the boycotters declare their opposition to the actions of the target.”
(Radzik p. 112). Moreover, the United States legal system has historically
categorized consumer boycotts as speech protected by the First Amendment.
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(Harper 1984; Lee 2012; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware). Although the
expressive goals of boycotting have been acknowledged, they has gone less
discussed than the instrumental goals of social, economic, and policy change.
These expressive goals are also distinct from the previously-identified noninstrumental goals. The non-instrumental goals identified and measured in
empirical literature do not seem to implicate the target company itself. That is to
say, boycotting for self-enhancement or to fit into certain social groups is not
directed at the company. Rather, it is self-enclosed and can occur in isolation of
the company. Boycotting for expressive reasons is similarly non-instrumental but,
like instrumental boycotts, it still directed at a company. Expressive actions
communicate a message to a company, not just to oneself and other groups, and
the desire to speak directly to a company and disagree with its actions is at the
core of the expressive goal of boycotting. The table below lays out the various
goals of boycotting and their distinctions.
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Directed at
Company

Directed at Others

Instrumental Goals

Non-Instrumental
Goals

Changing company
policy (potentially
unethical—Hussain
2012)

Expressive Actions
(ethical and required in
society for prosocial
consumer—this paper)

N/A162

Enhancing oneself;
fitting it with a group
(no ethical argument
made)

The fact that expressive goals are publicly directed at companies is critical for my
argument. On my account, boycotting in private, which only communicates to
oneself about one’s dissatisfaction, is not constituent of the expressive function.
A consumer must communicate their boycotting publicly in some manner (usually
through social media) for it to truly be directed at the company. When boycotting
takes this expressive form as its goal, it is not only ethical, but critical in today’s
marketplace, and the action contributes to what makes a good pro-social
consumer.
I note here that boycotting often satisfies more than one goal at a time. In fact, all
the psychological research on boycotting points to the multi-faceted aspect of
boycotts. I do not claim to advocate for the position that boycotting that is only
exclusively expressive and non-instrumental is beneficial. In many cases,
boycotting for expressive reasons will also implicate instrumental concerns.
However, I argue for an intent-based obligation. When a consumer boycotts
162

There are no forms of instrumental goals directed at others, because instrumental goals are defined
as goals that attempt to change a company’s behavior. Hence, they are always directed at a company.
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primarily for the purpose to express discontent with a corporation’s political or
social stance, this intention is enough on my account to categorize the boycotting
as expressive in nature. Though these expressive boycotts can and often do
effect real changes in terms of corporate behavior, my account neither relies on
boycotts creating real change nor prohibits real change. I seek only to elucidate
the intentional speech aspects of boycotting.

Part Three: Boycotting as Combative Speech
As described above, boycotting can take various forms and can have various
goals. One of the non-instrumental goals of boycotting is expressive in nature.
Boycotting for expressive purposes publicly sends a strong message of
disagreement with a company’s action. These corporate actions themselves
often express social or political ideas. Chick-fil-A supporting anti-gay marriage
legislation does not implicate any economic concerns, but it communicates a
clear social and political message: “LGBT citizens do not deserve the same
marriage rights as heterosexual couples.” Nike supporting Kaepaernik’s kneeling
does not implicate any economic concerns, but it communicates a clear political
message: “Protesting structural racism by kneeling for the National Anthem is a
laudable action.”
Boycotting in these circumstances acts as a means for consumers to combat the
expression of corporations. By publicly denouncing the company and refusing to
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patron the store, the consumer clearly expresses dissatisfaction with the social
and political message of a company. This expressive boycotting serves an
important function in today’s marketplace: it acts as counter-speech.
In this section I elucidate how boycotting is a form of counter-speech and why
this counter-speech is critical to a pro-social consumer. I begin with an account of
corporate political speech and then show how boycotting is necessary to address
the ever-increasing prevalence of corporate political speech. Finally, I respond to
criticisms of expressive boycotting.

A. Corporate Speech in Today’s Marketplace
In the past 10 years, corporate political speech (for profit companies publicly
taking political and social stances on various issues) has increased substantially.
(Korschun & Smith 2018; Ellis, McLaughlin, and Alsup 2016; Vanian 2016; Morris
2016). Whether through sponsorships, advertisements, political contributions, or
inventory of products, for-profit companies are encouraged to promote their
social and political identities in the marketplace. This phenomenon has been
encouraged by marketers who argue that it is good corporate policy to take clear
positions. (Korschun, Aggarwal, Rafieian, & Swain 2016; Oster 2018; Mitchel
2018; Sarkar & Kotler 2017; Kotler & Sarkar 2018). Modern strategies of
customer segmentation allow companies to easily determine the political or
social leanings of their ideal consumers, thereby making it easier to cater to
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these consumers. Moreover, consumers seek to patron companies that match
their political views. (Kotler & Sarkar 2017).
Korschun et al. find that even when consumers do not necessarily agree with a
company’s political position, they respect when a company publicly takes a
position. (Korschun, Aggarwal, Rafieian, & Swain 2017). In that study, the
authors found that consumers expect companies to take political positions and
discount those that do not. This response occurs even though consumers did not
necessarily personally hold the same position as the company. Moreover,
consumers in seeking employment care not just about salary but also want to
work for companies that do good and share their beliefs. (Tata, Hart, Sharma, &
Sarkar 2013).
In addition to the increase in corporate political speech owing to consumer
demand, legal jurisprudence and ethical theories are encouraging companies to
make political or social activism a part of their brand. Recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence has made the environment for corporate speech more favorable.
Courts have begun to categorize corporations taking political stands as protected
First Amendment speech. Historically, the First Amendment (which prohibits the
government from intruding on free speech) has applied to individuals and nonprofit organizations who seek to advocate for certain social or political positions.
(Columbo 2014). For-profit corporations often received very little to no protection
for political or social stances they took. This is because it has been recognized
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that corporations are in the business of making money and profit rather than
making political or social statements. (Friedman 2007; Jensen 2002)
In a 2010 landmark case, Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court held that
when for-profit corporations make political donations, they engage in protected
First Amendment speech, akin to an individual taking a political stand. This was a
foundational change in how corporate speech was treated by the legal system. In
effect, it has emboldened for-profit companies to more publicly and more
frequently take political stances. But these stances do not manifest as simply
political press releases; actions companies take that are politically motivated also
qualify for this First Amendment protection, thereby encouraging this exact
behavior.
In 2014, the general craft store Hobby Lobby came under scrutiny for not
providing contraceptives for their employees. The provision of these
contraceptives was required under federal law. Hobby Lobby claimed that the
company’s founders’ religion precluded the use of contraceptives and that the
company itself was established on religious grounds. As such, requiring the
company to provide the contraceptives would violate its strongly held religious
beliefs. Effectively, Hobby Lobby was making a very public political statement
that they did not think that contraceptives were appropriate for women. The
Supreme Court, on the heels of its Citizens United decision, ruled in favor of
Hobby Lobby even though federal law required companies to provide
contraceptives. They articulated that Hobby Lobby, as a company, was making a
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political statement that was protected under the First Amendment. (Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby) This decision reinforced the reality that U.S. law would protect forprofit companies when they made any sort of political or social statement in the
marketplace. Of course, Hobby Lobby was boycotted by many people who
disagreed with the company’s position. (Allen 2014).
Most recently, in 2018, the Supreme Court once again was faced with a for-profit
company attempting to make a political statement. In this case, a bake shop
owner in Colorado refused to make a wedding cake for a gay couple. The baker
claimed that he would sell a pre-made cake for the gay couple, but would not
create a custom cake that would be used in a gay wedding. His opinion (and the
opinion of the company of which he was the owner and baker) was that gay
marriage was immoral. Colorado has a law, however, that prohibits for-profit
companies from discriminating in any way against customers due to their race,
gender, or sexual orientation. Therefore, the baker was violating Colorado law,
and the state brought action to compel the baker to make a cake for a gay
couple. The Supreme Court once again did not find that the law prevented the
baker from espousing his political and social viewpoints through the business
entity.163 (Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission).
Again, this was a message to for-profit companies that when they make political

163
Although the Court did not rule in favor of the Colorado law, it dismissed the case on very narrow
grounds that left relatively unclear whether the baker’s actions would be protected if the case were relitigated.
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statements through their actions, these statements will be protected by the First
Amendment.
Ethics scholars have also encouraged for-profit companies to take public stands
on various political issues that the company deems important. (Scherer &
Palazzo 2007; Scherer & Palazzo 2011; Scherer, Palazzo, & Matten 2014; Neron
2013). This movement has been termed political corporate social responsibility
(“CSR”). Political CSR is the view that in many economies and states, the
government does not do enough to further appropriate political goals like
protecting minorities, religious groups, or women. When there is this lack of state
sponsored political support, for-profit companies should partake in the political
sphere and assist states in their endeavors. (Scherer & Palazzo 2007; Scherer &
Palazzo 2011). “In order to respond to the globalization phenomenon and the
emerging post‐national constellation, it is necessary to acknowledge a new
political role of business that goes beyond mere compliance with legal standards
and conformity with moral rules.” (Scherer & Palazzo 2011). Businesses do this
by engaging in acts that support education, health, and human rights (Matten &
Crane, 2005); defining ethics codes (Cragg, 2005); treating the environment as a
relevant stakeholder (Marcus & Fremeth, 2009); self-regulating their actions to
more appropriately match moral norms (Scherer & Smid, 2000); and engaging in
political lobbying and funneling of money to various political agendas (Hillman,
Keim, & Schuler, 2004).
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Most importantly, these actions go beyond simple profit making. Ethics scholars
argue that political CSR should be undertaken by for-profit firms even if those
actions do not necessarily increase profits in the long run. The idea is that the
corporation holds an important place in modern society not only economically but
also politically and socially. Given that the corporation has this importance place,
there is a duty for the corporation to undertake a political or social agenda.
(Scherer & Palazzo 2007; Donaldson & Preston 1995, Freeman 2011). When we
acknowledge “[this] new political role of business…firms viewed in this manner
sometimes assume a state like role and become political actors.” (Scherer and
Palazzo 2007 p. 1098).
This is all to say that the environment for corporations to take political and social
stands through expressive actions is ripe. Some camps argue that increasing
corporate political speech will attract better consumers and increase profits,
others argue that these speech acts are protected under current law, and still
others argue that corporations have a moral obligation to partake in the political
and social arena, not just the economic one. All routes here point to the
phenomenon that corporations are espousing political ideals while doing
business. And this is exactly what we see with Nike (structural racism), Chick-filA (gay rights), Hobby Lobby (reproductive rights), Jigsaw (immigration), Tiffany’s
(environment), EBay (transgender rights), and others.
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B. Boycotting as a Means to Combat Corporate Speech
At first glance, one may see no problem with the expansion of corporate political
speech in the marketplace. After all, under one account, corporations are owned
and run by individuals, so there should be no difference between corporate
political speech and individual speech. (Meese and Oman 2014; Velasquez
1983).
There is a key difference, however, between corporate political speech and
individual speech that is relevant for my argument. Corporations are wealthier,
more connected, and have more widespread awareness and appeal than
individual consumers. (Korten 1998; Derber 2000). As such, their speech and
expression receives much more exposure in comparison to that of individual
consumers. Boycotting, then, particularly when done in groups and publicly, is a
means of combatting corporate speech and putting individual consumers on a
level playing field with corporations. When boycotting is done to counter the
political or social expression of a corporation, the action should be lauded,
regardless of the moral or political position of either the corporation or the
individual consumer.
Counter speech has long been recognized as a necessity in society by political
philosophers. (Ingber 1984; Barendt 2005). Many proponents of free speech
advocate for the marketplace of ideas, which occurs only when there are ample
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amounts of diverse expression that conflict with each other and provide a fruitful
discourse. It was John Stuart Mill who initially had hinted at the term. (Gordon
1997; Mill 1859). In effect, Mill argued that “all opinions are to be expressed;
everyone comes to the market with his or her ideas, and through discussion
everyone exchanges ideas with one another.” (Gordon 1997 p.236). These ideas
compete in the same way products compete in a marketplace for supremacy: the
best ideas are most highly demanded and promoted in society and those ideas
win out and rise to the top. The strategy is to ensure that all actors in the
marketplace of ideas are exposed to as many viewpoints as possible and then
are free to choose which are the “best” (Gordon 1997; Blasi 2004). This theory
was connected to the speech by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the Supreme
Court case Abrams v. United States. He argued for “free trade in ideas—that the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market.” (Blasi 2004). Subsequent First Amendment
jurisprudence has relied heavily on this notion that all viewpoints should be
allowed in the marketplace: “the purpose of the First Amendment [is] to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail.” (Turner
v. Broad, Red Lion Broad Co. v. FCC).
For speech to compete effectively in the marketplace of ideas, there must be
ample dissemination of the various political or social viewpoints. It is here where
boycotting serves the function of combatting corporate speech to contribute to
the marketplace of ideas. Corporate political speech and, in turn, the ideas that
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corporations contribute to marketplace, are backed by loyal consumers,
advertising, wealth, and other corporate factors. These unique aspects of
corporate political speech give it more power and exposure than average
individual consumer speech. This increase in power manifests in the promotion
of corporate ideas. By spending more money on their expressions, corporations
risk tipping the scale of the marketplace of ideas in their favor. It becomes
possible that corporate ideas continue to win out and become the supreme ideas
in the marketplace.
Non-instrumental boycotting that has as its goal expression directed at the
company is a form of counter-speech that can balance out the marketplace of
ideas. This form of boycotting is critical in making sure there is diversity of ideas
and expressions in the marketplace and, most importantly, that those ideas are
receiving adequate exposure. Boycotting combats political corporate speech
when is satisfies certain conditions. First, boycotting should be expressive in
nature and be directed at the company, as explained above. Second, boycotting
should be public. Non-instrumental boycotting that is directed at the company
must be public to be effective. One can boycott a good to build one’s moral
identity. I might not consume Nike products because I do not want to be the kind
of person who supports a company that takes Nike’s political stand—I might
privately disprove of Nike. However, for boycotting to be combative it must be
public. Only when boycotting is public does it implicate the marketplace of ideas.
It is not enough that consumers decide to prohibit purchases from a company.
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Boycotters must communicate why and how they are combatting a company’s
political speech. In the recent Nike boycott, consumers took to social media and
other media outlets to berate the company, burn products, and write about their
dissatisfaction with the company. This is a key element to making boycotts useful
as combative speech. Consumers should be posting and communicating via
social media and other media outlets their responses to corporate speech.
Closely related to the public nature of boycotting is the group aspect of it. By
publicly boycotting, consumers gain members in their quest to combat corporate
speech. One boycotter’s actions are unlikely to effectively communicate against
corporations, even when that speech is public. But once that boycotter gains
membership, the boycott snowballs into a mass of consumers expressing
frustration with corporate political expression. “A boycott with common support,
conveys the message to the one being boycotted as they see it in their actual
experience.” (Lee 2012 p. 18). Boycotting, on my account, is important precisely
when it is public and expressive in intent because only then can it adequately
combat the public and widespread nature of corporate political speech.
Corporate speech by its very nature is public and disseminates widely quite
quickly. Effective counter speech must also do the same. And boycotting of the
sort I define here can adequately do that.
Boycotting need not even be successful in terms of changing any corporate
behavior. Even when a boycott fails to change behavior, “it remains a vehicle for
forcing the dissemination of an idea. Boycotts make perhaps otherwise latent
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dissent visible to a greater number of participants in the marketplace of ideas,
highlighting not only their position but also the very debate.” (Lee p. 19).
Boycotting, in other words, allows the corporate speech at issue to be tested in
the marketplace. Will consumers agree with the corporation, especially when
counter-speech is highlighted by boycotting? Will the political stance or norm
being advocated by a corporation reign supreme and win out over competing
ideas? An expressive public boycott directed at the company allows for the rest
of the marketplace to evaluate the corporation’s expression precisely because
there exists adequate counter-expression. Moreover, boycotting actions are also
actual market transactions and decisions which are “classic instantiation[s] of
th[e] market. By tying ideas directly to market choice, boycotts provide perhaps
the best tangible example of the marketplace of ideas.” (Lee p. 20).

C. Boycotting and the Prosocial Consumer
Given that boycotting serves an important role in combatting the ever-present
and increasing political corporate speech, publicly partaking in expressive
boycotts is critical to being a prosocial consumer. Ethical consumerism (a form of
prosocial consumption) is often couched in terms of helping others, whether it is
the environment, fellow citizens, or even helping oneself (so-called non-altruistic
motivations). (Small and Cryder 2016; Dunn, Aknin & Norton 2008).
Psychologists and consumer behaviorists however have too narrowly defined
ethical consumerism.
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Ethical consumerism has not traditionally encompassed non-normative actions
that contribute to facilitating democratic processes. For example, voting
contributes to the structures and procedures of democracy even if one votes for
what we might think of as perverse outcomes. Voting is important because it
procedurally (as opposed to substantively) furthers democracy.
Like voting, boycotting procedurally furthers the goals of democracy. In the
boycotting case, the goal is the dissemination of all ideas. Boycotting contributes
to the marketplace of ideas which in turn provides for better discourse and
decision-making in the long run, even if a boycotter’s viewpoint or expression
ultimately loses. By standing up to corporate actors who risk perverting the
marketplace of ideas due to the power they hold, boycotting satisfies broader
obligations of ethical consumerism—not just acting based upon ethics, but
contributing to the democratic process. The prosocial consumer attempts to
make society better with their marketplace transactions. Boycotting does exactly
that, by making the structures of democracy more effective and efficient.
Some argue that boycotting inappropriately stifles speech rather than contributes
to it. (Radzik 2017). Many times, boycotting on social media or hazing someone
for their personal views takes on a type of monstrous following. A twitter trial is
one example where boycotting an individual consumer for her single action might
end up stifling speech. If consumers know that they will be berated significantly
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across social media for taking controversial positions, their speech is more likely
to be chilled. (Ronson 2015; Radzik 2017). This is not, in my view, problematic,
because I only advocate for the prosocial consumer boycotting for-profit
companies. The individual context does not implicate the same type of power
balance that the corporate context does. An individual who expresses an idea
should face another individual with a counter-response. But an individual
counter-response for a corporation is not enough to even out the scales of power
and exposure.
Still others argue that corporations themselves should not be making political or
social statements. These scholars argue that political CSR is inappropriate in
democracy because it bypasses the procedural legislative checks and balances
that define a democracy. (Hussain & Moriarty 2016). In this way, if corporate
political speech bypasses procedural democratic principles, then boycotting is
similarly likely to also bypass those principles. For example, boycotting a
company that sells contraceptives may force the company to cease that practice
to remain viable in the marketplace. If this happens enough, then the market is
effectively rid of all contraceptives, without any sort of legislative process, thereby
bypassing procedurally democratic principles. This account is compelling but fails
for two reasons.
First, I only argue here for the non-instrumental expressive boycott—boycotts
that further the marketplace of ideas. Although, as described above, these
boycotts may have instrumental effects (e.g., companies may change their
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behavior), I focus on the predominant intentions of the boycott. When the boycott
is intended to be expressive in nature, it serves precisely the procedural
democratic principles that critics argue it bypasses. Contributing and furthering
the marketplace of ideas is an important part of the democratic process.
Second, the above argument against boycotting asks us to abstract away from
the current organizational structures in society. If we take an ideal society, where
corporations do not impose political and social speech on the marketplace, then
it is plausible that boycotting inappropriately can bypass procedural democratic
principles. This argument starts with ideal conditions and then seeks to elucidate
normative principles and guidelines for the prosocial consumers. (Farrelly 2007;
Rawls 1971). My account relies instead on the non-ideal conditions as we see
them currently. The marketplace is rife with corporate political speech, whether
we like or not. As such, my argument relies not on some pristine society where
corporations are only focused on profits, but on the very real one in which they
can shift and influence the marketplace of ideas. We should seek to elucidate
guidelines for the prosocial consumer in light of these conditions. The prosocial
consumer should seek to make a difference given the current state of injustices.
(Wiens 2012; Ingber 1984). Boycotting has an important role to play in non-ideal
but real societal conditions.
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Conclusions and Recommendations for Consumer Behavior Research

I have argued here that engaging in non-instrumental expressive boycotting
targeted at a company is an ethical obligation for a prosocial consumer. When
the intent of boycotting is to publicly express dissatisfaction and disagreement
with a company, it serves an important purpose in marketplace of ideas.
Boycotting becomes a form of counter-speech against the increase in corporate
political and social speech. The public actions of consumers push back against
this corporate speech and foster a more fruitful discourse that is critical to the
dissemination of ideas.
This form of boycotting can provide ample avenues of novel research for
consumer behavior scholars. While research has explored the incentives behind
boycotting, it has not yet fully explored the non-instrumental expressive
incentives directed towards a company. Do consumers feel as if they are
communicating against a company’s position when they boycott? Does public
versus private boycotting induce different perceptions of expression? Private
boycotting seems to be more about self-expression while public boycotting
seems to implicate more outward expressive concerns.
Part of the reason that empirical research has not explored this aspect of
boycotting is that most situations presented to respondents in extant studies
have taken the form of corporate economic decisions, for example, the closing of
factories or the payment of less than living wages. But as noted above, while
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much corporate action is economic, it can also be political. It is more likely that
non-instrumental expressive boycotting takes place in the presence of corporate
action that is political in nature—such as when a for-profit company makes
religious statements or takes religious-inspired actions (e.g., Chick-fil-A
advocating against gay marriage). In these situations, it is often unclear what an
instrumental boycott would seek to accomplish. Do those who boycott Nike really
want to Nike to come and apologize and drop Kaepernick from their brand? It
seems that the boycott there serves more of an expression function advocating
against the Nike position. Researchers should seek to better understand how
consumers respond to these kinds of corporate actions. Only one article that the
author could find has sought to understand consumer reactions to corporate
religious speech. (Fitzgerald & Donovan 2018).
In addition, the pro-social consumer has been too narrowly construed by
consumer behaviorists. Most work has focused on how consumers can
contribute to substantive ethical principles (saving the environment, donating to
charities, buying organic, etc.). Little work has focused on how consumers can
contribute to procedural principles. These principles do not assume any
normative positions. They are neutral on whether recycling, donating to charities,
or buying organic are even good decisions. Instead, these principles focus on
how consumers can contribute to making the marketplace more democratic.
Understanding how consumers can be persuaded to express themselves in the
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marketplace in response to corporate expression is an underexplored form of
prosocial consumer research.
Lastly, while work has focused on how boycotting can influence corporate action
(i.e., does a boycott change the corporation’s behavior), little research has
explored the effects of boycotting on the marketplace of ideas. Does boycotting
convince other consumers that a corporation’s political or social expression is
wrong? Is boycotting effective in combatting corporate political speech—can it be
as persuasive or is it even more persuasive? Understanding how the ideas
implicit in a boycott in response to political corporate speech develop as time
goes on is an important aspect of determining whether boycotting as an empirical
matter furthers the democratic principle that I theorize.
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CHAPTER 3: Marketing’s Ethical Blind Spot: Catering to Consumer
Preferences
Introduction
Whether in the context of teaching marketing classes, finding the best
attributes of a product, or producing viral, revenue enhancing advertising,
marketers are guided by a longstanding mantra: Consumers preferences are
king. In many ways, to be the best marketer is to create products and services
that are directly aligned with consumer preferences.
This paper focuses on the potential ethical issues associated with catering
to consumer preferences. The preoccupation with consumer preferences leads
marketers to prioritize them, even if the preferences are perverse. Taking a
holistic view of customer preferences (e.g. not just product/service preferences,
but also preferences on how products are marketed) this paper argues that
prioritizing perverse consumer preferences can trigger a kind of cultural, group
based harm. Marketers and business ethicists alike have historically understood
consumer harm narrowly, focusing only on how business actions can harm
individuals. Their failure to be sensitive to group harms makes marketers more
likely to act unethically.
Traditional accounts of marketing and business ethics have used the
theories of John Rawls to argue that certain practices are unethical because they
harm individuals. (Rawls 1971) This harm can take multiples forms including
marketing physically harmful products (smoking, guns), breaches of implicit
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social contracts, and violations of autonomy. This paper seeks instead to use Iris
Marion Young’s criticism of John Rawls to expand the scope of harms to which
marketers should be attuned to. Young argues that Rawls has too narrow of a
view of justice. According to her, the focus on individual level harm leaves a
theory of justice blind to those kinds of harms or injustices that require appeal to
group based categories such as race or gender. Her account focuses on harms
that reinforce cultural norms while stereotyping minorities, females, and other
under-represented cultural groups—so called “cultural imperialism.” (Young
1990)
In the first paper to analyze Young from a marketing ethics perspective, I
go beyond the ethical conventional view by highlighting the distinctive cultural
harms posed by tailoring products, services and advertising to consumer
preferences. When marketers tailor their activities to majoritarian preferences
they risk using predominately majoritarian models and imagery which not only
further normalizes white, male, straight faces but also renders invisible their
counterparts. This kind of discrimination reinforces cultural hierarchy. If images
of minority and female models are primarily cast in stereotypical roles, this only
validates such roles, creating a culture and set of meanings that stigmatize
minorities and how they are perceived as members of a subordinated group. It is
this group harm that makes discrimination in marketing so problematic.
Turning our attention to this kind of group-based cultural harm has two
ethical implications for marketers. First, marketers should not cater to customer
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preferences in ways that create these harms by reinforcing social hierarchies and
stereotypes. Doing so is unethical. Second, marketers may even have a
positive obligation to counteract and mitigate this kind of cultural harm. Hence,
managers should encourage their companies to be more culturally inclusive in
their marketing strategies.
The contributions of this work are following: first, it uses critical political
theory to identify a harm that has gone unnoticed in the marketing ethics
literature. Although, marketing ethics has been sensitive to some aspects of
problematic imagery including stereotypes, that work has still understood the
harm of stereotypes and lack of cultural diversity narrowly. Broadening this harm
to group based harms creates new sets of unethical products and practices.
Second, no work has attempted to provide rationales for why problematic images
and products still exist in the marketplace. By rooting this problem in catering to
consumer preferences, I provide an easy and clear intervention for marketers
(e.g. be skeptical of consumer preferences in some cases). Lastly, previous
work on cultural diversity in marketing ethics has not provided normative
justifications of why it is that marketing firms have an obligation to prevent the
sorts of harms I identify, even though those harms to do not accrue to their
customers. They may even benefit their customers, yet I argue marketers should
not pursue actions that create cultural harms.
Part one of the article focuses on marketing’s emphasis on consumer
preferences. Marketers generally use two forms of activities to cater to consumer
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preferences: they tailor products and services to those preferences and create
advertising that similarly caters to preferences. Part two provides a background
on previous conceptions of marketing ethics and how it has focused only on
individual consumer harms. Part three, drawing upon Young’s criticism of Rawls,
sketches out what Young means by cultural imperialism and group harms. This
section also shows that consumers have discriminatory preferences and how
marketers contribute and cause cultural harms by tailoring products to these
preferences. Finally, in part four, the article explains why marketers should not
only seek to prevent causing cultural harms but also may have a duty to promote
cultural diversity and provides guidance on how to go about preventing cultural
harms.
Part One: Marketing’s Preoccupation with Consumer Preferences

Both in practice and research, marketing as a discipline is focused on
creating products and services that align with consumer preferences. This is in
many ways the unifying theme throughout marketing research: consumer
preferences are king. “One of the basic tenets of marketing is that firms should
be customer oriented, offering products and services that provide value to
consumers.” (Lehmann et al 1998) Seeing the truth of this statement is not
difficult. Marketing scholars have created and implemented methods uniquely
designed to elicit and identify consumer preferences. The most obvious one is
conjoint analysis (Green and Srinivasan 1990; Green et al 2001).
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Conjoint analysis allows marketers to identify which attributes and features
of products consumers care about and even how much consumers are willing to
pay for a given attribute. Since its inception in the early 1970s (Kruskal 1965;
Green and Rao 1971), conjoint analysis has become a worldwide industry
standard in creating products and services geared towards consumer
preferences. (Wittink & Cattin 1989; Wittink, Vriens, & Burhenne 1994). Conjoint
analysis also allows marketing professionals to create preference maps which
help in understanding how products are perceived by consumers. (Lehmann et al
1998).
More quantitative models also show marketing’s emphasis on consumer
preferences. Latent utility theory and logit choice models are designed to help
marketers better understand which products consumers buy and why they buy
those products. (Guadagni and Little 2008; Fiebig et al 2010). The exercise being
that once marketers understand these preferences through these models, they
can adapt their product offerings to maximize consumers interest in their
products.
Ultimately, the process of catering to consumer preferences generally
takes two forms for marketers: tailoring products and services to consumers and
tailoring advertising to consumer preferences.
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Tailoring Products and Services
The most obvious method of catering to consumers is creating products
that align with their preferences. Marketers do this for a simple reason. If one
wants consumers to buy one’s products, one must give consumers exactly what
they want. The product that closer matches consumer preferences gains more
market share. Market segmentation is a prime example of this. Market
segmentation is a process by which companies create distinct products for
different people in any given market. (Smith 1956; Lockley 1950; Dickinson &
Ginter 1987; Kotler & Armstrong 2012) This arises precisely because marketers
want to appease heterogeneous consumer preferences. (Dickinson & Ginter
1987; Baker 2008 p. 709; Swait 1994) For example, skin care companies design
products differently for consumers of varying ages. For those that are younger in
the market, products are focused on acne or clearing up problematic skin, while
for those that are older, products are focused on tightening skin and decreasing
lines and wrinkles.
Tailoring Advertising
It is not just tailoring the products themselves to consumer preferences
that makes marketing effective however, how marketers advertise and brand
their products also seems to draw on and cater to consumer preferences.
Marketers intuitively design their commercials, print ads, and online ads to
appeal to consumers. Consumer behavior research shows that consumers
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respond better to those advertisements with which they can relate (Grier et al
2001; Brunel and Nelson 2003; MacKenzie et al 1986). Moreover, consumers are
willing to engage with the substance of advertisement if they are involved in the
process (Petty et al 1983). It’s only reasonable that consumers will be more
involved if the advertisement aligns with their preferences and outlooks. (Mehta
2000)
Social identity advertising is a prime example of marketing to consumer
preferences. (Madrigal 2001; Forehand et al 2002) By focusing on what kinds of
things consumers identify with and leveraging this in advertisements, marketers
create a connection between their products and their consumers. (Douglas &
Isherwood 2003; Berger & Heath 2007) This connection naturally leads to higher
purchase rates. As described further below, this form of advertising can have
widespread problematic effects as the consumer preferences to which
advertisements cater to can be perverse.
Part Two: Historical Ethical Perspectives on Consumer Preferences

Marketers have been to some degree sensitive to potential problems with
blindly catering to consumer preferences. Previous business ethics research has
raised issues with advertising certain products that have harmful effects on
consumers. Business ethics writ large has always been focused on this
consumer specific harm (i.e. harming consumers through dangerous products or
deceitful advertising is problematic). These ethics scholars have only focused on
126

the individual harms that certain marketing and business practices create. This
concern for individual consumers arises out of the traditional framework that
which business ethics has been utilized.

John Rawls and Individual Harms
Traditionally, business ethics has looked to the works of political theorist
John Rawls to advocate for practices that protect individuals from harm. John
Rawls posited a theory of justice that focused on public institutions protecting
individual rights of citizens and consumers. (Rawls 1971) Subsequent research
has applied the Rawlsian framework to business decisions and corporations
(See, e.g., Donaldson & Dunfee 1994; Freeman 1994; Hasnas 1998; De George
1987; Goodpaster 1993).
Although Rawls’s political theories are incredibly vast and widespread, the
focus here is on briefly summarizing the “basic structure” and “original position”
theories that have been used extensively in the business ethics arena. To
logically distill first principles on how important political and economic institutions
(the so called “basic structure”) should treat citizens, Rawls postulated a thought
experiment. This thought experiment was called the “original position.”
The original position was characterized as individuals coming together as
representatives of other individual citizens in a given population to decide how
society should be structured. These representatives operated under a veil of
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ignorance however, not knowing the endowments that their citizens had.
Representatives do not know what race, gender, socio-economic class, religious
beliefs, talents, etc. that characterize their citizens (they abstract away from
these characteristics to determine what justice requires). These representatives
are then presented with a menu of options of how the rules of society should be
structured. Rawls argued that if all representatives are rational individuals, they
will agree to two basic principles on how political and economic institutions
should be structured. First, they would all agree that “each person has an equal
right to the most extensive liberties compatible with similar liberties for all.”
Second, they would all agree that “Social and economic inequalities should be
arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
persons, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of
equality of opportunity.” (Rawls 1971)
This latter principle effectively means that no individual characteristics
would be prioritized in a just society. Those that are less wealthy, less talented or
of the non-dominant race should be given equal opportunities and equal rights.
This flows logically from the fact that no representatives in the original position
knows what their citizens are like—each representative would want to hedge and
make sure that whomever their citizens turn out to be, those citizens are
protected. These protections have been used by business ethics scholars to
argue that corporations should focus their efforts on protecting equality of
opportunities and rights. Hence, companies should not discriminate in hiring
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practices. They shouldn’t take advantage of those consumers that are less
fortunately positioned in the market. This framework has been extended to issues
like false advertising and sweatshop labor.
The framing of Rawls’s original position and his two principles of justice
focuses on the individual rights of consumers and citizens in the marketplace. As
such, extant marketing ethics and business ethics literature has also focused on
what obligation businesses have towards individual consumers. It explains why
marketers should not advertise harmful products or take advantage of at-risk
populations and why business managers should not discriminate in employment
practices (Smith 1995).
Traditional Perspectives on Marketing Ethics
Marketing as a discipline has historically been sensitive to ethical issues.
Marketing ethics has focused on the risk of activities causing individual consumer
harms, this traditionally has included the duty to not market harmful products, to
not take advantage of at risk populations, and to not deceive consumers.
(Tsalikis & Fritzsche 1989; Gaski 1999)
Marketing harmful products to consumers, in particular to at-risk
consumers (Bellizzi & Hite 1989; Robin & Reidenbach 1987; Mascarenhas 1995)
has been important to marketing ethics. Historically much of this scholarship was
focused on cigarettes and alcohol. Smoking was a harmful product which
marketers should be skeptical and critical of advertising to consumers. The
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production and advertising of harmful products in general have thus been
criticized in the marketing literature:
“The Code of Ethics of American Marketing Associations states that
marketers should conform to the basic rule of professional ethics not do
harm knowingly, and they should offer products and services that are safe
and fit for their intended uses.” (Smith and Martin 1997)

Moreover, this seems to hold even if consumers prefer products and
services that create harm. Commercials for cigarettes were hence made illegal in
April of 1970 by the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act. (4 Stat 87) But as
Smith and Martin argue, it is not just marketing of products that cause physical
harm that is unethical, potentially causing “economic or psychological harm” is
also problematic. (Smith & Martin at 4). Similar ethical pitfalls include Nestlé’s
production and sale of baby formula in third world countries (Murphy & Pridgen
1991), the Ford Pinto exploding gas tank (Gaski 1999) and toxic Rely tampons
(Gaski 1999). These examples show that marketers are concerned about the
ethics of producing and advertising harmful products.
Previous research has thus argued that catering to consumer preferences
for products that are harmful is unethical. And so is advertising those products to
at-risk populations. Advertising to children (Nairn & Fine 2008; Austin and Reed
1999; Paine et al 1984) or the elderly (Benet Pitts and LaTour 1993) has
historically been seen as problematic. This so called “targeted marketing” has
been criticized as unethical because it takes advantage of those who are either
vulnerable or are “disadvantage[d] in exchange relationships where that
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disadvantage is attributable to characteristics that are largely not controllable by
them at the time of transaction.” (Andreasen and Manning 1990 p.13). This was
such an important issue for marketing ethics that the Journal of Public Policy &
Marketing published a special issue in 1995 focused on advertising to vulnerable
populations. Although this seems to implicate group harms, the designation of a
consumer as a child or an elder does not trigger the ethical duty. Instead, it is the
taking advantage of an individual who lacks the mental state to make educated
decisions that is doing the work. In this case, to understand the wrong, we simply
appeal to the individual disposition of a consumer, not to the group as a whole.
Marketing ethics work has also criticized advertising that convinces
consumers to be more materialistic and consume outside their means. (Smith
and Quelch 1993 p. 621; Inglis 1972). Again this work focuses on the harms that
accrue to those individuals who are the subject of the marketing actions (Waide
1987). “Advertising’s most fundamental impact may be that it induces people to
keep productive in order to keep consuming, to work in order to buy.” (Pollay
1986). The American Association of Advertising Agencies’ Creative Code
similarly reflects a concern for harming individual consumers in ways that
disrespect them through manipulation or take away their autonomy. (AAACC
codes a-f).
Deception has also been at the forefront of marketing ethics (Corey and
Boone 1990; Murphy & Pridgen 1991). Marketers have routinely “endorse[d] the
position that deceiving or being untruthful to customers is wrong.” (Gaski 1999;
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Lantos 1986) Take for example ethical issues associated with product packaging.
Slack fill, charging for greater volume then that which is perceived, has generally
been treated as a potentially unethical and maybe even illegal practice (Bone &
Corey 2000). Much of the work on product packaging and labeling has mirrored
legal requirements that the FTC and FDA have promulgated (see Fair Package
and Labeling Act of 1967). In 2018, a class action of consumers sued the brand
Tootsie Roll Industries in federal court for deceptive packaging, arguing that the
Junior Mint box has too much air in it and hence is deceptive in terms the amount
of candy in the package. (Biola Daniel v. Tootsie Roll Industries LLC, Case No.
1:17-cv-07541, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York).
The problem with marketing harmful products and deceiving customers is
focused on the harms these activities create to individuals. That is, they take
advantage of particular citizens in the market. In terms of Rawls and his theory of
justice, these practices deny consumers some fundamental rights and
opportunities such that they become unethical for marketers.
Moreover, extant management ethics literature focuses on the individual
wrong discriminating in hiring practices creates. Scholars have argued that
employment discrimination (e.g. Altonji & Blank, 1999; Bielby and Baron 1986;
Pager & Shepard 2008; Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 2010) denies individuals
equality of opportunity, causing them psychological harm, and creating negative
spillovers in non-employment arenas. (e.g. McGinn and Milkman 2012; Lundberg
& Startz 1998; Sunstein 1991; Fiske et al. 2002).
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It is this pre-occupation with individual harms that has created a blind spot
for marketing managers and business ethicists. By only focusing on the potential
of harming individual consumers, marketers ignore the widespread group
oriented harms that can occur when they cater to consumer preferences. It is this
kind of group harm described below that is problematic and occurs precisely
because marketers accommodate consumer preferences.
Part Three: Cultural Harms—the Problem with Catering to Consumer
Preferences

Marketing’s obsession with catering to consumer preferences has created
an often underappreciated type of harm. Marketing to consumer preferences can
create group-based harms that reinforce cultural norms and hierarchies. The
reinforcement of these norms creates cultural imperialism which has been shown
to cause serious social justice problems. This all occurs because consumers take
discriminatory preferences with them into marketplace transactions.
Consumers’ Perverse Preferences
When thinking of discrimination, one often thinks of denying somebody
some fundamental right or treating them differently in social contexts because of
their race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. Discriminatory preferences,
however, are ripe in the marketplace as well. Many consumers take their private
perverse preferences into market transactions. One reason this may occur is due
to implicit biases. Implicit biases have been extensively studied in both
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psychology and marketing (see e.g. Nosek 2001; Williams 1995; Fazio et al
1995). It is these implicit biases that have recently been shown to effect
marketplace transactions.
Several studies have shown that when taking part in online marketplace
transactions, consumers routinely discriminate on race, gender and religion
(Bartlett & Gulati 2016). A recent study using Ebay transactions, show that
buyers preferred buying products from white sellers as opposed to minority
sellers. (Ayres et al 2015; Doleac & Stein 2013; Nardinelli and Simon 1990).
Those studies found that items that were in black hands received 13% fewer
response and 17% fewer offers than those same items in white hands. The
studies also found that online purchasers trust black sellers less than white
sellers and “they are 17% less likely to include their name in e-mails, 44% less
likely to accept delivery by mail, and 56% more likely to express concern about
making a long-distance payment,” with black sellers. (Doleac & Stein 2013).
Other studies have shown that the sharing economic has caused cultural
harms via its discriminatory consumer preferences. Recent studies show using
Air BnB that blacks are discriminated against on both sides of the rental process.
(Edelman & Luca 2014; Cui et al 2016) Black renters are less likely to be
approved by apartment owners, less likely to receive rental requests, and offered
less money for their comparable apartments that white counterparts.
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As an example of how choice based conjoint analysis can elicit perverse
preferences, I ran a simple conjoint focusing on preferences of cars. Included in
the attributes were three levels of car manufacture, three levels of miles per
gallon, three types of car sizes, and three levels of price. I also included an
attribute called “car salesman.” In this attribute I included two names, Jerome (a
traditional black name) and Henry (a more traditional white name). 100
respondents recruited off Amazon Mechanical Turk worked through the choice
conjoint. As one would predict, price was the most important attribute followed by
manufacture, car size, and miles per gallon. The least important attribute was car
salesman. However, there was a strong preference for Henry over Jerome. This
is more evidence of how consumers have implicit or potentially explicit
discriminatory preferences even in market place transactions.
Moreover, advertising research has shown that consumers don’t
necessarily like seeing other identities represented in the ads they see. (Cagley
& Cardozo 1970). For example, studies have shown that whites respond
negatively to ads featuring racial minorities (Kerin 1979; Whittler and DiMeo
1991; Grier and Deshpande 2001; Johnson & Grier 2015; Aaker et al 2000). As I
will argue below catering to these types of preferences leads to problematic
harms that marketing should be cognizant of.
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Cultural Imperialism and Marketing
By focusing on a Rawlsian paradigm, business ethicists have taken a
narrow view of the scope of justice and a limited view of harm. (Singer 2015).
This has led marketers to de-emphasize group-based cultural harms. The
political theorist Iris Marion Young in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990)
has a broader account of the scope of harms and justice that social institutions
should take into consideration.
Central to Young’s argument is that the Rawlsian distributive paradigm is
insufficient to meet the demands of justice. One of her core claims is that this
paradigm:
assumes a single model for all analyses of justice; all situations in which
justice is at issue are analogous to the situation of persons dividing a
stock of goods and comparing the size of the portions individuals have.
(Young 1990: 18).
This concept of distribution entails the idea that an individual has something less
or more than another. It reduces an injustice to something that can be
understood on the individual level such as equality of opportunity. In fact, in the
Rawlsian original position abstract away from their race to demonstrate that
equality of opportunity.
Thus, marketing’s tactics of tailoring to consumer preferences that can
end up discriminating based on race or gender are wrong because they deny
individuals a fundamental opportunity, one that is an important part of a theory of
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justice. That much is clear from the Rawlsian analysis. According to Young,
however, this focus on individual level harm leaves a theory of justice blind to
those kinds of harms or injustices that require appeal to group based categories
such as race or gender.
The notion of marketing to consumer preferences contributes to what
Young calls the harm of “cultural imperialism.” For Young, to experience cultural
imperialism “means to experience how the dominant meanings of a society
render the particular perspective of one’s own group invisible at the same time as
they stereotype one’s group and mark it out as the Other.” (Young 1990: 58-59).
Cultural imperialism occurs when a dominant group’s cultures becomes
the social norm which gives the dominant culture a type of power that sends a
message to those groups outside of the norm. The message is that the dominant
group’s perspectives express the appropriate “experience, values, goals and
achievements” in society (Young 1990 p. 59). Those that are labeled as “others”
(not part of the dominant cultural group) suffer what Young calls “paradoxical
oppression” where certain races, genders, and non-mainstream cultural groups
are both stereotyped as well as “rendered invisible.” (Young 1990 p. 59). This is
a kind of group-based harm and Young makes clear that “mass entertainment
media” which includes “movies, television, magazines and their advertisements”
is a major producer of these dominant meanings. But even in more modern forms
of marketing, where products and services are targeted to those who are most
likely to use them, cultural imperialism may loom large. Groups who do not see
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or interact with products/advertisements can be still harmed by cultural
imperialism. By promoting cultural hierarchies just with those consumers who the
hierarchies appeal to, marketers reinforce the structure of problematic culture
norms (e.g. it is problematic to use stereotypical or harmful imagery even if those
who are not being stereotyped will never see the marketing activities.) In this
way, even ads that use advanced technology to narrowly targeted consumers
cause problems to those who may never be consumers.
In the U.S., the dominant cultural group has taken on the identity of the
straight white male. With cultural imperialism, those not part of this cultural
dominant group experience unique group harms that label those who are not
white, straight, and male as deviant, unimportant, and voiceless. “As a result, the
‘privileged experience’ of white consumers stands as the ‘normal one’ against
which non-whites’ experience is evaluated. In such instances, non-white
communities are clustered into monolithic categories, while the oft privileged
positionalities of white consumers are naturalized and normalized.” (Johnson &
Grier 2017; Grier et al 2017)
It is this harm that Young argues has gone undertheorized in the social
and political realms. Marketing, in addition to other private activities, contributes
to this phenomenon of cultural harm. While most private business decisions like
discrimination of employees does create individual harms, marketing is uniquely
situated to contribute to cultural imperialism. This is because marketing reaches
audiences in a way that internal business decisions that discriminate do not.
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But how do marketers contribute to cultural imperialism? The answer here
lies in the pre-occupation with consumer preferences. To appeal to both relevant
audiences, marketers seek to create products and services that appeal to certain
dominant groups. By focusing on customer preferences (through tailoring
products and advertising), marketers end up mimicking the preferences of the
largest cultural groups, thereby furthering cultural imperialism. Even when they
target consumers based upon market segmentation, the majority of those
consumers still fall into some form of a culturally dominant group. As such, both
mass marketing (commercials, print ads, etc.) and targeted marketing (banner
ads, online advertising, etc.) implicate catering to the cultural majority.
The preferences of the members of the dominant culture can be perverse
and therefore catering to them only promotes the exact type of group harm that
Young advocates should be within the scope of justice. Cultural dominant group
preferences tend to reinforce their dominance. Many consumers have
discriminatory preferences as describe above (they prefer to do business with
only certain races and genders). Others have harmful preferences (they prefer to
see marginalized groups in subservient positions). And still others prefer media
that stereotypes non-dominant cultural group members (many enjoy
advertisements and products that poke fun at non-dominant cultural groups). The
following section provides examples of these types of preferences and how
catering to them creates cultural harms. It is marketing’s contribution to this
cultural harm that has been a blind spot for marketing ethics.
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Tailoring Products/Services to Discriminatory Preferences
When consumer preferences are discriminatory, tailoring products or
services to consumer preferences creates group-based cultural harms.
A concrete example of tailoring to male consumer preferences that
creates cultural harms includes the arguably sexist hiring practices of Hooters.
(Barkacks & Barkacks 2011; Rhee 1997). Hooters is a paradigmatic case of
creating a service tailored to straight male preferences for sexualized women. It
is a restaurant that serves typical American cuisine including wings, burgers and
fries. The restaurant is staffed a by unique set of servers who wear a unique
uniform. Hooters only hires women and encourages them to wear short shorts
and tight tops to extenuate their bodies. These women are generally extremely
thin and must have large breasts—presumably to whet the appetite of the male
patrons. They routinely hire and fire women who do not satisfy the “ideal” body
type of so called “Hooters Girl.” (Bedi 2016)
(http://www.originalhooters.com/careers). This imagery is clearly geared towards
men’s sexual appetite. It appeals to those exact consumers preferences that
marketers care so deeply about. When eating at that restaurant, it appears that
men prefer to be served by women who look like and dress like a Hooters Girl.
Hooters has been criticized heavily for their discriminatory practices,
whether it be gender related to body type related (Bedi 2016; Schneyer 1998).
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These discriminatory practices are wrong for the exact historical reasons
described above—they cause individual harms. Those citizens who are either
fired or not hired due to their bodies or gender are denied some fundamental
opportunity and are treated differently based upon endowed characteristics.
This harm and this wrong is clear enough. But tailoring a service and
product like the “Hooters Girl” to men’s preferences creates a broader cultural
harm. The marketing of Hooters furthers the already problematic heteronormative
perception of women in society. (Colker 1986; Gervais et al 2012; Stankiewicz &
Rosselli 2008) Hooters promotes the cultural agenda that women should be
sexual entertainment for men and the agenda of what the ideal body type of a
women should be.
This amounts to a hijacking of cultural norms by Hooters. By creating a
product that is tailored to men’s preferences, Hooters has promoted cultural
imperialism of the type that Young argues is problematic. By no means is
Hooters the only restaurant chain that does this, several other copy cats (termed
breastaurants) have arisen and are extremely popular all around the world
including The WingHouse Bar & Grill, Bikinis Sports Bar & Grill, Twin Peaks and
the Tilted Kilt Pub and Eatery.
Another important example is the imagery and controversy of Abercrombie
& Fitch’s catering to the preferences of white, affluent, clean cut consumers.
(Hancock 2015; Mcbride 2005; Hanson & Cristina M. Giannantonio 2006).
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Abercrombie & Fitch is a clothing retailer that became very popular with the
teenager crowd in the early 2000s. The company routinely used white imagery
(male and female) in their advertising. This included print and TV ads featuring
no minorities whatsoever for quite some time. But it wasn’t just racial imagery
that personified the brand, Abercrombie also prided itself on having an image of
a clean cut preppy teenager. Of course, this reinforces imagery around whites
because historically they are perceived culturally has cleaner, more refined and
preppy individuals.
This mentality that only preppy white teenagers could wear their clothes
permeated not only through their advertising, but also through their hiring
practices. The company found itself hiring only white men and women who were
very attractive. It found itself requiring men to cut their hair and shave their
beards to create a “clean” look. When a company would hire a minority they
would force them to assimilate to a culturally white image (black men were told to
cut their dreadlocks or they would be fired) (Bedi 2016). Still other times,
Abercrombie would not allow minorities to be front of store employees arguing
that again their customers (white affluent teenagers) did not have a preference to
be served by minorities.
The company found itself in a host of legal troubles, most recently after
not hiring a Muslim woman who refused to take off her hijab. Abercrombie’s
employee policy required that employees not wear any headgear whatsoever,
again to maintain a clean look. (Abercrombie’s Model Group Interview Guide,
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dated June 26, 2008) However, this of course disqualifies Muslim women, Sikh
men, and even some Jewish men from working at the store. For Abercrombie,
this is what sold product. Selling the lifestyle of a white affluent teenager and
creating that imagery through their marketing practices is exactly what their
customers needed to patron the store.
In this case, tailoring their products, through employees, advertising and
general imagery isolated both religious and racial minorities creating a form of
cultural imperialism. Being part of mainstream society was being able to wear the
clothes and live the lifestyle of Abercrombie & Fitch. But that mainstream culture
was defined by white, straight, good looking, preppy values creating a cultural
harm to those who did not fit the mold.

Tailoring Advertising that Creates Cultural Harms
Tailoring advertising to consumers is one reason for the lack of diversity in
advertising (Knobloch-Westerwick and Coates 2006) and stereotypical portrayals
of racial minorities (e.g. Bristor, Lee, and Hunt 1995; Humphrey and Schuman
1984; Coltrane and Messneo 2000) Consider as paradigmatic examples: Uncle
Ben’s rice, a Spanish-speaking Taco Bell dog, or brown face in PopChips.
These advertisements do not harm individual people—as a matter of fact, they
give minorities opportunities to participate in market transactions (e.g.
commercials). But these types of marketing tactics only contribute to stereotypes
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of minorities, who are already invisible in many ways in mainstream US culture.
This form of advertising reinforces cultural hierarchies that portray whites as
normalized and minorities as stigmatized—a case of group-based harms.
Marketers use predominately white, male, heteronormative imagery to
more effectively sell their products. Whereas studies show that diversity in the
workforce may improve a business’ bottom line (e.g. Richard 2000, 2007; Erhardt
2003; Carter 2010) and positively affect group dynamics and task performance
(e.g. Bantel and Jackson 1989; Murray 1989; Pelled 1999), cultural diversity in
advertising may be detrimental to profitability precisely because consumers don’t
prefer it. Including minorities in advertising could lower the purchase likelihood of
non-minorities. (Kerin 1979; Whittler and DiMeo 1991; Grier and Deshpande
2001; Johnson & Grier 2015; Aaker et al 2000). This fear may motivate white
imagery in marketing campaigns. (Puntoni, Vanhamme, and Visscher 2011).
Moreover, as described above, many products affirmatively signal a certain
identity, especially products related to the fashion industry. (Douglas &
Isherwood 1978; Berger & Heath 2007) When those who do not share the same
social identity co-opt the products, this dilutes the signal and therefore decreases
demand of the brand’s products. (Berger & Heath 2007). Berger shows this by
giving popular students Livestrong bracelets and showing how they wear them
less frequently after “nerdy” students co-opt the bracelets.
Given that non-whites respond positively to advertisements that feature
non-white models and reflect non-white identity, (Williams, Qualls, and Grier
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1995) by making advertisements more diverse, marketers may encourage nonwhites to consume their relevant product. This, however, may turn off existing
and potential white customers. In fact, white consumers might actively abandon
certain practices and consumption behaviors simply to avoid signaling to their coethnics an undesirable identity associated with the product. (Berger 2008,
Cooper & Jones 1969). In this way, presenting only white models may effectively
deter minorities from taking part in the brand. (Khan, Lee, Lockshin 2015). Again,
this occurs because marketers cater to preferences of their consumers.
Even when minorities are included in advertising, they are often
stereotyped because this is how majoritarian consumers perceive minorities. By
focusing on these types of problematic representations, marketers make
advertising more effective for the cultural majority because there is easy of
processing. For example, the use of the Asian model minority or the perceptual
foreigner image is easily processed by white consumers because these are the
exact representations in the arena of the cultural majority (Taylor et al 2005;
Jussim 1990). This extension of the stereotype only reinforces the cultural
hierarchy and can have psychological effects on those minorities who do not fit
the stereotype (Graham 1983; Taylor and Lee 1994) Similar types of
stereotypical cultural advertising focus on blackness. (Crockett 2008; Beard
2008). Again, using archetypal minstrel characters permeates cultural
imperialism because it appeals to those who are in the cultural majority.
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But cultural harm need not only befall minorities and women, catering to
heteronormative preferences also contributes to cultural imperialism. In a small
study from 2006, researchers found that almost 50% of consumers said that their
propensity to buy from a brand would be changed if that brand advertised using a
gay family (Borgerson et al 2006). In marketing, scholars who purport to
advocate for diversity in advertising recognize that advertising to the gay
community need be a tailored type of focus that prevents straight culture from
interacting with gay ads. (Greenlee 2001) This ‘solution’ to gay advertising only
further reinforces Young’s cultural hierarchy as it does not promote gay culture in
main stream advertisements.
Empirical studies show that portraying only the culturally dominant groups
in advertising does cause serious harms. Minorities perceive themselves as
further marginalized or “second class” when they are not included in advertising
(Wyatt, Gelb, and Geiger-Oneto 2008; Tsai 2011). Tsai studied gay and lesbian
consumers and their responses to ads that predominately featured gays and
lesbians. She found that when mainstream ads showed gays and lesbians,
members of that cultural group showed more positive self-esteem and felt that
they were part of the mainstream culture. Some respondents commented after
seeing the ads: “I like that visibility and positive representation…We got money.
We contributed to big business. We are part of the mainstream now.” Other
respondents felt that when advertisements included gays and lesbians this meant
a type of recognition as valid consumers and citizens in a way that exclusion did
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not. Borgeson et al have studied the scarcity of gay imagery in advertising, in
particular the lack of representation of the gay family. (Borgerson et al 2006).
Moreover, white advertisements have been shown to affect self-image and selfesteem in negative ways for minorities (Kern-Foxworth 1994; Crocker 1999).
Even when marketers have understood the harms associated with
stereotypes, they have routinely focused on the individual harms associated with
problematic imagery. For example, arguments have been made that stereotypes
offend people who may view them. (Brenkert 2008) This however, is still too
narrow of a conception of harm. What if only those consumers who enjoy the
stereotypes, see them? According to prevailing theory, this is not problematic.
When we expand the scope of harms to group harms, we recognize that even
when individuals who are presented with problematic imagery find it compelling,
it still can be wrong. Understanding this kind of harm assists in broadening the
scope of products and images that cause cultural harms and are hence
problematic. For example, skin lightening cream creates no individual harm, in
fact it is quite in demand by those individuals who use it. Yet, these lightning
creams create cultural harms, by promoting the idea that lighter is better and
hence are problematic. Other accounts of marketing ethics, even those that
advise against stereotypes, do not encompass such problematic products.
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Part Four: Marketing’s Extended Ethical Obligations

I have argued above that marketing’s preoccupation with consumer
preferences can lead to actions that create cultural harms—real harms that a firm
should take into consideration when making marketing decisions. This section
expands upon the normative implications of causing cultural harms. I focus on
three aspects in this section: why marketing as an industry is an important actor
to fight cultural imperialism, what cultural harms are important for the purposes of
my argument, and what steps marketers can take to lower the likelihood of
causing cultural imperialism.
Marketing as an Industry is Poised to Prevent Cultural Imperialism
Marketing ethicists have historically been cognizant of marketing products
that create harms. However, these harms have been focused on individuals.
Whether it is advertising to children, or selling harmful products, marketing is
attuned to not causing their individual consumers harm. This focus on individual
harms has created an ethical blind spot for marketing managers. Expanding the
conception of harm from just individuals to group-based harms illuminates why
tailoring products and services to consumer preferences can be problematic.
In fact, marketing as a business discipline should be particularly sensitive
to group based harms. Individual harms are ubiquitous in several business
disciplines. Management scholars focus on preventing discriminatory harm to
employees (e.g. McGinn and Milkman 2012; Lundberg & Startz 1998; Sunstein
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1991; Fiske et al. 2002) and accounting/finance scholars focus on preventing
harms to shareholders (Rose 2007; Nesbit 1994; Kaplan 2001). These business
disciplines focus in many ways on the impact businesses have internally on the
members of their organizations. Marketing, as a business discipline, is unique in
that its focus has always been outwards. Marketing researchers and managers
care about consumer experiences and how their products effect consumers in
the marketplace. As such, their activities are focused uniquely on all members of
the marketplace. TV spots, print ads, website searches are all ways and
mechanisms to reach millions of consumers. Marketing is successfully exactly
when it permeates society and culture.
In this way, being sensitive to cultural harms is particularity important for
marketers. In the business context, it is in many ways, marketing that helps set
the agenda for what is culturally normal and cultural abnormal. It is through
advertising and products that consumers help define who they are and what part
of society they belong to.
David Schumann emphasizes that marketing has this tendency to set
cultural agendas (Schumann 2004). He argues that advertising can have drastic
effects of reinforcing prejudice in our society. Media’s role in perpetrating
discrimination and cultural imperialism is only a natural bi-product of the power of
marketing. Marketing and media “provide materials out of which we forge our
very identities, our sense of selfhood; our notion of what it means to be a male or
female; our sense of class, of ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality, of
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“us” and “them.” (Kellner 1995) Therefore, it is extremely important for marketing
managers to prevent the dissemination and harms of cultural imperialism as is
this exact discipline that contributes substantially to that harm.
One might argue that it is not in the purview of marketers to care about all
consumers in the market. When we think of marketing ethics, we think about
harm done to those exact consumers that are targeted (e.g. deception,
materialism in children, etc.). Moreover, it seems that these cultural harms exist
precisely when marketers give their important consumers exactly what it is the
consumers want. After all, many of the activities that create cultural harms
described above do so because marketers are focused on one segment of the
market. Advertising that reinforces white, straight males as the norm in society is
in many ways a product of marketing targeted at those exact consumers. Why
then should a marketer care about causing consumers cultural harms, when
these consumers might not even readily care about the firm’s products?
Many ethicists think broadly about a firm’s obligations. Edward Freeman is
the most vocal proponent of this way of conceptualizing obligations. He argues
that the best method of making decisions for companies should take the form of
a stakeholder model. That means that firms should take into consideration how
their actions effect not just shareholders but all people with which the company
interacts. This includes its employees, its consumers, its competitors and the
marketplace writ large (Freeman 1994; Hasnas 1998). Freeman and other
stakeholder theorists would agree that firms should be cognizant of the cultural
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harm that tailoring to consumer preferences causes even if those harms are not
born by the consumers of the firms’ products.
Moreover, marketing has already shown that it can be concerned with
things other than their direct consumers. The environment has been an important
stakeholder for marketers. (Dangelico & Pujari 2010; Miles & Covin 2000)
Reputational benefits to creating sustainable products has been shown to
increase sales. (Ginsberg & Bloom 2004) In addition, companies and
researchers are focusing on products and services that do not harm the
environment, so called green products. (Kalafatis et al 1999)
Effectively then when faced with two options—one option that reinforces
cultural imperialism, and another that does not but creates fewer potential
sales—marketers should take the option that minimizes cultural imperialism. This
is what it means to argue that marketing’s contribution to cultural harms is
unethical.
In addition to a negative ethical obligation to not contribute to cultural
harms, marketers may have an affirmative obligation to further cultural diversity
through their actions. This is because in many ways marketing set the stage for
cultural hierarchy. It is through advertisements, models, and products where
consumers begin to develop conceptions of what is important culture. The power
that marketing has in this vein is evidence that marketing should begin to correct
its previous faults by actively promoting cultural diversity.
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One possible reason that marketers have an affirmative obligation to
promote cultural diversity also draws from the deficiencies of John Rawls.
Rawls’s classic paradigm asks us to abstract away from personal and societal
characteristics to determine what the obligations of institutions are. Many have
criticized this approach as one focused on ideal conditions (i.e. it takes as the
given set of circumstances an ideal world where race and gender, for example,
are not disadvantaged). (Michelman 2003; Farrelly 2007) Young’s account of
cultural harm focuses on non-ideal conditions. That is, she roots her ethical
duties in society as it exists. On her account, the conditions in society do favor
certain cultural norms and we would be wise to take those conditions into
consideration when postulating ethical duties. Businesses should look to “actual
injustices” in order to understand how best to remedy them (Wiens 2012).
Therefore, for marketing’s obligations we should look to non-ideal
conditions as they currently exist. Currently, marketing does promulgate cultural
harms by reinforcing the normalcy of certain cultures (mainly straight white
males). As such, an effective response is not simply to prevent the further
creation of these harms (a classic negative duty that Rawls would proscribe) but
may also be to affirmatively further cultural diversity through their actions to
remedy the status quo of cultural injustices. In effect, the ethical obligation
becomes to challenge cultural hierarchies not just prevent from reinforcing them.
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Which Cultural Harms are Important?
One might wonder which cultural harms on my account are problematic. I have
articulated harms associated with reinforcement of racism, sexism and
homophobia. However, surely other forms of cultural hierarchies exist including
norms that reinforce that certain nationalities or religions are less valued, that the
elderly are less valued, those with certain body types are less valued, and that
certain income/social classes are less valued. Does my account imply that
marketers must prevent their products and message from creating any of these
cultural hierarchies? I don’t seek to elucidate which cultural harms marketers
should be cognizant of in this article. Instead, I simply seek to highlight the issue
that catering to discriminatory preferences although potentially appealing can
create cultural harms.
Some line will have to be drawn however. There will be have to some
cultural harms that marketers should not concern themselves with and others
than they should. Further work should seek to define the cultural harms that are
most important and most readily affected by marketing practices. But not being
able to draw a precise line is not necessarily a weakness of my argument. To
argue this would be a false dichotomy. One may conclude that either marketers
must be sensitize to all forms of cultural harms or sensitive to none, if a line
cannot be drawn. We however, draw these sorts of line all the time in law.
Looking at employment discrimination, only certain classes are protected
(gender, race, ethnicity, handicap, religion and age). There are of course, other
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classes (income, body type, height, etc.) that could be protected as well, yet we
have drawn a line in that area of the law. Similarly, some line will have to be
drawn in the case of cultural harms and marketing ethics, but this article simply
does not broach that question.
What Steps Can Marketers Take to Prevent Cultural Harms?
The purpose of this paper is to highlight and bring attention to the
contribution of marketing to cultural harms, even when they are not intended.
Here I provide some practical guidance on how marketing managers designing
both products and advertisements can avoid creating cultural harms. This is
meant to be a framework with which managers can begin to sensitize themselves
and identify which messages may be problematic.
The ultimate question a manger must ask herself is “Whether the
message created through the products, services, and advertising reinforces
problematic cultural norms?” Simply answering this question is a difficult task,
precisely because it is not one that managers routinely are trained in or cognizant
of. In helping them discover the answer, three questions should be asked in the
process of designing a product, service, or advertisement: Who, Why and What.
--Who is the target demographic of the product/service/advertisement?
This is a very standard market segmentation question. Determining which
consumers a product or message is directed at is an easy task and something
managers routinely do. For example, take a recent Heineken beer
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commercial/product launch—a light calorie beer. An advertisement was created
that showed a light beer passing dark colored actors and residing with a lighter
color women, with the tag line “Sometimes lighter is better.” Based upon the
messaging, it seemed as if the target segment was affluent women who wanted
a light calorie beer. The marketing firm likely tested the product and the message
with a certain demographic and found that the product was preferred by a subset
of the population. For copies of the ad and other seemingly non-problematic
versions of ads see http://adage.com/article/cmo-strategy/heineken-light-slighter-ad-mistake/312887.
--Why is the target demographic attracted to the product/service/advertisement?
Determining which customers are attracted to a certain message or product is a
relatively easy task. But managers should go a step further and question why
that message or product is appealing to that demographic. Does the consumer
find it funny, poignant, sad, exciting, etc.? In addition, why does the consumer
feel that way. Identifying the reasons why which certain products/messages
appeal to consumers is a nuanced approach that will allow managers to better
assess whether the message is problematic in the first instance. This process is
designed to help managers tease out which consumer preferences are
problematic or discriminatory and which are likely to be innocent.
In identifying why a target demographic is attracted to a product/advertisement, a
manger must determine whether or not the preferences implicate cultural norms.
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If no cultural norm is implicated, there is no need to proceed further or be
skeptical of the message. For example, liking an ad that shows a contrast
between dark skin and light beer might be appealing to the marketer, but it does
implicate a cultural norm: that lighter skin is better more desired than darker skin.
Some messages, however, are preferred by consumers and do not implicate any
cultural norms. For example, a message that shows a sleek computer working
well and facilitating word processing or design does not seem to implicate any
cultural norms—a very different message than a beer commercial that promotes
lighter is better. This step of understanding why consumers have the preferences
they do is not necessarily a part of the routine research of managers. Drilling
down to the nuances of why consumers prefer certain messages is critical to
determining whether the message creates cultural harm.
For some products, answering this question is enough to determine whether the
product is problematic. If a marketer takes a nuanced approach to understand
the preference for skin lightening creams, it would be obvious that the product is
appealing to those who want to be lighter, because being lighter is perceived as
more beautiful. Other times, a problematic cultural norm may be implicated, but it
is unclear if the message is reinforcing the norm or challenging it. For those
cases, managers should proceed to the next question.
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--What does the outgroup (non-targeted customers) think of the message?
Once a manager understands what makes the target segment attracted to a
product or service, she must determine whether the message reinforces a
problematic cultural norm or challenges it. In doing this, two aspects of diversity
are important. First, managers should have a culturally diverse set of employees
critically evaluating the messages a company is producing. Doing this will allow
managers more insight into whether the relevant consumer preferences identified
in the previous step reinforce cultural norms. In addition, the messages at issue
should be tested on non-targeted customers. Those that would be considered an
outgroup in this context. If the messaging appeals to a certain group of
consumers and creates cultural harm, it is likely that is will cause another cultural
group some discomfort. A/B testing on groups that may never even see the
products/services is an important step in the process of determining problematic
messages. Often, marketers focus on the consumers that are targeted and
ignore those that may never see or interact with the products/services. But
cultural harms of the sort Iris Marion Young are concerned with often accrue to
groups that are not the targeted audience. For example, it may be the case that
through targeted advertising, only affluent light skinned women would see the
beer ad claiming that “lighter is better.” Identifying the problematic imagery and
message is more readily done when a different, more culturally diverse set of
consumers interacts with the product and imagery. This form of A/B testing is
generally absent in the creation of products/services precisely because
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marketers understand that some consumers who are not targeted may never
interact with the marketing activities, yet it is a critical step of determining
whether or not a message creates cultural harm.

My account of cultural harm also has the upshot of permitting, and even
encouraging marketing activities that predominately feature racial minorities,
women and gay culture in non-stereotypical ways. Certain products or certain
brands might purposefully refuse to use white models in their advertisements
(e.g. FUBU, BET, Univision). At first glance, this too may seem problematic,
because these ads would lack cultural diversity. However, according to Young
and our analysis here, this type of conscious marketing challenges “cultural
imperialism” rather than informing it. Young argues that “removing oppressive
stereotypes [in mainstream culture] of Blacks, Latinos, Indians, Arabs, and
Asians and portraying them in the same roles as whites will not eliminate racism.”
This is because her argument entails that marketers must also provide “[p]ositive
and interesting portrayals of people of color.” (Young 1990: 174). As such, in
order to combat the legacy of cultural imperialism, marketers should consciously
reflect images of cultural diversity in producing services, products and
advertising.
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Conclusion

Marketing, both in research and in practice, has traditionally focused on
delivering products and services that align with consumer preferences. The
thought being that catering to consumer preferences will yield customer
satisfaction and hence increase sales. Blindly catering to preferences however is
an unethical form of marketing practice. Historically, marketing ethics has
focused on causing harms to individual consumers following the works of political
theorist John Rawls. This has explained the previous work on preventing the
marketing of products that cause physical harm to consumers, deceptive
advertising, and marketing to at-risk populations.
This paper has argued for expanding the scope of marketing ethics
concerns to accommodate the potential of group-based cultural harms. It has
used the work and theories of Iris Marion Young to argue that catering to
consumer preferences often leaves certain groups invisible and stereotyped in
mainstream culture. These cultural harms should be part of marketing ethics
going forward and if taken seriously mean that marketers have an obligation to
not create or contribute to those cultural harms. They may even further have any
obligation to promote cultural diversity give how important marketing is to setting
the cultural standard and the current non-ideal state of that exact cultural
standard.
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Further theoretical and normative work should focus on developing this
idea of cultural harms in marketing and calling out certain actions/companies that
do contribute to these harms. Further empirical work should focus on how those
in the non-cultural majority perceive marketing directed towards the cultural
majority and whether changing those marketing activities has psychological
benefits. This kind of work has started to gain traction in marketing research and
there has been a call for marketing researchers to focus more on these issues
(Grier et al 2017). Connecting this work of theory to empirical data on consumer
perceptions of cultural diversity is an important extension of this article.
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